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Independent Orbiter Assessment
CIL Issues Resolution Report
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June, 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was provided by the Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment
using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206,
Instructions for Preparation o_ FMEA and CIL.
Subsystem FMEA/CIL assessments were completed as revised NASA and
prime contractor EMEA/CIL documentation became available. The
MDAC IOA task was brought to an interim conclusion in March,
1988. This resulted in several subsystem assessment reports
being published with open issues. Subsequent task authority was
received that allowed for the resolution of all remaining open
issues involving the critical items list.
This report contains IOA assessment worksheets showing resolution
of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA
FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988 (reference
70). Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue
resolution and rationale.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted NASA to readdress safety
policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the National
Space Transportation System (NSTS). MDAC is providing an
independent assessment of the proposed post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL
for completeness and technical accuracy.
The MDAC was initially tasked in June 1986 to conduct an
independent analysis and assessment on twenty subsystems.
Subsequently, in April 1987, eight additional subsystems were
added which provided complete coverage of all standard Orbiter
equipment. Table 2-1 provides a listing of the Orbiter and GFE
subsystems identified by NASA to the National Research Council,
Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Committee.
Table 2-i
ORBITER AND GFE SUBSYSTEMS
ORIGINAL TWENTYSUBSYSTEMS (JUNE 1986)
o Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C)
o Data Processing System (DPS)
o Backup Flight System (BFS)
o Nose Wheel Steering (NWS)
o Instrumentation (INST)
o Electrical Power, Distribution & Control (EPD&C)
0 Main Propulsion System (MPS)
o Fuel Cell Powerplant (FCP)
o Power Reactant Supply & Distribution System (PRS&D)
o Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS)
o Reaction Control System (RCS)
o Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
o Hydraulics & Water Spray Boiler (HYD & WSB)
o Atmospheric Revitalization System (ARS)
o Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control
System (ARPCS)
0 Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU)
o Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU)
o Landing & Deceleration (L&D)
o Hydraulic Actuators (HA)
o Remote Manipulator System (RMS)
ADDITIONAL EIGHT SUBSYSTEMS (APRIL 1987)
o Communications and Tracking (C&T)
o Displays and Controls (D&C)
o Orbiter Experiments (OEX)
o Pyrotechnics (PYRO)
o Purge, Vent and Drain (PV&D)
o Mechanical Actuation System (MAS)
o Active Thermal Control System (ATCS), Life Support
System (LSS), and Airlock Support System (ALSS)
o Crew Equipment (CE)
The IOA analysis approach is summarized in the following steps
1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the assessment of the NASA
and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
I.I Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define Subsystem Analysis Diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure Events Definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA Analysis Data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
As a result of the preceding steps, general project assumptions
and ground rules (Appendix B) were developed to amplify and
clarify instructions in NSTS 22206. Also, subsystem specific
assumptions and ground rules were defined.
3.0 CIL ISSUES RESOLUTION WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
The IOA analysis process produced an initial total of 10,735
independently derived failure modes and 4,513 potential critical
items. As of 9 March 1988, when the Interim Report was published
(reference 70), a total of 3,193 FMEA issues and 1,637 CIL
assessment issues remained open due to a lack of revised
subsystem FMEA/CIL documentation to be assessed. Several
subsystems were still in the Rockwell FMEA/CIL revision process
during the first quarter of 1988. The IOA assessment results
were fully documented in separate subsystem reports (references
36 through 69) and summarized in the Interim Report.
Subsequently, MDAC received revised CIL documentation and was
able to resolve all CIL issues. Out of 1,693 CIL issues, NASA
accepted 304 recommendations and IOA withdrew 1,369 issues. As a
result, all issues with safety and mission implications were
resolved.
Appendix C includes the revised IOA assessment worksheets
reflecting the resolution of the open CIL issues. Resolution
rationale is presented in the "Remarks" section at the bottom of
each assessment worksheet.
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The number of assessment worksheets differs in many cases from
the number of CIL issues shown in the FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim
Report. This difference stems from the fact that there is not
always a one-to-one correspondence of IOA failure modes to NASA
failure modes.
The following subsystems have been excluded from this report
since they had no outstanding CIL issues remaining at the time of
publication of the interim report.
o Fuel Cell Powerplant
o Hydraulic Actuators
o Displays and Controls
o Guidance, Navigation and Control
o Orbiter Experiments
o Auxiliary Power Unit
o Backup Flight System
o Electrical Power Distribution and Control
In addition, the Manned Maneuvering Unit was omitted. This was
due to NASA indefinitely deferring its review of the Manned
Maneuvering Unit FMEA/CIL.
4.0 CONCLUSIONS
This report, as a companion volume to the Independent Orbiter
Assessment Final Report, MDAC Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA88003-47,
dated 16 September 1988, is intended to provide resolution and
rationale closing all open CIL assessment issues. In summary,
the NASA and Prime Contractor post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation
assessed is believed to be technically accurate and
complete. No assessment issues remain that have safety
implications.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
A-I
ACRONYMS
ABS
ACA
ACIP
ADI
ADP
ADS
ADTA
ALCA
AMCA
AOA
AOS
APC
APU
ARCS
ARPCS
ARS
ASA
ATCS
ATO
ATVC
B&AS
BF
BFC
BFS
BITE
C&W
CCB
CCC
CCTV
CCU
CIL
CIU
CNTLR
COAS
COMM
CPU
CRIT
CWS
D&C
DAP
DCM
DCN
DDU
DEU
DFI
DHE
DMA
DOD
DPS
DSC
- Ammonia Boiler System
- Annunciator Control Assembly
- Aerodynamic Coefficient Instrumentation Package
- Attitude Direction Indicator
- Air Data Probe
- Audio Distribution System
- Air Data Transducer Assembly
- Aft Load Control Assembly
- Aft Motor Control Assembly
- Abort-Once-Around
- Acquisition of Signal
- Aft Power Controller
- Auxiliary Power Unit
- Aft Reaction Control System (Subsystem)
- Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control System
- Atmospheric Revitalization System
- Aerosurface Servo Amplifier
- Active Thermal Control Subsystem
- Abort-To-Orbit
- Ascent Thrust Vector Control
- Brakes and Antiskid
- Body Flap
- Backup Flight Control
- Backup Flight System
- Built-In Test Equipment
- Caution and Warning
- Change Control Board
- Contaminant Control Cartridge
- Closed-Circuit Television
- Crew Communications Umbilical
- Critical Items List
- Communications Interface Unit
- Controller
- Crew Optical Alignment Sight
- Communication
- Central Processing Unit
- Criticality
- Caution and Warning System
- Displays and Controls
- Digital Autopilot
- Display and Control Module
- Document Change Notice
- Display Driver Unit
- Display Electronic Unit
- Development Flight Instrumentation
- Data-Handling Electronics
- Deployed Mechanical Assembly
- Department of Defense
- Data Processing System (Subsystem)
- Dedicated Signal Conditioner
A-2
ACRONYMS
ECLSS
EI
EIU
EMU
EPA
EPDC
EPG
EPS
ET
EVA
EVCS
FC
FCA
FCL
FCOS
FCP
FCS
FDA
FDM
FES
FFSSO
FLCA
FM
FMCA
FMD
FMEA
FPC
FRCS
FSM
FSS
FSSR
FSW
GAS
GFE
GMT
GNC
GPC
GSE
GSTDN
HDC
HEX
HIRAP
HIU
HPFTP
HPOT
HUT
HW
HX
HYD
- Environmental Control and Life Support System (Subsystem)
- Entry Interface
- Engine Interface Unit
- Extravehicular Mobility Unit
- Environmental Protection Agency
- Electrical Power, Distribution and Control
- Electrical Power Generator
- Electrical Power System
- External Tank
- Extravehicular Activity
- Extravehicular Communications System
- Fuel Cell
- Flow Control Assembly
- Freon Coolant Loop
- Flight Control Operating System
- Fuel Cell Power (Plant)
- Flight Control System
- Fault Detection and Annunciation
- Frequency Division Multiplexing
- Flash Evaporator System
- Forward Fuselage Support System for OEX
- Forward Load Control Assembly
- Failure Mode
- Forward Motor Control Assembly
- Frequency Division Multiplexer
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Forward Power Controller
- Forward Reaction Control System (Subsystem)
- Fault Summary Message
- Flight Support Structure
- Flight Systems Software Requirements
- Flight Software
- Get-Away Special
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Greenwich Mean Time
- Guidance, Navigation, and Control
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Ground Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network
- Hybrid Driver Controller
- Heat Exchanger
- High-Resolution Accelerometer Package
- Headset Interface Unit
- High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
- High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
- Hard Upper Torso
- Hardware
- Heat Exchanger
- Hydraulics
A-3
ACRONYMS
ICM
ICMS
ICOM
ICRS
IFM
IMU
IOA
IOM
IUS
IVA
JSC
KBD
LCA
LCC
LCVG
LEH
- Interface Control Module
- Intercom Master Station
- Intercommunications
- Intercom Remote Station
- In-Flight Maintenance
- Inertial Measurement Unit
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Input/Output Module
- Inertial Upper Stage
- Intravehicular Activity
- Johnson Space Center
- Ku-Band Deploy
- Load Controller Assembly
- Launch Control Center
- Liquid Cooling and Ventilation Garment
- Launch/Entry Helmet
LNDG/DECEL - Landing and Deceleration
LPS
LRU
LSS
LTA
MADS
MAS
MCA
MCC
MCDS
MDAC
MDM
MEC
MECO
MET
MGSSA
MIA
MLG
MM
MMU
MMU
MPL
MPM
MPS
MS
MSBLS
MSK
MTU
MUX
NASA
NGSSA
NGTD
NLG
NSI
- Launch Processing System
- Line Replaceable Unit
- Life Support Subsystem
- Lower Torso Assembly
- Modular Auxiliary Data System
- Mechanical Actuation System
- Motor Control Assembly
- Mission Control Center (JSC)
- Multifunction CRT Display System
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Engine Controller
- Main Engine Cutoff
- Mission Elapsed Time
- Main Gear Shock Strut Assembly
- Multiplexer Interface Adapter
- Main Landing Gear
- Major Mode
- Manned Maneuvering Unit
- Mass Memory Unit
- Minimum Power Level (65%)
- Manipulator Positioning Mechanism
- Main Propulsion System (Subsystem)
- Mission Specialist
- Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System
- Manual Select Keyboard
- Master Timing Unit
- Multiplex
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Nose Landing Gear Shock Strut Assembly
- Nose Gear Touch Down
- Nose Landing Gear
- NASA Standard Initiator
A-4
ACRONYMS
NSP
NSTS
NWS
OBS
OEX
OI
OMRS D
OMS
OTB
OWDA
P/L
PASS
PBI
PBM
PCA
PCI
PCM
PCMMU
PCN
PCS
PDU
PFR
PHS
PI
PIC
PLB
PLBD
PLS
PLSS
PMS
PRCB
PRCBD
PRCS
PRD
PROM
PRSD
PRSDS
PSA
PSA
PSP
PTT
PV&D
QD
R/BPA
RAM
RCS
RFCA
RFI
RGA
- Network Signal Processor
- National Space Transportation System
- Nose-Wheel Steering
- Operational Bioinstrumentation System
- Orbiter Experiments
- Operational Instrumentation
- Operational Maintenance Requirements &
Specifications Document
- Orbital Maneuvering System
- Orbiter Timing Buffer
- Operational Water Dispenser Assembly
- Payload
- Primary Avionics Software System
- Push-Button Indicator
- Payload Bay Mechanical
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Pulse Code Modulation
- Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit
- Page Change Notice
- Pressure Control System
- Power Drive Unit
- Portable Foot Restraint
- Personal Hygiene Station
- Payload Interrogater
- Pyro Initiator Controller
- Payload Bay
- Payload Bay Door
- Primary Landing Site
- Portable Life Support Subsystem
- Propellant Management Subsystem
- Program Requirements Control Board
- Program Requirements Control Board Directive
- Primary Reaction Control System (jet)
- Payload Retention Device
- Programmable Read-Only Memory
- Power Reactant Storage and Distribution
- Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System
- Power Section Assembly
- Provision Stowage Assembly
- Payload Signal Processor
- Push-to-talk
- Purge, Vent & Drain
- Quick Disconnect
- Rudder/Pedal Brake Assembly
- Random Access Memory
- Reaction Control System
- Radiator and Flow Control Assembly
- Radio Frequency Interference
- Rate Gyro Assembly
A-5
ACRONYMS
RHC
RHS
RI
RJD
RM
RMS
RPA
RPC
RPTA
RSB
RTD
RTLS
RTS
RVDT
SBTC
SCB
SCM
SCU
SCU
SDM
SEADS
SFOM
SFP
SGLS
SILTS
SM
SMM
SOP
SOS
SPA
SPFA
SPI
SRB
SSA
S SME
SSMEC
SSO
SSSH
ST
STDN
STS
TACAN
TAL
TCS
TD
TDRS
THC
THC
TPS
TVC
- Rotation Hand Controller
- Rehydration Station
- Rockwell International
- Reaction Jet Driver
- Redundancy Management
- Remote Manipulator System
- Rudder Pedal Assembly
- Remote Power Controller
- Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly
- Rudder Speed Brake
- Resistance Temperature Device
- Return-to-Launch-Site
- Remote Tracking Station
- Rotary Variable Differential Transformer
- Speed Brake Translation Controller
- Steering Control Box
- System Control Module
- Sequence Control Unit
- Service and Cooling Umbilical
- Startracker Door Mechanism
- Shuttle Entry Air Data System
- Shuttle Flight Operations Manual
- Single Failure Point
- Space Ground Link System
- Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensor
- Systems Management
- Solar Maximum Mission
- Secondary Oxygen Pack
- Space Operations Simulator
- Steering Position Amplifier
- Single Point Failure Analysis
- Surface Position Indicator
- Solid Rocket Booster
- Space Suit Assembly
- Space Shuttle Main Engine
- SSME Controller
- Space Shuttle Orbiter
- Space Shuttle Systems Handbook
- Star Tracker
- Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network
- Space Transportation System
- Tactical Air Navigation
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Thermal Control System (Subsystem)
- Touch Down
- Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
- Thruster Hand Controller
- Translation Hand Controller
- Thermal Protection System
- Thrust Vector Control
A-6
ACRONYMS
UCD
UEA
UHF
VDM
VRCS
WBSC
WCCS
WCCU
WMS
WP
WRS
WSB
- Urine Collection Device
- Unitized Electrode Assembly
- Ultra High Frequency
- Vent Door Mechanism
- Vernier Reaction Control System (jet)
- Wide-Band Signal Conditioner
- Window Cavity Conditioning System
- Wireless Crew Communications Umbilical
- Waste Management System
- Working Paper
- Water Removal Subsystem
- Water Spray Boiler
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 2_206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, were used with the following amplifications and
additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AO__AA- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AT__OO- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBL_ (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
M C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
M_SSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP__SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/$AFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, was employed with the following
amplifications and additions.
i.
Q
,
.
q
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware Cincluding firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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.
•
i0.
Ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-10205
02-1-079-1
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10205
DOWNLOCK BUNGEE
W. WEISSINGER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO SEE 10206
THE DOWNLOCK BUNGEE IS A MECHANICAL DEVICE THAT IF BENT OR
JAMMED IN THE EXTENDED POSITION COULD CAUSE A FORCE THAT WOULD
UNLOCK THE LOCK BRACE.
HYDRAULICS - THE EXTEND/RETRACT HYD ACTUATOR IS THE ONLY
REDUNDANT ITEM. WHEN THE VEHICLE IS SHUT DOWN POST LANDING THERE
IS NO REDUNDANCY. THE NASA FMEA/CIL DOES NOT CONSIDER APU
SHUTDOWN OCCURRING BEFORE CREW EGRESS.
NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF NLG OVERCENTER DOWNLOCK
BUNGEE STRUCTURAL FAILURE FROM 3/IR TO 2/IR. UPON FURTHER
ANALYSIS THE IOA AGREES THAT PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING (A RESULT
OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE) IS NOT A SINGLE FAILURE POINT; THEREFORE,
THE IOA CRITICALITY SHOULD BE DOWNGRADED FROM i/I TO 2/IR.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-10206
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-079-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
10206
DOWNLOCKBUNGEE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA]
[ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE 10205. THERE WILL BE NO COMPLICATIONS THROUGHOUT THE
LANDING UNTIL AFTER THE VEHICLE IS SHUTDOWN. ONCE THE HYDRAULICS
SYSTEM IS DEACTIVATED THERE IS NO SYSTEM TO HOLD THE LOCK BRACE
IN POSITION, AND A GUST OF WIND, AN IMPACT FROM APPROACHING
VEHICLES OR MOVEMENT INSIDE THE VEHICLE COULD CAUSE NLG COLLAPSE.
A COLLAPSE OF THE NLG WOULD CAUSE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND A
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE. THIS SITUATION CAN BE BYPASSED BY
INSTALLING THE LANDING GEAR SAFETY PINS IN THE LOCK BRACE PRIOR
TO HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1 SHUTDOWN.
NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF NLG OVERCENTER DOWNLOCK
BUNGEE STRUCTURAL FAILURE FROM 3/IR TO 2/IR. UPON FURTHER
ANALYSIS THE IOA AGREES THAT STRUCTURAL FAILURE IS NOT A SINGLE
FAILURE POINT; THEREFORE, THE IOA CRITICALITY SHOULD BE
DOWNGRADED FROM i/i TO 2/IR.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-10210
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
10210
STEERING DISCONNECTLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
NOT CONSIDERED BY THE NASA FMEA/CIL
NASA FMEA 02-IA-076-I ADDRESSES STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE
NOSE LANDING GEAR TORQUE ARMS. THE IOA CONSIDERS THE STRUCTURAL
FAILURE OF THE STEERING DISCONNECT LOCK TO BE COVERED BY THE NASA
FMEA. THE IOA AND NASA/RI AGREE ON A i/I CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LDGDEC-I0211
02-1-076-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10211
TORQUE ARM ASSEMBLY
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
A NOSE WHEEL SLAPDOWN WHERE THE NOSE WHEEL ROTATES BEYOND A
SAFE ANGLE OF ATTACK WILL CAUSE AN IMMEDIATE COLLAPSE OF THE NLG.
NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF FMEA 02-ia-076-I FROM
2/IR TO i/I; THEREFORE, THE IOA AND NASA/RI ASSESSMENTS ARE IN
COMPLETE AGREEMENT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LDGDEC-I0212
NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10212
NOSE WHEEL RETAINING BOLT
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ADDITIONAL DATA UNCOVERED AFTER STUDY COMPLETION ELIMINATES
THIS IOA EVALUATION REPORT
REPORT DATE 19 JUNE 1988 C.I-6
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LDGDEC-10213
NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10213
AXLE
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NOT EVALUATED BY NASA
NASA FMEA 02-IA-075-I ADDRESSES STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE
NOSE LANDING GEAR SHOCK STRUT AND OUTER CYLINDER AND LOAD
CARRYING MEMBERS. FROM FURTHER ANALYSIS THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT
THE NOSE LANDING GEAR AXLE IS PART OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR SHOCK
STRUT ASSEMBLY AND THEREFORE CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY
THE FMEA. THERE IS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IOA AND NASA/RI THAT
THE CRITICALITY IS I/i AND THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE IS A CIL
ITEM.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ I /1 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LDGDEC-10220
NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10220
TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE WORST CASE SCENARIO FOR A BROKEN TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
WOULD BE A FAILURE THAT WOULD PREVENT THE NLG FROM LOCKING IN THE
EXTENDED POSITION. SIMILAR TO MLG TORQUE TUBE ASSY REF 02-1-010-
I.
NASA/RI CREATED A NEW FMEA (02-1A-Ill-I) FOR THE NOSE
LANDING GEAR TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY FAILURE MODE. THE IOA AND
NASA/RI ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE CRITICALITY IS 1/l.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
LDGDEC-10221
02-1-077-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10221
DRAG BRACE
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ALSO SEE 10202, 10203
[x]
[ ]
FMEA 02-1-077-1 COVERS THE NLG DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY BUT IT
DOES NOT COVER THE CRITICAL PARTS INDIVIDUALLY. IOA AGREES WITH
CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-10402
02-6-H01-A02
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
10402
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM i. IF THE SYSTEM FAILS,
THEN THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR
VEHICLE. THE GEAR HAS A PYRO BACKUP TO UNLOCK THE GEAR. IF IT
FAILS, THE GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY. NASA INCORPORATED THIS FMEA/CIL
INTO-AO1 WHICH IS A HIGHER CRITICALITY. AN EXTERNAL LEAK IS
STILL A LEAK REGARDLESS OF THE FAILURE MODE. ISSUE RESOLVED; IOA
ACCEPTS HIGHER CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-10416
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-HOI-A04
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
10416
NLG EXTEND/ RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B BECAUSE HYD SYS 1 FLUID IS NOT
CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS THE FAILURE IS NOT
DETECTED. HOWEVER, FAILURE IS DETECTED WHEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED,
THUS PASSING SCREEN. NASA INCORPORATED THIS FMEA/CIL INTO-AOI,
WHICH IS A HIGHER CRITICALITY-I 1.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-II003
02-6-H03-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
11003
NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM i. IF SYSTEM FAILS, THEN
THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
PYRO BACKUP. HYDRAULIC FLUID IS NOT CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR
ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE CANNOT BE DETECTED - FAILS REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B.
WITHDRAW. THIS FAILURE IS INCORPORATED INTO-H03-1. A LEAK
IS A LEAK REGARDLESS OF THE FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-II004
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
11004
NLG UPLOCKACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
GEAR WILL NOT RELEASE HYDRAULICALLY. THE PYRO BACKUP WILL
RELEASE THE GEAR ONE SECOND AFTER THE COMMAND TO DEPLOY IF THE
LANDING GEAR HOOK IS NOT OPEN. THIS FAILURE IS THE SAME AS AN
"EXTERNAL HYDRAULIC LEAK" FOR CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, IT CAN
THIS FAILURE IS THE SAME AS AN "EXTERNAL HYDRAULIC LEAK" FOR
CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, IT CAN BE COMBINED WITH MDAC 11005.
WITHDRAW.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-II005
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H03-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
11005
NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE HYD SYS. 1 FLUID IS NOT
CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE NOT DETECTED.
HOWEVER, FAILURE IS DETECTED WHEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED, THUS PASSING
SCREEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-III02
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-097-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
11102
NLG B/U PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE MECH
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
SYSTEM IS NOT USED UNLESS HYDRAULIC UPLOCK RELEASE SYSTEM
FAILS. IF THIS SYSTEM FAILS WHEN CALLED ON TO FUNCTION, THERE IS
NO OTHER BACKUP.
ACCORDING TO THE REDUNDANCY RULES IN 22206, THIS SYSTEM IS A
2/IR CRITICALITY BUT, A FAILED HYDRAULICS SYSTEM ACTIVATES THIS
SYSTEM. THIS SYSTEMS FAILURE WILL NOT ACTIVATE THE HYDRAULICS.
THERE IS A LINEAR OPERATION HERE THAT WILL NOT ALLOW
REVERSAL OF THE ROLES.
THE CRITICALITY DIFFERENCE IS ATRIBUTED TO DIFFERENT
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE REDUNDANCY RULES IN NSTS 22206. FROM
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI ASSIGNMENT OF
CRITICALITY 2/IR AND THE RETENTION OF THE FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-II302
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
11302
NLG DOORBUNGEEASSIST ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: W.WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BUNGEE COULD POSSIBLY INADVERTENTLY RELEASE CAUSING THE NLG
DOOR TO CRACK OPEN.
NASA/RI CREATED A NEW FMEA (02-IA-I02-2) WHICH ADDRESSES
PREMATURE RELEASE OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR BOOSTER BUNGEE-DOOR
EXTENSION ASSIST. THE ASSIGNED CRITICALITY IS i/i WHICH IS IN
AGREEMENT WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20202
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20202
SHOCK STRUT PISTON ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA FMEA COVERS ONLY THE LOSS OF NITROGEN.
NASA/RI PREPARED A NEW FMEA, 02-IA-001-3, TO ADDRESS THE
LOSS OF MLG SHOCK STRUT HYDRAULIC FLUID. THE i/I CRITICALITY IS
IN AGREEMENT WITH THE IOA CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-20203
02-1-001-2
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
2O203
SHOCK STRUT PISTON ASSEMBLY
W. WEISSINGER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA ASSUMES LOSS OF NITROGEN ELASTIC MEDIUM ONLY.
HYD FLUID IS CONSIDERED AS CAPABLE OF ABSORBING A LANDING
SHOCK PER MC621-0011.
IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI 3/3 CRITICAILTY FOR LOSS OF
NITROGEN PRESSURE IN THE MLG SHOCK STRUT. LOSS OF HYDRAULIC
FLUID IS A DIFFERENT FAILURE MODE AND IS COVERED BY SEPARATE
FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20205
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20205
AXLE KIT - MLG
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 02-1A-001-1 ADDRESSES STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE MAIN
LANDING GEAR SHOCK STRUT INNER AND OUTER CYLINDER AND LOAD
CARRING MEMBERS. FROM FURTHER ANALYSIS THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT
THE MAIN LANDING GEAR AXLE IS PART OF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR SHOCK
STRUT ASSEMBLY AND THEREFORE CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY
THE FMEA. THERE IS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IOA AND NASA/RI THAT
THE CRITICALITY IS i/i AND THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE IS A CIL
ITEM.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-20209
02-1-008-1
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20209
DOWN LOCK BUNGEE
W. WEISSINGER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNTIL THE SAFETY PIN IS INSTALLED IN THE LOCK BRACE THERE IS
A MAJOR PROBLEM. FROM THE TIME THE HYD SYS 1 IS SHUTDOWN UNTIL
THE SAFETY IS INSTALLED THERE IS AN IMINENT THREAT OF COLLAPSE.
NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF MLG OVERCENTER DOWNLOCK
BUNGEE STRUCTURAL FAILURE FROM 3/IR TO 2/IR. UPON FURTHER
ANALYSIS THE IOA AGREES THAT THE DOWNLOCK BUNGEE IS NOT A SINGLE
FAILURE POINT; THEREFORE, THE IOA, CRITICALITY SHOULD BE
DOWNGRADED FROM i/I TO 2/IR.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LDGDEC-20210
02-1-008-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
20210
DOWN LOCK BUNGEE
W. WEISSINGER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ NA]
IN]
B
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
C
[ P ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA EFFECTS/RATIONALE.
NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF MLG OVERCENTER DOWNLOCK
BUNGEE STRUCTURAL FAILURE FROM 3/IR TO 2/IR. UPON FURTHER
ANALYSIS THE IOA AGREES THAT THE DOWNLOCK BUNGEE IS NOT A SINGLE
FAILURE POINT; THEREFORE, THE IOA CRITICALITY SHOULD BE
DOWNGRADED FROM I/i TO 2/IR.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20402
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G09-A02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20402
MLG EXTEND/ RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM I. IF SYSTEM FAILS, THEN
THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
THE GEAR HAS A PYRO BACKUP TO UNLOCK THE GEAR. IF IT FAILS, THE
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY. NASA INCORPORATED THIS FMEA/CIL
WITH-A01 WHICH IS A HIGHER CRITICALITY (I/I). AN EXTERNAL LEAK
IS A LEAK REGARDLESS OF THE FAILURE MODE. ISSUE RESOLVED; IOA
ACCEPTS HIGHER CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-20416
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-GO9-A04
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
20416
MLG EXTEND/ RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE HYD SYS 1 FLUID IS NOT
CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS, THE FAILURE IS NOT
DETECTED. HOWEVER, FAILURE IS DETECTED WHEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED,
THUS PASSING SCREEN. NASA INCORPORATED THIS FAILURE INTO-A01
WHICH IS A i/I.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-21003
02-6-G08-A02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
21003
MLG UPLOCKACTUATOR
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM i. IF SYSTEM FAILS, THEN
THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
PYRO BACKUP. HYDRAULIC FLUID IS NOT CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR
ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE CANNOT BE DETECTED - FAILS REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B. HOWEVER, FAILURE IS DETECTED WHEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED,
THUS PASSING SCREEN.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-21004
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
21004
MLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
GEAR WILL NOT RELEASE HYDRAULICALLY. THE PYRO BACKUP WILL
RELEASE THE GEAR ONE SECOND AFTER THE COMMAND TO DEPLOY IF THE
LANDING GEAR HOOK IS NOT OPEN. THIS FAILURE IS THE SAME AS AN
"EXTERNAL HYDRAULIC LEAK" FOR CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, IT CAN
BE COMBINED WITH MDAC 21003. WITHDRAW.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-21005
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G08-A01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
21005
MLG UPLOCKACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE HYD. SYS. 1 FLUID IS NOT
CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE NOT DETECTED.
HOWEVER, FAILURE IS DETECTED WHEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED, THUS PASSING
SCREEN.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-30104
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30104
BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CLOSED LVDT WILL RESULT IN HALF-WHEEL LOCKUP ON LANDING WITH
ANTISKID OFF, CAUSING POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE. ANTISKID WILL
PROVIDE PROTECTION IF ON.
FROM FURTHER ANALYSIS THE IOA WITHDRAWS THIS FAILURE MODE AS
A CIL ISSUE. A SHORT CIRCUIT WILL ONLY CAUSE LOSS OF BRAKING
CAPABILITY FROM ONE OF FOUR CHANNELS TO ONE WHEEL. AFTER THE
FIRST FAILURE, TWO SUCCESS PATHS REMAIN. THE ANTISKID CIRCUIT
IS A NON LIKE SYSTEM THAT OFFERS PROTECTION AGAINST BRAKE SYSTEM
CONTROL FAILURES. A FAILURE OF THE ANTISKID SYSTEM SHOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER FAILURE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LDGDEC-30105
02-1-025-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30105
BRAKE CIRCUIT
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH BRAKE PRESSURE BEING APPLIED AT TOUCHDOWN, TIRE ON THAT
WHEEL WILL PROBABLY BLOW RIGHT AFTER TOUCHDOWN CAUSING POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE.
NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF THE BRAKE CIRCUIT
FAILURE FROM 2/IR TO i/I. THIS RESULTS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE IOA
ASSIGNED CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-30111
02-1-033-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
30111
HYD PRESS REG (SYS 2 & 3)
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE 30129. SHOULD BE A 2 BECAUSE IF STANDBY SYSTEM HAD SOME
FAILURE VERY LITTLE BRAKING WOULD BE AVAILABLE - ONLY FROM LAST
REMAINING SYSTEM.
FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE 3/IR AND THAT THERE IS
NO METHOD TO READILY DETECT THE FAILURE (FAILS B SCREEN);
THEREFORE, THE HARDWARE FAILURE REMAINS AS A CIL ITEM. THIS IS
IN AGREEMENT WITH THE REVISED NASA/RI EVALUATION OF FMEA
02-IB-033-2.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
LDGDEC-30112
02-1-030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30112
INLET FILTER, HYD MODULE ASSY
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO CIL AVAILABLE. SHOULD BE 2/IR BECAUSE IF STANDBY FILTER
GETS CLOGGED, HALF BRAKING CAPABILITY TO BRAKES IN THAT WHEEL
WELL WILL BE LOST. SEE 30130.
ISSUE RESOLUTION:
FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE CRITICALITY
OF THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE 3/IR AND THAT THERE IS NO METHOD
TO READILY DETECT THE FAILURE (FAILS B SCREEN); THEREFORE, THE
HARDWARE FAILURE REMAINS AS A CIL ITEM. THIS IS IN AGREEMENT
WITH THE REVISED NASA/RI EVALUATION OF FMEA 02-IB-030-I.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LDGDEC-30116
02-1-029-2
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30116
BY - PASS VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/ FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS VALVE HAS VERY LITTLE VALUE SINCE HYD. SYS. 1 IS
SHUTDOWN AND LINE CLOSED OFF DURING FLIGHT. FLUID NOT AVAILABLE
TO VALVE UNTIL JUST PRIOR TO LANDING. IF BOTH PRIMARY AND
STANDBY SYSTEMS FAIL TO OPEN BOTH SYSTEMS MUST BE SO SLUGGISH
THAT
THE BRAKES ON THIS CONTROL MODULE WON'T FUNCTION. ALSO SEE
30131.
FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE
CRITICALITY FOR THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE 3/3 WHICH AGREES WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION. THERE ARE TWO BYPASS VALVES IN EACH MODULE
ASSEMBLY. THEY ALLOW FLUID TO CIRCULATE AND WARMUP THE RETURN
LINE. EVEN IF BOTH VALVES FAIL TO OPEN, THERE WILL STILL BE
ADEQUATE BRAKING.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-30124
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-066-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
30124
STATORS, ROTORS, CLIPS
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[P] [P] [P] [ ]*
[P] [P] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IF LOCKUP OCCURS AT HIGH SPEED, TIRE WILL BLOW CAUSING
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.
FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE DOWNGRADED FROM i/I TO
2/IR. LOSS OF BRAKING CAPABILITY ON ONE WHEEL (25% OF TOTAL) IS
PROBABLE EFFECT RATHER THAN A BLOWN TIRE WHICH COULD CAUSE
DIRECTIONAL CONTROL PROBLEMS. THIS IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE
REVISED NASA/RI EVALUATION OF FMEA 02-IE-066-2.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30129
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-033-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
30129
HYD PRESS REG (SYS I)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
SEE 30111 - DIFFERENT BECAUSE THIS DOESN'T PASS REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B.
FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE 3/IR AND THAT THERE IS
NO METHOD TO READILY DETECT THE FAILURE (FAILS B SCREEN);
THEREFORE, THE HARDWARE FAILURE REMAINS AS A CIL ITEM. THIS IS
IN AGREEMENT WITH THE REVISED NASA/RI EVALUATION OF FMEA 02-IB-
033-2.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-30130
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-030-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
30130
INLET FILTER, HYD MODULEASSY (SYS i)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE 30112 - SYS 1 DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE CRITICALITY
OF THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE 3/IR AND THAT THERE IS NO METHOD
TO READILY DETECT THE FAILURE (FAILS B SCREEN); THEREFORE, THE
HARDWARE FAILURE REMAINS AS A CIL ITEM. THIS IS IN AGREEMENT
WITH THE REVISED NASA/RI EVALUATION OF FMEA 02-IB-030-2.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-30131
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS
30131
BY - PASS VALVE, HYD MODULEASSY (SYS 2&3)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[P] [ P] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE 30116. SINCE CIRC PUMPS ARE ON FOR THESE SYSTEMS
ONORBIT, THIS FAILURE COULD BE DETECTED INFLIGHT.
FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE
CRITICALITY FOR THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE 3/3 WHICH AGREES WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION. THERE ARE TWO BYPASS VALVES IN EACH MODULE
ASSEMBLY. THEY ALLOW FLUID TO CIRCULATE AND WARMUP THE RETURN
LINE. EVEN IF BOTH VALVES FAIL TO OPEN, THERE WILL STILL BE
ADEQUATE BRAKING.
REPORT DATE 19 JUNE 1988 C. 1-35
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31105A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2205-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31105
TRANSIENT SUPPRESSORDIODE (4), 3 AMPS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND IOA RECOMMENDS
DOWNGRADING THE CRITICALITY AND REMOVING THIS ITEM FROM CIL.
LOSS OF TWO DIODES IS LOSS OF A HYDRAULIC SYSTEM WHICH THEN
RESULTS IN 3/IR CRITICALITY.
IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A
MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31114
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2115-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31114
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH (2), LANDING GEAR DOWN
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT MANUAL "ON" CONTROL FROM CONTROL BUS TO
LATCHING RELAYS FOR LANDING GEAR DOWN CIRCUIT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A
MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31115B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2116-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31115
LANDING GEAR TOGGLE SWITCH, S13
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION, FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT
ON SUBSYSTEM. CB60 REMAINS "OFF" UNTIL NEEDED. HOWEVER, IOA
ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31117
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2117-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31117
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH, LDG GR ARM, 4PDT, ILLUMINATED
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT MANUAL "ON" CONTROL FROM CONTROL BUS TO
LATCHING RELAYS FOR LANDING GEAR ARM CIRCUIT. IOA DOES NOT
CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND IOA RECOMMENDS: (i)
CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS, IT FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B,
AND LOWERING THE CRITICALITY TO 3/IR. HOWEVER, IOA ACCEPTS THE
MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A MORE CONSERVATIVE
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31125
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2302-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
EPD&C
31125
GENERALPURPOSEFUSE (5 AMP)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND IOA
RECOMMENDS: CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS SINCE IT FAILS
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B, AND DOWNGRADING THE CRITICALITY TO 3/IR.
TRANSFERRED OUT OF LANDING/DECEL. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE
NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A MORE CONSERVATIVE
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31137
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2303-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31137
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (2), 5 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2303-1
AND IOA RECOMMENDS CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO CONFORM TO
NSTS 22206.
FURTHER ANALYSIS INDICATES DOWNLIST PARAMETERS ARE AVAILABLE TO
DETERMINE STATUS OF THIS STRING, THUS INDICATING FUSE IS
FUNCTIONING
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31145
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2406-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31145
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1
HDC, IOA RECOMMENDS: DOWNGRADING CRITICALITY TO 3/3 AND COMBINING
FMEA'S 2406-1 AN 2406-2 TOGETHER TO CONFORM TO NSTS 22206.
IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A
MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31154
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2409-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31154
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER _TYPE 3)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 3 HDC'S.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE FMEA TO THE CIL BECAUSE IT FAILS
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
FURTHER ANALYSIS INDICATES DOWNLIST PARAMETERS ARE AVAILABLE TO
DETERMINE STATUS OF THIS FUNCTION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31161
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31161
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER(TYPE I)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE UNCOVERED TYPE 1 HDC TO NASA'S
FMEA/CIL. THE HDC CONNECTS MAIN BUS DC POWER TO THE "WOW2"
CIRCUITS WITHIN BRAKE/SKID CONTROL BOX A.
MOVED TO NOSE WHEEL STEERING EPD&C.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31166
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-200200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31166
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE III)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA INCORPORATED FMEA INTO OTHER FMEAS. SEE ASSESSMENT LDGDEC-
31164.
NASA HAS NOW GENERATED SEPARATE FMEAS AND THIS IS NOW COVERED BY
05-6BA-2410-2. NASA CONCURS WITH SCREEN B FAILING.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31168A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2501-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CIRCUITS
EPD&C
31168
LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'ARM' CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FMEA 2501-2 HAS A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE (SHORTS TO GROUND) AND
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FMEA AND ITS CIL BE DELETED. NASA
INCORPORATED 2501-2 INTO 2501-1.
NASA HAS DELETED FMEA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31170A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2502-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CIRCUITS
EPD&C
31170
LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'DOWN' CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FMEA 2502-2 AND ITS CIL BE DELETED, BECAUSE
IT HAS A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE: SHORTS TO GROUND. NASA
INCORPORATED 2502-2 INTO 2502-1.
NASA HAS DELETED FMEA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31183
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2578-I
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31183
ITEM: DIODE, 12 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE ISOLATION DIODE TO NASA'S CIL. THE
DIODE ISOLATES THE K6 & K7 ARM RELAYS FROM THE K8 DOWN RELAYS;
DIODE IS ALSO IN THE CIRCUIT SUPPLYING POWER TO THE LDG GEAR
CONTROL VALVE AND THE LDG GEAR DUMP CONTROL VALVE. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF POWER TO OPERATE THESE VALVES
IF THE DIODE FAILS OPEN.
FURTHER ANALYSIS INDICATES DOWNLINK PARAMETERS ARE AVAILABLE TO
DETERMINE STATUS OF THIS STRING, THUS INDICATING IF DIODE FAILS
OPEN, PASSING THE SCREEN. NASA UPGRADED THIS FAILURE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31205
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2241-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31205
GENERALPURPOSEFUSE (8), 2 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE GENERAL
PURPOSE FUSES. IOA RECOMMENDS: CHANGING THE REDUNANCY SCREENS
SINCE IT FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B, AND DOWNGRADING FMEA TO A
3/IR. HOWEVER, IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY
WHICH IS DUE TO A MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY
GROUNRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31210
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2249-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31210
CURRENTLIMITING RESISTOR (4), 1.21K, 2W
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE RPC
CONTROL CIRCUIT CURRENT LIMITING RESISTORS. IOA RECOMMENDS (I)
CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS (2) ADDING FMEA 2249-1 TO THE CIL
SINCE IT FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
FURTHER ANALYSIS INDICATES DOWNLIST PARAMETERS ARE AVAILABLE TO
DETERMINE STATUS OF STRING, THUS INDICATING THAT RESISTOR MUST BE
FUNCTIONING.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENTID: LDGDEC-31213A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2096-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31213
GENERALPURPOSERELAY, NONLATCHING(2)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P 3 [ F 3 [ P ] [ X 3
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FMEA 2096-2 BE DELETED, BECAUSE IT IS A NON-
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE (SHORTS TO GROUND) FOR THE NONLATCHING
RELAYS. NASA INCORPORATED FMEA 2096-2 INTO 2096-3.
THIS FMEA DELETED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31221
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2107-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31221
TOGGLE SWITCH, DPST
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P] [ P] [ P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDS DOWN-
GRADING FMEA 2107-3 TO CRITICALITY 3/3.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31225
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2106-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C
31225
TOGGLE SWITCH, DPST
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE "MAIN C" TOGGLE
SWITCH AND IOA RECOMMENDS CHANGING THE CRITICALITY TO 3/3.
NASA CRITICALITY IS NOW 3/3.
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SECTION C. 2
PURGE, VENT AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
C.2-1
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENTID: PV&D-9035A
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332404-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9035
DESICCANT/FILTER OUTERCAVITY
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY, BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (J. JANNEY/ES3) ON 3/31/88. FORWARD/MID
WINDOWS DO NOT EXCEED DESIGN MARGINS FOR THIS FAILURE MODE,
ACCORDING TO ROCKWELL INT. ANALYSIS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9036
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9036
ITEM: TUBING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A PV&D FMEA/CIL WAS NOT FOUND FOR THE FAILURE MODE, WCCS OUTER
TUBING CLOGS. TUBING CLOGS WOULD DEGRADE WCCS DEPRESSURIZATION
AND REPRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY WITH POSSIBLE THERMAL PANE
RUPTURE.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA THAT THIS FAILURE MODE IS NOT CREDIBLE,
EXCLUDING HUMAN ERRORS DURING REFURBISHMENT, AS DISCUSSED WITH
NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (J. JANNEY/ES3) ON 3/31/88 AND 4/4/88.
PORTS ARE PROTECTED BY DEBRIS SCREENS. LINE IS CHECKED FOR FREE
FLOW DURING VEHICLE TURNAROUND.
REPORT DATE 19 JULY 1988 C.2-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENTID: PV&D-9037A
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332406-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDACID: 9037
ITEM: TUBING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY, BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (J. JANNEY/ES3) ON 3/31/88. FORWARD/MID
WINDOWS DO NOT EXCEED DESIGN MARGINS FOR THIS FAILURE MODE,
ACCORDING TO ROCKWELL INT. ANALYSIS.
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SECTION C.3
PYROTECHNICSSUBSYSTEM
C.3-i
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: PYRO-4702
NASA FMEA #: 02-4-RI03-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4702
GUILLOTINE ASSY, PYROTECHNIC
LEAD ANALYST: W. W° ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA/CIL HAS BEEN DELETED BY NASA.
DELETION.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA CONCURS WITH
REPORT DATE 19 JULY 1988 C.3-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4703
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4703
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NEW NASA FMEA # P2-4H-RI05-1 HAS BEEN GENERATED FOR THIS
ASSESSMENT, CRITICALITY 2/IR NNP. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 19 JULY 1988 C.3-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4704
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4704
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[ NA]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RECOMMEND THAT CRITICALITY BE UPGRADED.
NEW NASA FMEA # P2-4H-RI06-1 HAS BEEN GENERATED FOR THIS
ASSESSMENT, CRITICALITY 3/IR NNP. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 19 JULY 1988 C.3-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: PYRO-4706
NASA FMEA #: 02-4-RI04-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4706
RELEASENUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA/CIL HAS BEEN DELETED BY NASA. IOA CONCURS WITH
DELETION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: PYRO-4707
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4707
PRESSURECARTRIDGE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NEW NASA FMEA # P2-4H-RI05-1 HAS BEEN GENERATED FOR THIS
ASSESSMENT, CRITICALITY 2/IR NNP. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS
CRITICALITY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4708
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PYROTECHNICS
4708
PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NEW NASA FMEA # P2-4H-RI07-1 HAS BEEN GENERATED FOR THIS
ASSESSMENT, CRITICALITY i/I NNN. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 19 JULY 1988 C.3-7

SECTION C.4
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AND LIFE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM
C.4-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-II00
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1101-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
Ii00
H2 SEPARATOR(2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE CAPABILITY TO REMOVE H2 FROM THE WATER IS LOST, AND THERE IS
NO OTHER WAY TO PROVIDE FOR THIS LOSS. THE PRESENCE OF H2 IN THE
WATER MAY CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH FES AND DUMP OPERATIONS, AND CREATE
CREW ILLNESS. THIS MAY HAVE POTENTIAL MISSION IMPACT
SPECIALLY FOR THE EMU/EVA MISSION - RECHARGING THE EMU WATER
TANKS WITH THE H2/H20 MIXTURE IS HAZARDOUS AND SHOULD NOT BE
DONE. ALTERNATE WATER LINE PLUS FCP RELIEF LINE ARE AVAILABLE TO
EXPEL WATER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCIES WITH THIS FAILURE WILL
DEAD-HEAD FUEL CELLS, THUS POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
WITHDREW ISSUE.
H2 SEPARATOR PROBLEMS ON PREVIOUS MISSIONS (H2 IN SUPPLY H20)
WERE CONCERNS BUT BY PROCEDURAL MANAGEMENT THE MISSIONS WERE NOT
TERMINATED. MAJOR PROBLEM (WORST CASE) H20 FLOODING THE FUEL
CELL LIST CRIT REFLECTING HARDWARE CRITICALITY OF 3.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-II00A
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1132-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
II00
H2 SEPARATOR(2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE CAPABILITY TO REMOVE H2 FROM THE WATER IS LOST, AND THERE IS
NO OTHER WAY TO PROVIDE FOR THIS LOSS. THE PRESENCE OF H2 IN THE
WATER MAY CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH FES AND DUMP OPERATIONS, AND CREATE
CREW ILLNESS. THIS MAY HAVE POTENTIAL MISSION IMPACT
SPECIALLY FOR THE EMU/EVA MISSION - RECHARGING THE EMU WATER
TANKS WITH THE H2/H20 MIXTURE IS HAZARDOUS AND SHOULD NOT BE
DONE. ALTERNATE WATER LINE PLUS FCP RELIEF LINE ARE AVAILABLE TO
EXPEL WATER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCIES WITH THIS FAILURE WILL
DEAD-HEAD FUEL CELLS, THUS POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
THIS FMEA WAS CONSIDERED SAME AS 06-2-1101-1 FOR THE FAILURE MODE
STUDIED, AND MAY THEREFOR BE COMBINED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. H2 SEPARATOR PROBLEMS ON PREVIOUS MISSIONS (H2
IN SUPPLY H20) WERE CONCERNS BUT BY PROCEDURAL MANAGEMENT THE
MISSIONS WERE NOT TERMINATED. MAJOR PROBLEM (WORST CASE) IS H20
FLOODING CELL LIST CRIT REFLECTING HARDWARE CRITICALITY OF 3.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-II01
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1101-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
ll01
H2 SEPARATORS(2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/ FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT SEE HOW THE FAILURE OF THIS ITEM WILL HAVE ANY
EFFECT ON THE OPERATION OF THE RADIATORS OR AMMONIA BOILER IN
ORDER TO LOOSE TOTAL COOLING CAPABILITY. LOSS OF WATER TO
REPLENISH THE TANKS, WILL FORCE MISSION TO BE SHORTED
(FLIGHT RULE 9-24). SINCE ADDITIONAL WATER WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE
FOR ON-ORBIT FES USE AND CREW REQUIREMENT. FUEL CELLS WILL NOT
BE DEAD-HEADED SINCE THIS FAILURE WILL ALWAYS RELIEVE THE WATER
OUT.
UPDATE TO NEW CRITICALITY.
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER A NEW CRITICALITY WAS AGREED UPON. THE
CRITICALITY IS DERIVED UPON A SCENERIO WHERE H20 LEAKAGE TO THE
VACUUM VENT DUCT CAN CAUSE UNCONTROLABLE BUILDUP OF ICE AT THE
OUTLET PORT WHICH CAN SEVERLY DAMAGE VEHICLE STRUCTURE DURING
ENTRY. EVEN IF THE FORMATION WERE FREED FROM THE VEHICLE VIA RMS
OR EVA THE BUILDUP COULD NOT BE CONTROLLED WHILE PREPARING FOR
ENTRY SINCE THE FUEL CELLS MUST CONTINUE TO OPERATE.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-I102
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1101-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1102
H2 SEPARATORS(2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ASSESSMENT IS BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT: - WATER WILL FLOW
THROUGH TO THE TANKS; - LOSS OF ONE SEPARATOR IS SIGNIFICANT.
THE BACKUP SEPARATOR IS NOT ADEQUATE TO REMOVE ALL OF THE
HYDROGEN (WORST CASE). THE INABILITY TO REMOVE H2 (WITH WATER
FLOWING) WILL HAVE POTENTIAL MISSION IMPACT AS EXPLAINED IN MDAC-
Ii00.
WITHDRAW ISSUES. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
THE GREATEST CONCERN IS H2 IN EMU H20. FIRST FAILURE MEANS THE
H2 CONCENTRATION WILL INCREASE. SECOND FAILURE (2ND SEPARATOR)
MEANS FURTHER PROBLEMS. IF WATER MANAGEMENT PROCEDURALLY ALLOWS
H2 INTO THE EMU SOURCE TANK C, PROBLEMS CAN BE EXPECTED AND
LOSS OF CREWMAN IS POSSIBLE.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-II05
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
I105
MICROBIAL FILTER (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1233. THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND
FITTINGS.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H20 IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-II06
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1106
MICROBIAL FILTER QUICK DISCONNECT (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1233. THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND
FITTINGS.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H20 IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1110
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
lll0
TANKS INLET ISOLATION VALVE (4)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1233. THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND
FITTINGS.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H20 IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-III3
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1165-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1113
TANKS OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE (4)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1235.
FITTINGS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE.
THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND
IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOOSE THE FES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-I135
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1123-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1135
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES (FCP WATER LINES) WITH THIS
FAILURE WILL STILL PROVIDE TANK A ULLAGE TO MANAGE THE WATER.
MISSION TERMINATION IS EMMINENT, RETURN ON TANKS C AND D, OR JUST
TANK A. ALTERNATE FCP LINE WILL NOT PROVIDE HYDROGEN
REMOVAL. IOA CONSIDERED BOTH RELIEF VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS-SEE
FMEA 06-2-1141 (LS-II35A).
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING DANGER TO
CREW/VEHCILE.
THE NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERS THE FAILURE OF THE CAPABILITY TO
REMOVE H20 FROM THE FUEL CELLS WHICH REQUIRES FOUR FAILURES
BEFORE THE FUEL CELLS FLOOD. THIS FAILURE SHOULD HAVE MISSION
EFFECTS BEFORE THE CREW/VEHICLE LOSS EFFECTS CAN OCCUR. IN THE
STRICTEST SENSE, THE FAILURE SHOULD BE A 2R, BUT THE NASA
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH IS UNDERSTOOD.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C. 4-i0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-II35A
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1141-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1135
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES (FCP WATER LINES) WITH THIS
FAILURE WILL STILL PROVIDE TANK A ULLAGE TO MANAGE THE WATER.
MISSION TERMINATION IS EMMINENT, RETURN ON TANKS C AND D, OR JUST
TANK A. ALTERNATE FCP LINE WILL NOT PROVIDE HYDROGEN
REMOVAL. IOA CONSIDERED BOTH RELIEF VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS-SEE
FMEA 06-2-1123-1 (LS-I135).
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING DANGER TO
CREW/VEHCILE.
THE NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERS THE FAILURE OF THE CAPABILITY TO
REMOVE H20 FROM THE FUEL CELLS WHICH REQUIRES FOUR FAILURES
BEFORE THE FUEL CELLS FLOOD. THIS FAILURE SHOULD HAVE MISSION
EFFECTS BEFORE THE CREW/VEHICLE LOSS EFFECTS CAN OCCUR. IN THE
STRICTEST SENSE, THE FAILURE SHOULD BE A 2R, BUT THE NASA
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH IS UNDERSTOOD.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-II
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-II35B
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1156-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
i135
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES (FCP WATER LINES) WITH THIS
FAILURE WILL STILL PROVIDE TANK A ULLAGE TO MANAGE THE WATER.
MISSION TERMINATION IS EMMINENT, RETURN ON TANKS C AND D, OR JUST
TANK A. ALTERNATE FCP LINE WILL NOT PROVIDE HYDROGEN
REMOVAL. THE FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS ONE LINES & FITTINGS
ANALYSIS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING DANGER TO
CREW/VEHCILE.
THE NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERS THE FAILURE OF THE CAPABILITY TO
REMOVE H20 FROM THE FUEL CELLS WHICH REQUIRES FOUR FAILURES
BEFORE THE FUEL CELLS FLOOD. THIS FAILURE SHOULD HAVE MISSION
EFFECTS BEFORE THE CREW/VEHICLE LOSS EFFECTS CAN OCCUR. IN THE
STRICTEST SENSE, THE FAILURE SHOULD BE A 2R, BUT THE NASA
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH IS UNDERSTOOD.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-I136
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1123-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
I136
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT THAT THE FUEL CELLS WILL BE
DEAD HEADED AFTER R. VALVE FAILURE. CHECK VALVES IN THE FCP
WATER LINE WILL PREVENT BACK FLOW TO THE CELLS. FES OPERATION
WILL BE MAINTAINED BY COMBINED WATER IN TANKS A AND B DRAWING
APPROXIMATELY 80 LB/HR OF WATER. FAILURE OF THE RELIEF VALVES IN
THE FCP LINE ARE CONSIDERED UNASSOCIATED WITH THE FAILURE OF 1.5
PSID VALVE. NO PROBLEM IS ANTICIPATED POST MECO. FUNCTIONAL
LOSS (NO C.V.) WILL RESULT IN FLOW OF WATER THRU THE FCP VENT
LINE FOR 8-10 MINUTES DURING PRE-MECO. IOA CONSIDERED BOTH
VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS-SEE FMEA 06-2-1141-2 (LS-II36A).
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING HARDWARE CRITICALITY
OF 2. EVEN THOUGH THE CHECK VALVES WILL KEEP BACKFLOW FROM
ENTERING THE FUEL CELLS THE HEAD PRESSURE CREATED FROM THE ASCENT
ACCELERATIONS CAN KEEP H20 FROM EXITING THE FUEL CELL BY
THE NORMAL H20 LINES. IF THIS OCCURS AND THE FUEL CELL RELIEF IS
PLUGGED THE 2/IR SITUATION EXISTS.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-I137
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1132-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1137
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1233. THE FMEA CONSIDERED SEVERAL ITEMS IN ONE LINES
AND FITTINGS ANALYSIS.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H20 IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-II40
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1130-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1140
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-II40A
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1131-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1140
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-I142
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1130-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1142
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.
REPORT DATE 30 JUNE 1988 C.4-17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-II42A
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1131-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1142
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS ; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-I144
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1130-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1144
CAP, GSE QD (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.
REPORT DATE 30 JUNE 1988 C. 4-19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1144A
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1131-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
i144
CAP, GSE QD (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-I154
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1165-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1154
CROSSOVER VALVE (i)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J° SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1235 FOR REMARKS. THE FMEA CONSIDERED SEVERAL ITEMS IN
ONE LINES AND FITTINGS ANALYSIS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOOSE THE FES.
THE VALVE CONSTRUCTION IS SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES WOULD HAVE TO
TAKE PLACE TO GIVE A LEAK THAT AFFECTS BOTH SIDES OF OUTLET
SYSTEM AND THUS CAUSE A FES LOSS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-I167
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1165-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1167
ISOL VALVE, FES B LINE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1235 FOR REMARKS. THE FMEA COVERED SEVERAL ITEMS INTO
ONE ANALYSIS FOR LINES AND FITTINGS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOOSE THE FES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1183A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2033-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1183
SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (i)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
ZOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ J [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS WAS ATTEMPTED.
UPDATE TO NEW CRITICALITY.
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER A NEW CRITICALITY WAS AGREED UPON. THE CRITICALITY IS
DERIVED FROM THE INLET SIDE H20 SYSTEMS LEAKS RESULTING IN FREE
H20 IN THE CABIN WHICH IS A 2/2 CRITICALITY. IN THE CASE OF THE
GALLY THE LINE IF LEAKING CAN BE ISOLATED VIA A QUICK DISCONNECT
WHICH IS CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN ISOLATING THE LEAK.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-I184
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2033-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1184
SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPED.
UPDATE TO NEW CRITICALITY.
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER A NEW CRITICALITY WAS AGREED UPON. THE CRITICALITY IS
DERIVED FROM THE INLET SIDE H20 SYSTEMS LEAKS RESULTING IN FREE
H20 IN THE CABIN WHICH IS A 2/2 CRITICALITY. IN THE CASE OF THE
GALLY THE LINE IF LEAKING CAN BE ISOLATED VIA A QUICK DISCONNECT
WHICH IS CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN ISOLATING THE LEAK.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-I189
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2005-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1189
CIRCUIT BREAKER, GALLEY VALVE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
UPDATE TO NEW CRITICALITY.
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER A NEW CRITICALITY WAS AGREED UPON. THE CRITICALITY IS
DERIVED FROM THE INLET SIDE H20 SYSTEMS LEAKS RESULTING IN FREE
H20 IN THE CABIN WHICH IS A 2/2 CRITICALITY. IN THE CASE OF THE
GALLY THE LINE IF LEAKING CAN BE ISOLATED VIA A QUICK DISCONNECT
WHICH IS CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN ISOLATING THE LEAK.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-I193
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1165-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1193
DUMP ISOL VALVE (i)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO THE CREW MODULE OR OUTSIDE TO THE
MIDBODY UNLESS THE LEAK IS STOPPED BY SHUTTING OFF THE TANKS A
AND B OUTLET VALVES AND X-OVER VALVE. IN THIS CASE, THE USE OF
A/L SUPPORT (EVA MISSION) AND TWO TANKS ARE LOST FROM THE
WATER MANAGEMENT - MISSION IMPACT. NO REDUNDANCY EXISTS TO
COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS. ALSO, LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE
REDUNDANCIES (FESB, FCP RELIEF) WITH THIS FAILURE RESULTS IN
CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO CABIN - FCP OPERATING. THIS FMEA
INCLUDES SEVERAL ITEMS INTO ONE ANALYSIS FOR LINES AND FITTINGS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE. LEAKS IN THE
OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES INLET) CAN WITH A
SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY
FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND RADIATORS ARE THEN
AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO
FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOOSE THE FES.
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wAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1210
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VD-2028-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1210
SWITCH, DUMP VALVE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE.
DUMP MAY BE CONTROLLED VIA DUMP ISOLATION VALVE AND THE
CONTINGENCY COLLECTION DEVICE IS AVAILABLE FOR SUBSEQUENT WASTE
WATER MANAGEMENT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1228
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1135-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1228
QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT KNOW OF THE CAP. BASED ON THE SAME RATIONING AS 06-
2-1124-2, HYDROPHOBIC FILTER, FOR WHICH THE WATER WILL LEAK INTO
THE CABIN, THIS SHOULD BE 3/2R. LOSS OF FUNCTION WITH NO CREW
INTERVENTION WILL RESULT IN CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER
(TANK B ONLY) INTO THE CABIN. ALSO, THE DUMP WITH X-TIE CAN
STILL BE ACHIEVED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOOSE THE FES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1228A
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1162-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1228
QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE (i)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT KNOW OF THE CAP. BASED ON THE SAME RATIONING AS 06-
2-1124-2, HYDROPHOBIC FILTER, FOR WHICH THE WATER WILL LEAK INTO
THE CABIN, THIS SHOULD BE 3/2R. LOSS OF FUNCTION WITH NO CREW
INTERVENTION WILL RESULT IN CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER
(TANK B ONLY) INTO THE CABIN. ALSO, THE DUMP WITH X-TIE CAN
STILL BE ACHIEVED. THIS FMEA INCLUDES SEVERAL ITEMS INTO LINES
AND FITTINGS ANALYSIS-SEE FMEA 06-2-1135-2 (LS-1228).
WITHDRAW ISSUE.
THIS ASSESSMENT WAS MISTAKENLY MADE BETWEEN THE CONTINGENCY
CROSSTIE BETWEEN THE SUPPLY & WASTE H20 SYSTEMS AND THE FOUR-WAY
CROSS-FITTING ON THE SUPPLY WATER INLET LINES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-1233
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1132-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1233
LINES AND FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE FMEA ABOUT THE FAILURES OF THE
RADIATOR AND ABS. THESE ITEMS ARE NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE ITEM
BEING STUDIED. CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO THE MID-BODY OR
CREW MODULE - LEAK CANNOT BE ISOLATED WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE
FCP.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE IF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H20 IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1233A
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1162-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1233
LINES AND FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE FMEA, ABOUT THE FAILURES OF THE
RADIATOR AND ABS. THESE ITEMS ARE NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE ITEM
BEING STUDIED. CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO THE MID-BODY OR
CREW MODULE - LEAK CANNOT BE ISOLATED WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE
FCP.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE IF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H20 IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1234
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1156-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1234
LINES AND FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FOR LEAKAGE BETWEEN THE A/B AND B/C RELIEF VALVES: I) CONTINUOUS
FLOW OF FCP (PRIME/ALTER) TO CREW CABIN - NO WAY TO ISOLATE LEAK
WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE FUEL CELLS, 2) TANKS C/D AVAILABLE FOR
RETURN WITH EXISTING LEAK.
FOR LEAKAGE DOWNSTREAM OF THE B/C RELIEF VALVE: - TANKS C AND D
COULD BE ISOLATED, AND TANK B KEPT LOW IN ORDER TO ISOLATE THE
LEAKAGE - LESS SEVERE THAN PREVIOUS CASE.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOSE THE FES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1235
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1165-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1235
LINES AND FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEAKAGE UPSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS C/D TO BE SHUT
DOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE B, AND TWO
TANKS RESERVE; - TANKS A AND B AND FES FEEDLINE A AVAILABLE.
LEAKAGE DOWNSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS A AND B TO BE
SHUTDOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE A,
PRIMARY DUMP, X-TIE FUNCTION, AND A/L SUPPORT; - ONLY TWO TANKS
AVAILABLE PLUS FES FEEDLINE B.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOSE THE FES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LS-1235A
06-2-1164-2
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LIFE SUPPORT
1235
LINES AND FITTINGS
M.J. SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEAKAGE UPSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS C/D TO BE SHUT
DOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE B, AND TWO
TANKS RESERVE; - TANKS A AND B AND FES FEEDLINE A AVAILABLE.
LEAKAGE DOWNSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS A AND B TO BE
SHUTDOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE A,
PRIMARY DUMP, X-TIE FUNCTION, AND A/L SUPPORT; - ONLY TWO TANKS
AVAILABLE PLUS FES FEEDLINE B.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H20 SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOSE THE FES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-1255X
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1103-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
1255
LINES AND FITTINGS, H2 VENT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE LOSS OF FUNCTION PLUS THIS FAILURE WILL ONLY RESULT IN
INABILITY TO REMOVE H2 FROM WATER - WATER FROM FCP STILL FLOWS TO
THE TANKS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
THE GREATEST CONCERN IS H2 IN EMU H20. FIRST FAILURE MEANS THE
H2 CONCENTRATION WILL INCREASE. SECOND FAILURE (2ND SEPARATOR)
MEANS FURTHER PROBLEMS. IF WATER MANAGEMENT PROCEDURALLY ALLOWS
H2 INTO THE EMU SOURCE TANK C, PROBLEMS CAN BE EXPECTED AND
LOSS OF CREWMAN IS POSSIBLE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2040
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0435-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2040
WCS TO WWS QD (i)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ S ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW BUT ALSO INCLUDES ARS LINES.
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE QD BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION
OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA
ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT.
THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA
ANALYSIS. WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB
AND UCD ARE ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS
REDUNDANCY IN THE STRICKEST SENSE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2040A
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0443-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2040
WCS TO WWS QD (I)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE QD BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION
OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA
ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT.
THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA
ANALYSIS. WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB
AND UCD ARE ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS
REDUNDANCY IN THE STRICKEST SENSE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2044
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0435-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2044
WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE (i)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARI CKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE DYNATUBE BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION
OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA
ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT.
THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA
ANALYSIS. WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB
AND UCD ARE ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS
REDUNDANCY IN THE STRICKEST SENSE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-2044A
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0443-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2044
WCSTO WWSDYNATUBE(i)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE DYNATUBE BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION
OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA
ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT.
THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA
ANALYSIS. WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB
AND UCD ARE ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS
REDUNDANCY IN THE STRICKEST SENSE.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-39
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2048
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0401-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2048
MANUAL VENT VALVE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
IOA COMMENT: IF THE VALVE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE DEVELOPS SUCH THAT
THE AIR FLOW IS DOWNSTREAM OF THE VALVE CONTROLLER (PAST 2 SEALS)
THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE WOULD BE POSSIBLE DUE TO
UNCONTROLLED CABIN PRESSURE LOSS IF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION
VALVE DID NOT FUNCTION TO RESTRICT THE AIR FLOW. THE RECOMMENDED
CRITICALITY WOULD BE 3/IR PNP.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING
CONDITION. WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. IF THE
VALVE LEAKS THE ONLY REDUNDANCY LEFT IS THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION
VALVE. THUS CRITICALITY IS 2/IR.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-2126
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0314-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2126
WASTETANK N2 HYDROPHOBICFILTER (i)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: INTERNAL LEAKAGE
IOA COMMENT: THE FAILURE OF THE FILTER IS NO CRITICALITY CHANGE,
HOWEVER IF THE LOSS OF THE BELLOWS OCCURS THEN THE FCB AND UCD
MUST BE USED AS REDUNDANT SUPPLIES WHICH MAY REQUIRE TERMINATION
OF THE MISSION BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT UCD SUPPLIES PAST
3-DAYS USAGE. THE NEW CRITICALITY SHOULD BE 3/2R FNP.
THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS WAS DUE TO NO DETAILED
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGERS REGARDING THE
REDUNDANT PATHS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT, AS STATED IN
PREVIOUS IOA REMARKS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2131
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0420-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2131
GSE FILL AND PLUG (i)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARI CKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE
IOA COMMENT: IF THE LEAKAGE DEVELOPS AFTER GROUND SERVICING AND
THE CAP, AS SECONDARY SEAL, ALSO FAILS, THEN A POTENTIAL FOR LOSS
OF LIFE OCCURS DUE TO CABIN PRESSURE LOSS FOR A CRITICALITY OF
3/IR FFP.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE CONDITION OF A POTENTIAL CABIN
ATMOSPHERE LEAK, IF A SECOND FAILURE OCCURED IN THE REDUNDANCY
STREAM, TO BE A LIFE CRITICAL CONDITION.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY CORRECT. IF THE IOA FAILURE
OCCURS THE LEAK RATE WOULD BE SUCH THAT THE CABIN PRESSURE COULD
BE MAINTAINED EASILY, BASED UPON LINE SIZE AND CONSTRUCTION OF
THE QD AND CAP SEALING CAPABILITIES. THUS MISSION LOSS SHOULD
BE WORST CASE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-2136
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0438-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2136
DUMPLINES, FITTINGS, JOINTS AND UNIONS
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
IOA COMMENT: THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE DUMP LINE PRODUCES A
LOSS OF MISSION WITH NO CHANGE IN CRITICAL EVENTS.
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY FOR THE WASTE WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS AND ADD 3/IR PPP CRTICALITY FOR SUPPLY WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL OTHER WASTE WATER
DUMP COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-2137
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0438-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2137
DUMP LINES, FITTINGS AND CONNECTIONS
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW.
IOA COMMENT: THE RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE DUMP LINE PRODUCES A LOSS
OF MISSION WITH NO CHANGE IN CRITICAL EVENTS.
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY FOR THE WASTE WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS AND ADD 3/IR PPP CRTICALITY FOR SUPPLY WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL OTHER WASTE WATER
DUMP COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2141
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0438-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2141
QD AND TP @ HIGH CAP. FILTER (2)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF DUMP LINE AND WCS FUNCTION REQUIRES USE OF
CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS AND A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
LOSS OF ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE CAPABILITY.
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY FOR THE WASTE WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS AND ADD 3/IR PPP CRTICALITY FOR SUPPLY WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL OTHER WASTE WATER
DUMP COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
LS-2142A
06-2-0438-1
LIFE SUPPORT
2142
HIGH CAPACITY FILTER (i)
K. BARICKMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
IN] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED BLOCKED FLOW
NOTE TO NASA: WHY ARE 06-2-0423-1 AND 06-2-0438-1 NOT CONSISTENT
FOR CRITICALITY?
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY FOR THE WASTE WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS AND ADD 3/IR PPP CRTICALITY FOR SUPPLY WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL OTHER WASTE WATER
DUMP COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2144
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0431-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2144
CONTINGENCY H20 CROSS-TIE QD AND PLUG (I)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
[ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA FM:
FLOW
NASA FM:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
INABILITY TO MATE/DE-MATE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED
FAILS CLOSED, RESTRICTED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF DUMP LINE AND WCS FUNCTION REQUIRES USE OF
CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS AND A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
LOSS OF ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE CAPABILITY.
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IN THE STRICTEST SENSE THIS SHOULD HAVE A DUAL
CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR WASTE H20 AND 3/IR FOR SUPPLY H20. THE
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER HAS FOREGONE WASTE CRITICALITY SAYING ONLY
SUPPLY TO WASTE FLOW WILL BE ALLOWED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2189
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VF-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2189
DUMP VALVE/NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (I)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM:
IOA COMMENT:
THE CWC FOR
LIFE.
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
THE LOSS OF THE WASTE WATER DUMP REQUIRES USE OF
FLUID STORAGE THUS 3/2R CRITICALITY, NOT LOSS OF
THE NASA VIEWED ANY LOSS OF WATER DUMP CAPABILITY, EITHER SUPPLY
OR WASTE WATER, AS A LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE CONDITION. HOWEVER
THE IOA ANALYSIS DID NOT RECOGNIZE THIS LIMITATION AND VIEWED THE
LOSS OF WASTE WATER DUMP CAPABILITY TO
BE ONLY A LOSS OF MISSION CONDITION.
INCORPORATE REVISED CRITICALITY AS RECOMMENDED. IN THE STRICTEST
SENSE THIS SHOULD HAVE A DUAL CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR WASTE H20
AND 3/IR FOR SUPPLY H20, THUS THE 3/IR APPLIES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2191
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2191
DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (i)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FM: SHORTED TO GROUND
NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF SWITCH ELIMINATES WASTE WATER DUMP
CAPABILITY THRU THE NORMAL CHANNELS, BUT DUMP CAN STILL BE DONE
THRU THE SUPPLY WATER SYSTEM. IF THE FAILURE OCCURS DURING A
VALVE OPEN PHASE, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE CAN OCCUR IF THE
DUMP ISOLATION VALVE ALSO FAILS - THUS A CRITICALITY OF 3/IR PNP.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED
THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE
THREATENING CONDITION. INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY. IN THE
STRICTEST SENSE THIS SHOULD HAVE A DUAL CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR
WASTE H20 AND 3/IR FOR SUPPLY H20, THUS THE 3/IR APPLIES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2192
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VE-2024-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2192
DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (i)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARI CKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FM: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF SWITCH ELIMINATES WASTE WATER DUMP
CAPABILITY THRU THE NORMAL CHANNELS, BUT DUMP CAN STILL BE DONE
THRU THE SUPPLY WATER SYSTEM. IF THE FAILURE OCCURS DURING A
VALVE OPEN PHASE, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE CAN OCCUR IF THE
DUMP ISOLATION VALVE ALSO FAILS - THUS A CRITICALITY OF 3/IR PNP.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED
THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE
THREATENING CONDITION. INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY. IN THE
STRICTEST SENSE THIS SHOULD HAVE A DUAL CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR
WASTE H20 AND 3/IR FOR SUPPLY H20, THUS THE 3/IR APPLIES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-2193
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2024-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2193
DUMPVALVE ENABLE/NOZZLEHEATERSWITCH (i)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
NASA FM: OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND WHILE VALVE CLOSED.
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF SWITCH ELIMINATES WASTE WATER DUMP
CAPABILITY THRU NORMAL CHANNELS. IF THE FAILURE OCCURS DURING A
VALVE CLOSED PHASE, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE CAN OCCUR IF
THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE ALSO FAILS-THUS A CRITICALITY OF 3/IR
PNP.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING
CONDITION. INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY. IN THE STRICTEST
SENSE THIS SHOULD HAVE A DUAL CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR WASTE H20
AND 3/IR FOR SUPPLY H20, THUS THE 3/IR APPLIES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2211
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0418-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2211
VACUUM VENT NOZZLE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: THIS MAY BE DETERMINED TO BE A "NON-CREDIBLE"
CONDITION OF BLOCKED FLOW IN THE VACUUM VENT LINE, HOWEVER IF
PLAUSIBLE A POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE ENVIRONMENT DUE TO HYDROGEN GAS
CONCENTRATIONS WOULD BE POSSIBLE, HENCE THE 1/l CRITICALITY.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. A SECOND FAILURE
WHICH INDUCES 02 INTO THE ENVIRONMENT IS REQUIRED TO PRODUCE AN
EXPLOSIVE ENVIRONMENT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2213
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2213
VACUUM VENT LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT (2)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION.
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
REVISE CRITICALITY TO 3/3. THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ASSESSED
AGAINST 06-2E-0424 & 0425. THE FAILURE OF THE THERMOSTAT EITHER
CLOSED OR OPEN DOES NOT CREATE A PROBLEM. WHEN CLOSED THE
WATTAGE IS NOT SUFFICIENT ENOUGH TO OVER TEMP THE LINE AND IF
OPEN THE
REDUNDANT HEATER IS AVAILABLE ALTHOUGH THE GAS FLOWING THROUGH
THIS 2 INCH LINE ACTUALLY DOES NOT REQUIRE HEATING. IF H20 IS
INDUCED IN THE LINE (i.e. H2 SEPARATOR FAILURE) THE HEATER IS TO
SMALL TO STOP FREEZING.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2218
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2006-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2218
NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (i)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED,
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACUUM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS
ENVIRONMENT.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE HEATER IS
SIZED TO KEEP ANY FROST FROM BUILDING UP IN THE DUCT. THE
MOISTURE (VERY LOW LEVEL) IS VENTED OVERBOARD FROM THE COMMODE OR
THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. ANY FREEZING IN THIS CASE WOULD NOT
COMPLETELY BLOCK FLOW NOR WOULD THE ICE BUILD UP BE SIGNIFICANT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2219
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2219
NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (i)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FM: ELECTRICAL OPEN
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION.
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE HEATER IS
SIZED TO KEEP ANY FROST FROM BUILDING UP IN THE DUCT. THE
MOISTURE (VERY LOW LEVEL) IS VENTED OVERBOARD FROM THE COMMODE OR
THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. ANY FREEZING IN THIS CASE WOULD NOT
COMPLETELY BLOCK FLOW NOR WOULD THE ICE BUILD UP BE SIGNIFICANT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2220
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VE-2411-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2220
NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (I)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FM: SHORTED. NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND.
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED,
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACUUM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS
ENVIRONMENT.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE HEATER IS
SIZED TO KEEP ANY FROST FROM BUILDING UP IN THE DUCT. THE
MOISTURE (VERY LOW LEVEL) IS VENTED OVERBOARD FROM THE COMMODE OR
THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. ANY FREEZING IN THIS CASE WOULD NOT
COMPLETELY BLOCK FLOW NOR WOULD THE ICE BUILD UP BE SIGNIFICANT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2220A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2025-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2220
NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (I)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FM: SHORTED. NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND.
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED,
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACUUM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS
ENVIRONMENT.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE HEATER IS
SIZED TO KEEP ANY FROST FROM BUILDING UP IN THE DUCT. THE
MOISTURE (VERY LOW LEVEL) IS VENTED OVERBOARD FROM THE COMMODE OR
THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. ANY FREEZING IN THIS CASE WOULD NOT
COMPLETELY BLOCK FLOW NOR WOULD THE ICE BUILD UP BE SIGNIFICANT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2222
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0425-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2222
VACUUM VENT NOZZLE HEATER (i)
LEAD ANALYST : K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FM: ELECTRICAL OPEN, SHORT. NASA FM: OPEN. NOTE: THE
NASA CRITICALITY WERE 2R/3 DURING A PREVIOUS ANALYSIS.
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED,
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACUUM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS
ENVIRONMENT.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE HEATER IS
SIZED TO KEEP ANY FROST FROM BUILDING UP IN THE DUCT. THE
MOISTURE (VERY LOW LEVEL) IS VENTED OVERBOARD FROM THE COMMODE OR
THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. ANY FREEZING IN THIS CASE WOULD NOT
COMPLETELY BLOCK FLOW NOR WOULD THE ICE BUILD UP BE SIGNIFICANT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENTID: LS-2233X
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0443-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2233
WCSCHECKVALVE LINES TO WWSQD
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY
NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE
ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE
NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB AND UCD ARE
ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN THE
STRICKEST SENSE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2236X
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0445-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2236
FAN/SEPARATOR MUFFLER HOUSING INLET DUCT
LEAD ANALYST : K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: NOT VIEWED AS IMMEDIATE MISSION CRITICAL BECAUSE OF
FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLY USAGE MAY CREATE A
LOSS OF MISSION DEPENDING ON MISSION DURATION DUE TO LACK OF
SUPPLIES.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING
CONDITION.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB AND UCD ARE
ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN THE
STRICKEST SENSE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2237X
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0445-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2237
MUFFLER HOUSING ASSEMBLY (i)
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: NOT VIEWED AS IMMEDIATE MISSION CRITICAL BECAUSE OF
FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLY USAGE MAY CREATE A
LOSS OF MISSION DEPENDING ON MISSION DURATION DUE TO LACK OF
SUPPLIES.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING
CONDITION.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB AND UCD ARE
ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN THE
STRICKEST SENSE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2252X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
2252
WASTE DUMP VALVE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: SHORTED TO GROUND
IOA COMMENT: THE FIRST FAILURE IS POTENTIAL PROBLEM IF VALVE
OPEN AT FAILURE BECAUSE OF LOST CONTINGENCY DUMP CAPABILITY.
POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE IF DUMP ISOLATION VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE IF
DUMP VALVE IS OPEN AT FAILURE, THUS CRITICALITY 2/IR PNP.
THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS WAS DUE TO NO DETAILED
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGERS REGARDING THE
REDUNDANT PATHS.
INCORPORATE REVISED CRITICALITY AS RECOMMENDED FOR THE WASTE
WATER DUMP CONSIDERATIONS AND ADD 3/IR PPP CRITICALITY FOR SUPPLY
WATER DUMP CONSIDERATIONS. CONSISTENT WITH ALL OTHER WASTE WATER
DUMP COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3001
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
7)
LIFE SUPPORT
3001
CB-SMOKE DETN BAY 2A/3B, IB/3A, IA/2B (CB8, 7,
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PER NSTS-222006 (CN 4) PARAGRAPH 2.3.5A SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE
THE SENSORS ARE OPERATING DURING LOS. VISUAL OPEN STATE OF
CIRCUIT BREAKERS IS NOT CONSIDERED DETECTABLE. A POSSIBLE
ADDITION TO THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT WOULD BE TO TRIGGER
FDA IF THE OUTPUT FAILS TO ZERO, INDICATING LOSS OF POWER TO THE
SENSOR.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION.
SINCE DETECTABILITY IS AVAILABLE WITH STATION COVERAGE AND THE
ITEM IS ALREADY A CIL IT APPEARS THE ITEM HAS BEEN GIVEN
SUFFICIENT VISABILITY WITHIN THE CCB AND PRCB.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3003
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3003
CB-SMOKE DETN L/R FLT DECK (CB7)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELE_)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PER NSTS-22206 (CN 4) PARAGRAPH 2.3.5A SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE T?/E
SENSORS ARE OPERATING DURING LOS. VISUAL OPEN STATE OF CIRCUIT
BREAKERS IS NOT CONSIDERED DETECTABLE. A POSSIBLE ADDITION TO
THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT WOULD BE TO TRIGGER FDA IF THE
OUTPUT FAILS TO ZERO, INDICATING LOSS OF POWER TO SENSOR.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION.
SINCE DETECTABILITY IS AVAILABLE WITH STATION COVERAGE AND TH_
ITEM IS ALREADY A CIL IT APPEARS THE ITEM HAS BEEN GIVEN
SUFFICIENT VISABILITY WITHIN THE CCB AND PRCB.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3005
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3O05
CB-SMOKE DETN CABIN (CB6)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PER NSTS-22206 (CN 4) PARAGRAPH 2.3.5A SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE THE
SENSORS ARE OPERATING DURING LOS. VISUAL OPEN STATE OF CIRCUIT
BREAKERS IS NOT CONSIDERED DETECTABLE. A POSSIBLE ADDITION TO
THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT WOULD BE TO TRIGGER FDA IF THE
OUTPUT FAILS TO ZERO, INDICATING LOSS OF POWER TO THE SENSOR.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION.
SINCE DETECTABILITY IS AVAILABLE WITH STATION COVERAGE AND THE
ITEM IS ALREADY A CIL IT APPEARS THE ITEM HAS BEEN GIVEN
SUFFICIENT VISABILITY WITHIN THE CCB AND PRCB.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3027
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2075-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(l.2K)
LIFE SUPPORT
3027
RESISTOR AIRI, R2, R3, R4, R5, R8, R9, RI0, RII
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ALARM STILL WILL BE ISSUED VIA THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION FDA
PARAMETER AND THE APPROPRIATE FIRE LIGHT WILL ILLUMINATE.
NASA CRITICALITY CHANGED TO AGREE WITH IOA CRITICALITY (B SCREEN,
P). THE ACCUMULATED RESULTS TABLE (SMOKE) DATED 3/14/88
INDICATES THE LATEST NASA ANALYSIS AGREES WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3030
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2251-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3030
DIODE AICRI, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, ii
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE IS DETECTED BY THE SMOKE DETECTOR CONCENTRATION FDA
ALERT AND SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION. THE
IOA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED THE FAILURE DETECTABLE AND ISOLATABLE
UPON SENSOR ACTIVATION, WHERE-AS NASA CONSIDERED IT NON-
DETECTABLE BECAUSE IT COULD BE IN EXISTANCE A LONG TIME BEFORE
THE SENSOR IS ACTIVATED. THIS IS ANOTHER CASE OF THE APPLICATION
OF DETECTABILITY AS DEFINED IN NSTS-22206. IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA
ANALYSIS BASED UPON THE HIGHER CRITICALITY WHICH PROVIDES EVEN
GREATER VISABILITY INTO THE FAILURE AND ITS EFFECTS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-3033
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2075-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3033
RESISTOR A6RII, RI2 (I.2K)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
_EW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THESE RESISTORS ONLY EFFECT THE PAYLOAD SMOKE DETECTION ALL OTHER
ALARMS WORK TO INDIACTE THE FIRE. BUT THE LOSS OF ALL LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY (ALL ALARM OUTPUTS) COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN
LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHCILE.
NASA CRITCALITY CHANGED TO AGREE WITH IOA CRITI_TY (B SCREEN,
P). THE ACCUMULATED RESULTS TABLE (SMOKE) DATED 3/14/88
INDICATES THE LATEST NASA ANALYSIS AGREES WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3036
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2251-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3036
DIODE A6CRI, CR2
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALL OTHER ALARMS WORK TO INDICATE THE FIRE AND THE SOURCE CAN BE
IDENTIFIED BY SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION. THE
IOA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED THE FAILURE DETECTABLE AND ISOLATABLE
UPON SENSOR ACTIVATION, WHERE-AS NASA CONSIDERED IT NON-
DETECTABLE BECAUSE IT COULD BE IN EXISTANCE A LONG TIME BEFORE
THE SENSOR IS ACTIVATED. THIS IS ANOTHER CASE OF THE APPLICATION
OF DETECTABILITY AS DEFINED IN NSTS-22206. IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA
ANALYSIS BASED UPON THE HIGHER CRITICALITY WHICH PROVIDES EVEN
GREATER VISABILITY INTO THE FAILURE AND ITS EFFECTS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3042
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2311-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3042
SMOKE DETECTION LIGHT MATRIX-LAMPS
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE CAN BE DETECTED INFLIGHT WHEN ALARMS ANNUNCIATE THE FIRE
BUT LIGHT DOES NOT. SOFTWARE FDA PROVIDES SOURCE OF FIRE.
NASA CRITICALITY CHANGED TO AGREE WITH IOA CRITICALITY (B SCREEN,
P). THE ACCUMULATED RESULTS TABLE (SMOKE) DATED 3/14/88
INDICATES THE LATEST NASA ANALYSIS WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3054
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2253-I
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3054
DIODE-NO IDENTIFIER
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POST LAUNCH, OPEN ACTUALLY ISOLATES THE GROUND CIRCUIT BETTER
THAN ANY OTHER CONDITION AND DOES NOT EFFECT THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT
PRE-LAUNCH THE CIRCUIT PROVIDES CAPABILITY TO FIGHT A FIRE
THROUGH GROUND COMMAND CAPABILITIES. THIS DIODE, THE ON BOARD
CIRCUIT, AND THE PORTABLE BOTTLES MUST FAILS TO RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE. CONSIDERATIONS OF PREMATURE FIRING ARE ACTUALLY A
FAIL SAFE CONDITION.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE IOA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE THAT CONSIDERED USE OF THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER AS ANOTHER BACKUP IS SUSPECT. IN THE VERTICAL
POSITION THE REACH FROM THE AFT AREA TO THE AV BAY FIRE PORTS IS
RATHER DIFFICULT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3055
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2073-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3055
RESISTOR-NO IDENTIFIER (5.11K)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT THUS THE ONLY
CONSIDERATION IS ON THE LAUNCH PAD. FAILURE OF THE GROUND
SYSTEMS TO DISCHARGE THE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER IS BACKED UP BY
THE FLIGHT SYSTEM, PORTABLE BOTTLES, AND LAUNCH TOWER FIRE
SYSTEMS.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE IOA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE THAT CONSIDERED USE OF THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER AS ANOTHER BACKUP IS SUSPECT. IN THE VERTICAL
POSITION THE REACH FROM THE AFT AREA TO THE AV BAY FIRE PORTS IS
RATHER DIFFICULT.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C. 4-72
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3057
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2302-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3057
PYRO CONTROLLER NO. I, 2, 3
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A PREMATURE OPERATION OF THIS CIRCUIT (SHORT INTERNAL) CAN
INHIBIT THE ACTUAL FIRE VOLTAGE BY NOT ALLOWING THE CAPACITOR
VOLTAGE TO BUILD UP. THUS THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY IS I/i. IF
THE NSI CAN FIRE AT A LOWER VOLTAGE OR IF THE FAILURE FIRES THE
NSI PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL FIRE COMMAND THE FAILURE WOULD BE A
CRITICALITY 3/3 SINCE THE DESIRE RESULTS ARE ACHIEVED.
NASA CRITICALITY CHANGED TO AGREE WITH IOA RECOMMENDED
CRITICALITY. IOA REMARKS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY NASA SUBSYTEM
MANAGER FOR THE BASIC EPD&C COMPONENTS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3059
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-330001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3059
FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY (9)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE REQUIRES MORE THOUGHT THAN ONE FMEA/CIL: i) THE
FAILURE BY ITSELF SHOULD BE INDICATED BY ILLUMINATION OF THE
AGENT DISCHARGE LIGHT. UPON DISCHARGE (ASSUMING A HIGH LEAD
RATE) THE AV BAY WOULD BE PROTECTED FOR UP TO 50 HRS. THUS THE
FAILURE ONLY HAS MISSION TERMINATION EFFECTS AND LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE ARE NOT THE CONCERN; 2) THE FAILURE ASSUMING A SLOW
LEAK WOULD REDUCE THIS AV BAY PROTECTION TIME BUT DETECTION WOULD
STILL BE INDICATED VIA THE AGENT DISCHARGE LIGHT. IF THE RATE
IS SLOW ENOUGH IT WILL BE DETECTED BY GROUND CHECKOUT BETWEEN
MISSION; 3) THE MAJOR PROBLEM IS IF FOLLOWING GROUND CHECKOUT THE
RESISTOR THAT PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING FOR THE CIRCUIT FAILS
OPEN OR THE PRESSURE SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED, OR THE
CIRCUIT IS SHORTED TO GROUND NO AGENT DISCHARGE LIGHT
ILLUMINATION CAN TAKE PLACE AND THEN THIS FAILURE CAN BE
CATASTROPHIC IF THE LEAK IS UNDETECTED AND COMPLETE PRIOR TO
LIFT-OFF. THUS THE FAILURE WOULD APPEAR AS A IR/2.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE. SINCE THE LEAK OF THE BOTTLE COULD
RESULT IN NO SUPPRESSANT TO FIGHT A SUBSEQUENT FIRE AND
CREW/VEHICLE ARE AT RISK. IOA ACCEPTS THE HIGHER CRITICALITY
BASED ON GREATER VISABILITY.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-3062
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-371000-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3062
PORTABLE FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A JAMMED ACTUATOR WILL BE KNOW IMMEDIATELY UPON USAGE.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE. SINCE THE DIFFERENCE IN SCREEN B HAS NO
EFFECT ON THE ANALYSIS OUTCOME THE NASA ANALYSIS IS CONSIDERED
GOOD.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-75
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-3063
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2204-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3063
HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE III) (3)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT THUS THE ONLY
CONSIDERATION IS ON THE LAUNCH PAD. FAILURE OF THE GROUND
SYSTEMS TO DISCHARGE THE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER IS BACKED UP BY
THE FLIGHT SYSTEM, PORTABLE BOTTLES, AND LAUNCH TOWER FIRE
SYSTEMS.
WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
THE IOA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE THAT CONSIDERED USE OF THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER AS ANOTHER BACKUP IS SUSPECT. IN THE VERTICAL
POSITION THE REACH FROM THE AFT AREA TO THE AV BAY FIRE PORTS IS
RATHER DIFFICULT.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/07/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-3064
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2203-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3064
HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) (3)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT THUS THE ONLY
CONSIDERATION IS ON THE LAUNCH PAD. FAILURE OF THE GROUND
SYSTEMS TO DISCHARGE THE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER IS BACKED UP BY
THE FLIGHT SYSTEM, PORTABLE BOTTLES, AND LAUNCH TOWER FIRE
SYSTEMS.
WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
THE IOA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE THAT CONSIDERED USE OF THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER AS ANOTHER BACKUP IS SUSPECT. IN THE VERTICAL
POSITION THE REACH FROM THE AFT AREA TO THE AV BAY FIRE PORTS IS
RATHER DIFFICULT.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-3148X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2028-3
NASA DATA:
eaSZn'rNE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3148
SW-FIRE SUPPRESSION AV BAY i, 2, 3 AGENT DISCH
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ A ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE COUPLED WITH A FAILURE OF THE ONE SECOND TIME DELAY
CAN INHIBIT THE DISCHANGE OF THE FIRE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER.
WORST CASE IS DURING ASCENT AND DEORBIT.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE FAILURE OF THE ONE SECOND TIME DELAY IS NOT CONSIDERED A
CREDIBLE FAILURE FOR THAT DEVICE. THUS THE CIRCUIT IS SUCH THAT
THE CAPACITOR BANK WILL CHARGE UP AND DISCHARGE EVEN WITH THIS
FAILURE. THE DIFFERENCE IN OPERATION IS THAT THE AGENT DISCH SW
DOES NOT NEED TO BE DEPRESSED.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/09/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-3154X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2253-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3154
DIODE-NO IDENTIFIER
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE AS RUN GROUND TURNAROUND TEST UNDER MOST CONDITIONS WILL NOT
DETECT THE FAILURE.
NASA CRITICALITY CHANGED TO AGREE WITH IOA CRITICALITY (A SCREEN,
F). THE ACCUMULATED RESULTS TABLE (SMOKE) DATED 3/14/88
INDICATES THE LATEST NASA ANALYSIS AGREES WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-3164X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2203-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3164
HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) (3)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PRELAUNCH PORTABLE BOTTLES ARE AVAILABLE TO DISCHARGE SUPPRESSANT
INTO THE BAY. THIS IS ALSO TRUE FOR ONORBIT AND LANDING/SAFING.
DURING LIFT OFF AND DEORBIT, A FAILURE OF THE PRE-FLIGHT BUS
WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ISSUE THE COMMAND VIA THIS FAILURE.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE IOA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE THAT CONSIDERED USE OF THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER AS ANOTHER BACKUP IS SUSPECT. IN THE VERTICAL
POSITION THE REACH FROM THE AFT AREA TO THE AV BAY FIRE PORTS IS
RATHER DIFFICULT.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/07/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-3166X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
RESET
LIFE SUPPORT
3166
HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) - SMOKEDETECTORGROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE IS DETECTABLE THROUGH THE REDUNDANT SENSING
CAPABILITY.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION. THE
IOA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED THE FAILURE DETECTABLE AND ISOLATABLE
UPON SENSOR ACTIVATION; WHERE-AS NASA CONSIDERED IT NON-
DETECTABLE BECAUSE IT COULD BE IN EXISTANCE A LONG TIME BEFORE
THE SENSOR IS ACTIVATED. THIS IS ANOTHER CASE OF THE APPLICATION
OF DETECTABILITY AS DEFINED IN NSTS-22206. IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA
ANALYSIS BASED UPON THE HIGHER CRITICALTY WHICH PROVIDES EVEN
GREATER VISABILITY INTO THE FAILURE AND ITS EFFECTS.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-3258X
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-311000-03
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
3258
SMOKEDETECTOR(9)
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DURING GROUND TURNAROUND TEST THE ONLY TRUE TEST OF THE
CONCENTRATION PARAMETER WOULD BE TO VERIFY A KNOWN CONCENTRATION
LEVEL WHICH THE PROCEDURES DO NOT ATTEMPT. SIMILAR LOGIC APPLIES
TO THE INFLIGHT CASE.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE ISSUE AS DEFINED IS BASED ON A MIS-MATCH OF FAILURES. THE
NASA FAILURE IS AN ABSOLUTE FAILURE OF THE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT
(i.e. THE SIGNAL THAT IS THE CONCENTRATION LEVEL SENSED INTERNAL
TO THE SENSOR). THE IOA FAILURE CONSIDERED THE SENSOR COULD
NOT DETECT CHANGES IN CONSENTRATION LEVEL AND ONLY OUTPUT A
CONSTANT VALUE WHICH INDICATION WOULD BE GIVEN. BASED UPON THE
CONFUSION AND HIGHER CRITICALITY THE NASA CRITICALITY IS
ACCEPTED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5003
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1206-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5OO3
EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE LIST NASA CRITICALTIY. THE
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS HARDWARE DEPENDS ON HOW THE
INSTRUCTIONS IN NSTS 22206 ARE INTERPRETED AND WHETHER THE
FAILURE EFFECT IS LOSS OF PLANNED OR LOSS OF CONTINGENCY EVA
CAPABILITY. FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES THAT THE TWO EMU
WATER SUPPLY VALVES PROVIDE SOME DEGREE IF REDUNDANCY WHICH
SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY. ALSO, THE
WORST CASE SCENARIO WOULD BE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF EVA CONTINGENCY CAPABILTIY. THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS
WITH THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION, PASSAGE OF A AND C SCREENS, AND
EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5005
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1206-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5OO5
EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5005. LOSS OF THE FUNCTION TO SEAL THE WATER
ON THE LINE DOES NOT LEAD TO LOSS OF FES. A REVALVING OF THE
SUPPLY WATER SYSTEM WILL CORRECT THE FAILURE; HOWEVER EVA
MISSIONS ARE STILL LOST.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY.
BOTH NASA/RI AND IOA ANALYSIS AGREE THAT THE HARDWARE FAILURE
MODE SHOULD BE INCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM. THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE
IR FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY ASSIGNED BY NASA/RI IF THE FAILURE
EFFECT IS CONSIDERED TO BE LOSS OF CONTINGENCY EVA CAPABILITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5006
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5006
EMU WATER SUPPLY SWITCH (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5006. FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS OF DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE
THE LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION
NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT
#5003, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION, PASSAGE
OF SCREENS A AND C, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5006A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2008-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5006
EMU WATER SUPPLY SWITCH (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5006. FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION
NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT
#5003, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION, PASSAGE
OF SCREENS A AND C, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5009
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5009
EMU WATER SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SAME SCENARIO (WORST CASE) AS FOR VALVE FAILED CLOSED (#5003).
NASA DATA IS NOT AVAILABLE, BUT IOA & NASA'A CRITICALITIES ARE
CONSISTENT WITH #5003 & 06-IA-1206-I THUS, THE ISSUE FOLLOWS THE
LOGIC OF ASSESSMENT #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT
#5003, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION, PASSAGE
OF SCREENS A AND C, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5011
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1212-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5011
EMU WASTE WATER VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST : R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOa [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5011. PRE 51-L ANALYSIS SAYS LOSS OF
REDUNDANCY. HOWEVER, WITH TWO SUITED CREWMAN, THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO WMU WASTE
WATER VALVES DO PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. THIS SHOULD BE REFLECTED BY
ASSIGNING EITHER A 3/IR OR 3/2R CRITICALITY DEPENDING ON WHETHER
THE FAILURE "EFFECT IS CONSIDERED LOSS OF CONTINGENCY OR LOSS
OF PLANNED EVA CAPABILITY. SINCE ALL SCREENS PASS, THE FAILURE
MODE WILL BE EXCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM. THEREFORE, THE IOA
ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE NASA/RI EVALUATION IS ACCEPTABLE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5014
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2009-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5014
EMU WASTE WATER SWITCH (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SAME SCENARIO (WORST CASE) AS FOR VALVE FAILED CLOSED (#5011),
(NASA 06-1-1212-1). WITH TWO SUITED CREWMAN THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FUTHER REVIEW, AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH ASSESSMENT #50011,
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE NASA/RI EVALUATION IS ACCEPTABLE
AND THAT THE FAILURE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LS-5014A
05-6UA-2009-2
LIFE SUPPORT
5014
EMU WASTE WATER SWITCH (2)
R.E. DUFFY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SAME SCENARIO (WORST CASE) AS FOR VALVE FAILED CLOSED (#5011),
(NASA 06-1-1212-1). WITH TWO SUITED CREWMAN THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY, THUS MISSION LOSS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FUTHER REVIEW, AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH ASSESSMENT #50011,
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE NASA/RI EVALUATION IS ACCEPTABLE
AND THAT THE FAILURE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5017
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5017
EMU WASTE WATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5017. ASSUMING TWO CREWMEN THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY FOR EACH CREWMEN. THUS LOSS OF CB FORCES THE VALVE TO
REMAIN CLOSED AND LOSS OF MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FUTHER REVIEW, AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH ASSESSMENT #50011,
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE NASA/RI EVALUATION IS ACCEPTABLE
AND THAT THE FAILURE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5020
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1208-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5020
EMU WATER SUPPLY LINES AND FITTING
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5020. FUNCTIONAL LOSS LEADS TO INABILITY TO
SERVICE THE EMU'S. HOWEVER, AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM.
FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION SEE ASSESSMENT #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH ASSESSMENT #5003,
THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION, PASSAGE OF ALL
SCREENS, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-5022
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5022
02 SUPPLY LINES AND FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EXISTING EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA WAS FOUND FOR THIS FAILURE (SEE
IOA ANALYSIS #5022).
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE.
THIS SHOULD HAVE REFERENCED NASA FMEA # 06-IC-1510-I WHICH SHOWS
A CRITICALTIY OF I/i. SINCE IT COMBINES ALL LINES & FITTINGS
THAT IS THE WORST CASE CRITICALTIY. WHEN THE AIRLOCK IS
CONSIDERED BY ITSELF THE CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO ISOLATION
CAPABILITIES. THUS THE IOA ANALYSIS WAS TO A FINER LEVEL AND
BOTH THE NASA AND IOA CRITICALITIES ARE CORRECT.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-93
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5025
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1201-1
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
ITEM :
LIFE SUPPORT
5025
EMU 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5025. ASSUMING A BASELINE OF TWO SUITED
CREWMEMBERS AND NO CREW ACTION (RULE 2.3.3.f OF NSTS 22206). TWO
CREWMEMBERS SHARING ONE SCU IS NOT A "NOMINAL CREW ACTION", THUS
LOSS OF MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THIS FAILURE IS ANALOGOUS
TO THE EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE FAILURE ADDRESSED IN ASSESSMENT #
5003. IT SHOULD BE ASSIGNED A 3/2R CRITICALITY AND EXCLUDED AS A
CIL ITEM SINCE ALL REDUDNANCY SCREENS ARE PASSED. THIS
FAILURE IS SIMILIAR TO THAT LISTED IN LS-5017.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-5026
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1201-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5026
EMU02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5026. LOSS OF 02 ISOLATION FUNCTION LEADS TO
LOSS OF EVA AND SHUTTLE MISSION. THIS IS BECAUSE LV3 AND LV4
WOULD BE CLOSED, AND THIS ACTION ISOLATES THE LEH'S. THUS, UPON
FUNCTION LOSS, THE MISSION IS TERMINATED AND DEORBIT PLANNED
FOR THE NEXT PLS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE NASA/RI ANALYSIS OF THIS FAILURE
MODE REPRESENTS A MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN NSTS 22206. THEREFORE,
THE NASA EVALUATION IS ACCEPTABLE AND THE INCLUSION OF THE EMU 02
SUPPLY VALVE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM IS
APPROPRIATE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5029
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1128-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5029
DEPRESS CAP VENT (I)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO EQUALIZATION
VALVES ON THE AIRLOCK HATCH LEADING TO THE PAYLOAD BAY PROVIDE
REDUNDANCY TO THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CONTINGENCY EVA;
THEREFORE, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION,
PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A
CIL ITEM.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C. 4-96
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: L8-5030
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1127-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5030
CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN (i)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO EQUALIZATION
VALVES ON THE AIRLOCK HATCH LEADING TO THE PAYLOAD BAY PROVIDE
REDUNDANCY TO THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CONTINGENCY EVA;
THEREFORE, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION,
PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A
CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5031
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1127-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5031
CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN (i)
LEAD ANALYST : R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO EQUALIZATION
VALVES ON THE AIRLOCK HATCH LEADING TO THE PAYLOAD BAY PROVIDE
REDUNDANCY TO THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CONTINGENCY EVA;
THEREFORE, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION,
PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A
CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5032A
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1126-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5032
DEPRESS VALVE/CAP (i EACH)
LEAD ANALYST : R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE MORE CONSERVATIVE EVALUATION OF THIS
FAILURE MODE BY NASA/RI AND THE INCLUSION OF THE FAILURE MODE AS
A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5033
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1126-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5033
DEPRESS VALVE (i)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO EQUALIZATION
VALVES ON THE AIRLOCK HATCH LEADING TO THE PAYLOAD BAY PROVIDE
REDUNDANCY TO THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CONTINGENCY EVA;
THEREFORE, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION,
PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A
CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5035
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1603-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5035
AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5035. NASA FMEA NOT AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, THERE
ARE ONLY TWO EQUALIZATION VALVES, THUS ONLY TWO PIECES OF
HARDWARE THAT CAN ALLOW REPRESSURIZATION OF THE AIRLOCK AFTER AN
EVA.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION.
THE EQUALIZATION CAPS ARE REMOVED PRIOR TO THE START OF AN EVA,
THEREFORE THE WORST CASE EFFECT OF AN INABILITY TO REMOVE THE
CAPS ON THE AIRLOCK TO CABIN HATCH WOULD BE LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA. THREE PATHS EXIST, THE
DEPRESS VALVE AND TWO EQUALIZATION VALVE/CAPS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5035A
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1603-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5035
AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5035. NASA FMEA NOT AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, THERE
ARE ONLY TWO EQUALIZATION VALVES, THUS ONLY TWO PIECES OF
HARDWARE THAT CAN ALLOW REPRESSURIZATION OF THE AIRLOCK AFTER AN
EVA.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION.
THE EQUALIZATION CAPS ARE REMOVED PRIOR TO THE START OF AN EVA,
THEREFORE THE WORST CASE EFFECT OF AN INABILITY TO REMOVE THE
CAPS ON THE AIRLOCK TO CABIN HATCH WOULD BE LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA. THREE PATHS EXIST, THE
DEPRESS VALVE AND TWO EQUALIZATION VALVE/CAPS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5036
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1603-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5036
AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION SINCE THE VALVE IS AN UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY TO THE CAP. HOWEVER THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY
PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION SEE ASSESSMENT
#LS-5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES THE WORST SCENARIO WOULD BE
LOSS OF CONTINGENCY EVA CAPABILITY (IR FUNCTIONAL CRITICALTIY).
TO BE CONSISTANT WITH OTHER ANALOGOUS AIRLOCK COMPONENT FAILURES,
THE IOA WOULD ASSIGN A LEVEL 3 CRITICALITY TO THE HARDWARE
FAILURE. HOWEVER, SINCE THE NASA/RI EVALUATION REPRESENTS A MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF GROUNDRULES
CONTAINED IN NSTS 22206, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE 2/IR
CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION OF THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-I03
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5040
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1601-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5040
AIRLOCK TO CABIN EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WORST CASE SCENARIO HARDWARE LOSS IS VALVE OPEN, CAP DOES NOT
MATE. EVA MISSION IS CALLED SHORT/OFF AND FURTHER MISSIONS ARE
CANCELLED. THUS FUNCTION LOSS IS LOSS OF EVA MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES THE WORST SCENARIO WOULD BE
LOSS OF CONTINGENCY EVA CAPABILITY (IR FUNCTIONAL CRITICALTIY).
TO BE CONSISTANT WITH OTHER ANALOGOUS AIRLOCK COMPONENT FAILURES,
THE IOA WOULD ASSIGN A LEVEL 3 CRITICALITY TO THE HARDWARE
FAILURE. HOWEVER, SINCE THE NASA/RI EVALUATION REPRESENTS A MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF GROUNDRULES
CONTAINED IN NSTS 22206, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE 2/IR
CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION OF THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5041
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1601-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5041
AIRLOCK TO CABIN EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES NSTS 22206. FOR IOA
ANALYSIS SEE THE LIFE SUPPORT ID# 5041.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
WOULD BE LOSS OF CONTINGENCY EVA CAPABILITY (IR FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY). TO BE CONSISTANT WITH OTHER ANALOGOUS AIRLOCK
COMPONENT FAILURES, THE IOA WOULD ASSIGN A LEVEL 3 CRITICALITY TO
THE HARDWARE FAILURE. HOWEVER, SINCE THE NASA/RI EVALUATION
REPRESENTS A MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
GROUND RULES CONTAINED IN NSTS 22206, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE
I/I CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION OF THE HARDWARE FAILURE AS A CIL
ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5043
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1604-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5043
AIRLOCK TO CABIN PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WORST CASE SCENARIO HARDWARE LOSS IS VALVE OPEN, CAP DOES NOT
MATE. EVA MISSION IS CALLED SHORT/OFF AND FURTHER MISSIONS ARE
CANCELLED. THUS FUNCTION LOSS IS LOSS OF EVA MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION
THAT THIS FAILURE MODE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA WHICH PER OPERATIONS GROUND RULES IS
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY I.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5043A
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1605-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5043
AIRLOCK TO CABIN PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WORST CASE SCENARIO HARDWARE LOSS IS VALVE OPEN, CAP DOES NOT
MATE. EVA MISSION IS CALLED SHORT/OFF AND FURTHER MISSIONS ARE
CANCELLED. THUS FUNCTION LOSS IS LOSS OF EVA MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION
THAT THIS FAILURE MODE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA WHICH PER OPERATIONS GROUND RULES IS
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY i.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-5047
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1124-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5047
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT VENT CAP (2)
LEAD ANALYST : R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND INCORPORATE NASA
CRITICALITY. FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE
POSSIBILITY OF THE FAILURE OCCURRING IS INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER
THE TUNNEL ADAPTER IS ATTACHED AND THAT THE EFFECT OF THIS
FAILURE MODE AND ASSOCIATED REDUNDANCY (i.e. LOSS OF AIRLOCK
REPRESS CAPABILITY) IS POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC. THEREFORE, THE
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-5051
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1122-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5051
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ANALYSIS #5041 ASSUMED THE TUNNEL ADAPTER WAS ATTACHED.
WITHOUT THIS THE AIRLOCK WOULD LEAK TO SPACE FORCING EVALUATION
BY THE AIRLOCK CREW. THE LEAK CANNOT BE GREATER THAN TWO
EQUALIZATION VALVES WIDE OPEN ON THE CABIN SIDE. EACH VALVE ALSO
HAS A THREATED CAP WHICH IS CAPABLE OF A PRESSURE SEAL. WORST
CASE SCENARIO IS LOSS OF FURTHER MISSIONS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND INCORPORATE NASA
CRITICALITY. FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE
POSSIBILITY OF THE FAILURE OCCURRING IS INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER
THE TUNNEL ADAPTER IS ATTACHED AND THAT THE EFFECT OF THIS
FAILURE MODE AND ASSOCIATED REDUNDANCY (i.e. LOSS OF AIRLOCK
REPRESS CAPABILITY) IS POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC. THEREFORE, THE
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-I09
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5052
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1122-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5052
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES NSTS 22206. FOR IOA
ANALYSIS SEE THE LIFE SUPPORT ID# 5041.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE INABILITY TO
PRESSURIZE THE AIRLOCK BECAUSE OF EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH THE
EQUALIZATION VALVE IS POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC (IF FAILURE OCCURS
WHILE EVA IS UNDERWAY). THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5054
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1120-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5054
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST CORRECT NASA
CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE INABILITY TO
PRESSURIZE THE AIRLOCK BECAUSE OF EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH THE
EQUALIZATION VALVE IS POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC (IF FAILURE OCCURS
WHILE EVA IS UNDERWAY). THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION.
NOTE: THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE IS 2/IR
VS. 2/2 ERRONEOUSLY SHOWN ON THE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET.
(REDUNDANCY SCREENS ARE PPP).
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5054A
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1121-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5054
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST CORRECT NASA
CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE INABILITY TO
PRESSURIZE THE AIRLOCK BECAUSE OF EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH THE
EQUALIZATION VALVE IS POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC (IF FAILURE OCCURS
WHILE EVA IS UNDERWAY). THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION.
NOTE: THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE IS 2/IR
VS. 2/2 ERRONEOUSLY SHOWN ON THE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET.
(REDUNDANCY SCREENS ARE PPP).
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5055
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5055
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER BUS SELECT SWITCH (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY TO EACH OF
THE SWITCH/SYSTEMS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST PROPER NASA
CRITICALTIY. THIS ITEM WAS INITIALLY ASSESSED AGAINST THE WRONG
CIL. THE PROPER NASA CIL LISTS A CRITICALITY OF 2R/3.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE CRITICALITY IF
THE HARDWARE FAILURE DEPENDS ON THE STATUS OF THE ASSOCIATED EMU
BATTERY AND THAT THE WORST CASE SCENARIO IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE
TO FAIL IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM EVA AFTER THE
BATTERIES ARE DEPLETED. THEREFORE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FLIGHT
CRITICALITY BE 3/2R, WITH PASSAGE OF A AND C SCREEN AND EXCLUSION
OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-5055A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2008-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5055
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER BUS SELECT SWITCH (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY TO EACH OF
THE SWITCH/SYSTEMS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST PROPER NASA
CRITICALTIY. THIS ITEM WAS INITIALLY ASSESSED AGAINST THE WRONG
CIL. THE PROPER NASA CIL LISTS A CRITICALITY OF 2R/3.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE CRITICALITY IF
THE HARDWARE FAILURE DEPENDS ON THE STATUS OF THE ASSOCIATED EMU
BATTERY AND THAT THE WORST CASE SCENARIO IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE
TO FAIL IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM EVA AFTER THE
BATTERIES ARE DEPLETED. THEREFORE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FLIGHT
CRITICALITY BE 3/2R, WITH PASSAGE OF A AND C SCREEN AND EXCLUSION
OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5056
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5056
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER RPC (4)
LEAD ANALYST : R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION.
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST PROPER NASA
CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE IS
DOWNGRADED FROM 2/2 TO 3/2R. THE A AND C SCREENS PASS AND B
SCREEN IS N/A. THEREFORE, THE FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS
A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5059
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5059
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER POWER SUPPLY (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION.
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST PROPER NASA
CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE IS
DOWNGRADED FROM 2/2 TO 3/2R. THE A AND C SCREENS PASS AND B
SCREEN IS N/A. THEREFORE, THE FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS
A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5060
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5060
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER POWER SUPPLY (2)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION.
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST PROPER NASA
CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE IS
DOWNGRADED FROM 2/2 TO 3/2R. THE A AND C SCREENS PASS AND B
SCREEN IS N/A. THEREFORE, THE FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS
A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-5066
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1631-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5066
VACUUMVENT ISOLATION VALVE (i)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE CREW CAN DETECT
THE VALVE FAIL TO CLOSE FROM THE POSITION TALKBACK; THEREFORE,
SCREEN B PASSES WHICH AGREES WITH THE NASA EVALUATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5067
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2026-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5067
VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CNTRL. SWITCH (i)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA FMEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT FAILURE OF THE
CONTROL SWITCH PLUS FAILURE OF THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE TO CLOSE
WHILE EVA IS UNDERWAY WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC. ALSO, THE SCREEN B
PASSES BECAUSE THE POSITION TALKBACK PROVIDES A FAILURE
DETECTION CAPABILITY. THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-I19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5068
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2026-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5068
VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CNTRL. SWITCH (I)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA FMEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT FAILURE OF THE
CONTROL SWITCH PLUS FAILURE OF THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE CAN
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO VENT OR PRESSURIZE THE
AIRLOCK. THIS CAN HAVE CATASTROPHIC EFFECTS DEPENDING ON WHETHER
AN EVA IS UNDERWAY OR WHETHER IT PREVENTS A CONTINGENCY EVA FROM
BEING PERFORMED. THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AND THE INCLUSION AS A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-5068A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5068
VACUUMVENT ISOL. VLV. CNTRL. SWITCH (I)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA FMEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT FAILURE OF THE
CONTROL SWITCH PLUS FAILURE OF THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE CAN
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO VENT OR PRESSURIZE THE
AIRLOCK. THIS CAN HAVE CATASTROPHIC EFFECTS DEPENDING ON WHETHER
AN EVA IS UNDERWAY OR WHETHER IT PREVENTS A CONTINGENCY EVA FROM
BEING PERFORMED. THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AND THE INCLUSION AS A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-5069
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2027-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5069
VACUUMVENT ISOL. VLV. BUS SELECT SWITCH (i)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA FMEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT FAILURE OF THE BUS
SELECT SWITCH PLUS FAILURE OF THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE CAN
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO VENT OR PRESSURIZE THE
AIRLOCK. THIS CAN HAVE CATASTROPHIC EFFECTS DEPENDING ON WHETHER
AN EVA IS UNDERWAY OR WHETHER IT PREVENTS A CONTINGENCY EVA FROM
BEING PERFORMED. THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE AND THE INCLUSION AS A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-5081A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2044-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5081
ISOL. VALVE SENSORPOWERRESISTOR (A8R3 & 4)
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC RESISTOR VALUES ARE IN ERROR. THE VALUE
SHOULD BE 1.2K OHM, INSTEAD OF THE 5.1K OHM SHOWN FOR THE
SCHEMATIC. DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY
SUMMARY WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL
ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM REVIEW OF THE FMEA, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI
EVALUATION. END-TO-END SHORTS OF BOTH RESISTORS RESULT IN A LOSS
OF CONTROL OVER THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE. REGARDLESS OF
THE POSITION IN WHICH THE VALVE STICKS (OPEN OR CLOSED) A SIMILAR
FAILURE OF THE DEPRESS VALVE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5085X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2012-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LIFE SUPPORT
5085
EMU WATER SUPPLY STATUS INDICATOR (2)
R. DUFFY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
(SHORTS TO GROUND)
WITH LINE SHORTED TO GROUND, AS THE SWITCH IS MADE, THE BREAKER
WILL OPEN DUE TO HIGH DEMAND AND THE VALVE WILL NOT ACTUATE. EMU
SUIT CAN NOT BE SERVICED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION. FURTHER
ASSESSMENT CANNOT BE MADE DUE TO LACK OF NASA FMEA DATA.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT #
5003 APPROACH, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION,
PACKAGE OF SCREEN A AND C, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS
A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5086X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2013-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5086
EMU WASTE WATER STATUS INDICATOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
(SHORTS TO GROUND)
WITH THE LINE SHORTED TO GROUND, AS THE SWITCH IS MADE, THE
BREAKER WILL OPEN DUE TO HIGH DEMAND, AND THE VALVE WILL NOT
ACTUATE. EMU SUIT CANNOT BE SERVICED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
FURTHER ASSESSMENT CANNOT BE MADE DUE TO LACK IF NASA FMEA DATA.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: INCORPORATE REVISED CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT # 5011
APPROACH, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE FAILURE SHOULD BE MISSION
CRITICAL BUT BE EXCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5087X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1208-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LIFE SUPPORT
5087
EMU WATER SUPPLY LINES & FITTINGS
R. DUFFY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P] [ P] [ P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
(RESTRICTED FLOW)
FUNCTIONAL LOSS LEADS TO INABILITY TO SERVICE THE EMU'S.
HOWEVER, THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM. ASSUMING AN
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS
22206.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT #
5003 APPROACH, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION,
PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A
CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-5088X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1402-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5088
LCG SUPPLY & RETURN, LINES & FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
(EXTERNAL LEAK)
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM FUNCTION. ASSUMING A
TWO MAN CREW (BASELINE MISSION), RECOVERY CANNOT BE PERFORMED
SINCE EACH SCU CONNECTION HAS NO REDUNDANCY AND SHARING ONE SCU
WOULD BE CREW ACTION WHICH IS AGAINST SPEC NSTS 22206.
THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM. FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION
SEE ASSESSMENT #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE HIGHER LEVEL FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY
ASSIGNED BY NASA/RI. EXTERNAL LEAKAGE COULD DEPLETE THE EMU
WATER SUPPLY, CONTAMINATE THE AIRLOCK WITH FREE WATER, AND CAUSE
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5089X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1402-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5089
LCG SUPPLY & RETURN, LINES & FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
(RESTRICTED FLOW) LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM
FUNCTION. ASSUMING A TWO MAN CREW (BASELINE MISSION), RECOVERY
CANNOT BE PERFORMED SINCE EACH SCU CONNECTION HAS NO REDUNDANCY
AND SHARING ONE SCU WOULD BE CREW ACTION WHICH IS AGAINST SPEC
NSTS 22206. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM. FOR FURTHER
CLARIFICATION SEE ASSESSMENT #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
FOR RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE LCVG LINES & FITTINGS WOULD BE
INADEQUATE COOLING TO A STANDBY CREWMAN CONNECTED TO AN SCU
DURING A SCHEDULED OR UNSCHEDULED EVA. THEREFORE, THE IOA
CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION, PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS, AND
EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM. EVEN THOUGH
MISSION CAPABILITY IS LOST, IT WOULD STILL BE POSSIBLE FOR ONE
CREWMAN TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-5090X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1209-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5090
EMU WASTE WATER LINE & FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
(RESTRICTED FLOW)
ASSUMING A TWO MAN CREW, THE FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION SINCE
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR EACH CREWMAN.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT LOSS OF MISSION WOULD
BE WORST CASE SCENARIO BUT THAT THE SECOND SCU IN THE AIRLOCK
DOES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY FOR THE STANDBY CREWMAN DURING AN EVA.
THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION AND THE
EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5091X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5091
02 QUICK COUPLINGS (NOT USED FOR SCU) AND CAP
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
(INABILITY TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE HARDWARE ITEMS TO
PREVENT LEAKS ARE THE VALVE, COUPLING AND CAP. FUNCTIONALLY THIS
FAILURE IS NOT IMPORTANT SINCE BY DEFINITION THIS LEAK IS
"INTERNAL". THUS THE CREW IS NOT EVEN AWARE OF THIS FAILURE.
THAT IS, BY DEFINITION "INTERNAL LEAK" MEANS NOT ALL THE SEALS
CAN FAIL (THIS WOULD BE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). INABILITY TO CLOSE IS
MOOT SINCE THE CAP WOULD NEVER BE TAKEN OFF DURING FLIGHT (CREW
USES THE SCU).
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICLAITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCURS THAT IF ALL REDUNDANT 02
SHUTOFF VALVES EXPERIENCED INTERNAL LEAKS, AND EITHER THE SCU
COUPLINGS OR CAPS LEAKED, THE 02 CONCENTATION COULD BECOME
EXCESSIVE, AN EXPLOSION OR FIRE COULD CASUE LOSS OF CREW AND
VEHICLE. THEREFORE, THE IOA AGREES THE NASA/RI EVALUATION IS
VALID AND THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE INCLUDED AS A CIL
ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: LS-5094X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1124-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5094
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT CAP
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ /NA ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
(EXTERNAL LEAK)
THIS FAILURE IS NOT REALISTIC SINCE THIS VALVE WOULD NOT BE USED
DURING A NORMAL MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICLAITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT IF THE OUTER HATCH
EQUALIZATION VALVES AND CAPS LEAK, IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO
REPRESSURIZE THE AIRLOCK AFTER AN EVA. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW. THE FAILURE COULD ALSO CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA. THEREFORE, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5095X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1631-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5095
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
(EXTERNAL LEAK) THE FAILURE IS QUESTIONABLE. PER NSTS 22206 THE
LEAK CANNOT BE THROUGH THE PACKING IN THE VALVES PENETRATION.
THE ONLY OTHER PLACES COULD BE THE CASING ITSELF WHICH IS
UNREALISTIC OR THE O-RING WHICH SEALS THE VALVE TO THE BULKHEAD.
THE O-RING (LACK OF) IS NOT BIG ENOUGH TO DRAIN THE CABIN FASTER
THAN CONSUMMBLES FLOW. HOWEVER, ASSUMING CREW INABILITY TO
CORRECT THE FAILURE LEADS TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN IMMEDIATE LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO AN UNCONTROLLABLE LEAK.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A CREDIBLE EVENT. FOR THE VACUUM VENT
ISOLATION VALVE, THE LEAKAGE FLOW PATH WOULD BE FROM THE
PRESSURIZED CABIN INTO THE VALVE. THIS IS A SINGLE FAILURE POINT
PER THE NASA/RI EVALUATION. AN EXCESSIVE LEAK COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CABIN PRESSURIZATION AND THE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-132
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5096X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1630-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5096
LINES & FITTINGS, 2 INCH DEPRESSURIZATION
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
(EXTERNAL LEAKAGE)
THE LEAK CAN BE CONTROLLED WITH THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE.
LOSS OF FUNCTION CREATES A LEAK IN THE CABIN WITH POTENTIAL LOSS
OF LIFE/VEHICLE. EVEN THOUGH THE VACUUM ISOLATION VALVE HAS A
DRAIN ORIFICE, THERE IS A POTENTIAL BUILD UP OF H2 IF THE
LEAK IS DOWNSTREAM OF THE INTERFACE, WHICH ALSO HAS THE POTENTIAL
FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE IF H2 IGNITES. THUS, MISSION IS
TERMINATED ON FIRST FAILURE.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE WORST CASE EFFECT OF
THIS FAILURE MODE COULD BE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THEREFORE, THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION IS APPROPRIATE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5097X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1630-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5097
LINES & FITTINGS, 2 INCH DEPRESSURIZATION
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
(RESTRICTED FLOW). NO CRITICALITY HAS BEEN ASSIGNED BECAUSE
THIS FAILURE IS NOT CREDIBLE. THE LINE IS 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER
AND WOULD REQUIRE LARGE SIZE DEBRIS FOR EFFECTIVE PLUGGING. ON
THE OTHER HAND, HYDROGEN IS A VERY LIGHT MOLECULE AND CAN
PERMEATE THROUGH ANY SIZE CRACK. IF IOA HAD TO ASSIGN A
CRITICALITY, IT WOULD BE A 2/2 (LOSS OF MISSION) SINCE THE
AIRLOCK WOULD BE UNABLE TO DEPRESSURIZE.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT IF FLOW THROUGH THE
TWO - INCH DEPRESSURIZATION LINES AND FITTINGS WAS RESTRICTED,
THE OUTER HATCH EQUALIZATION VALVES COULD BE USED TO DEPRESSURIZE
AIRLOCK. SINCE THIS CAPABILITY EXISTS, THE IOA WOULD ASSIGN A
3/IR CRITICALITY TO THIS FAILURE MODE FOR THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
OF LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANY WHICH PREVENTS BEING ABLE TO
PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA, BUT THE MORE CONSERVATIVE NASA
APPROACH IS ACCEPTED.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5098X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1128-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LIFE SUPPORT
5098
AIRLOCK DEPRESSURIZATION CAP
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: INABILITY TO REMOVE.
IOA COMMENT: FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION AND THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY AVAILABLE.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA DETERMINED THE FAILURE MODE UNDER
REVIEW IS INABILITY TO MATE RATHER THAN INABILITY TO REMOVE. IN
ADDITION TO THE CAP, THE DEPRESS VALVE AND VACUUM VENT VALVE
PROVIDE REDUNDANT LEAKAGE PROTECTION. THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA/RI 3/IR EVALUATION, PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS, AND EXCLUSION OF
THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
ATCS-1004
06-3-0102-2
ATCS
1004
INLET FILTER (ACCUMULATOR)
S.K. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
IF] IF]
[P] [P]
IN] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK ROTTER,
ON 5/5/88. HANK'S DATA INDICATES THAT A RUPTURE OF THIS FILTER
WILL RESULT IN THE FILTER ELEMENTS ACCUMULATING ON THE FILTER OF
THE WORKING PUMP ONLY - LEAVING THE SECOND PUMP CLEAR AND
OPERATIONAL. THIS WILL MAKE THE CRITICALITY 3/IR. IOA AGREES
WITH THIS ANALYSIS AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-1006
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0112-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ATCS
1006
SELF-SEALING DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA COMBINES ALL DISCONNECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PUMP PACKAGE
INTO ONE FMEA EVALUATED AT THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. FOR
BETTER CLARITY, EACH DISCONNECT SHOULD BE EVALUATED SEPARATELY.
HOWEVER, SINCE THE NASA FMEA DOES CARRY THE WORST CASE
CRITICALITY, IOA WILL AGREE WITH THE FMEA AND WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-1025
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0301-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
1025
HYDRAULICHEAT EXCHANGER
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N 3 [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA'S RE-EVALUATION OF THE FMEA CRITICALITY HAS RESULTED IN
AGREEMENT WITH IOA. ISSUE IS CLOSED.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-1027
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
1027
HYDRAULICHEAT EXCHANGERS
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON RE-EVALUATION, IOA FEELS THAT THIS FAILURE IS A PART OF NASA
FMEA 06-3-0301-3. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1035
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0304-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
1035
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [x]*
] [ ]
] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THIS ITEM. IOA CONCURS WITH
THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-1037
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDACID: 1037
ITEM: 02 RESTRICTOR
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DEEMED THIS TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE REQUIRING TWO
SEPARATE FAILURES (06-3-0250-1). UPON RE-EXAMINATION OF
AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ATCS-1038 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDACID: 1038
ITEM: 02 RESTRICTOR
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DEEMED THIS TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE REQUIRING TWO
SEPARATE FAILURES (06-3-0250-1). UPON RE-EXAMINATION OF
AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-1043
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
1043
ARS INTERCHANGERHEAT EXCHANGER
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA WAS COVERED BY NASA IN THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE ARS,
NASA FMEA 06-1-0505-1 WITH CRIT 2/IR IS THE EQUIVALENT ITEM.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1045
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
1045
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS COVERED BY NASA DURING THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE
ARS, NASA FMEA 06-1-0505-2 IS THE EQUIVALENT FAILURE. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-1053
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0223-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
1053
PAYLOADHEAT EXCHANGER
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK
ROTTER, ON 5/5/88. ANALYSIS HAS SHOWN THAT SUFFICIENT FLOW
CAPACITY EXISTS IN THE OTHER PORTION OF THE LOOP TO COMPENSATE
FOR A COMPLETELY BLOCKED PAYLOAD LOOP. THIS WILL LOWER THE
CRITICALITY TO 2/2. IOA AGREES WITH THIS ANALYSIS AND WITHDRAWS
THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ATCS-2003
06-3-0502-3
ATCS
2003
FLOW CONTROL VALVE
S.K. SINCLAIR
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DURING THE INITIAL ASSESSMENT, IOA ERRONEOUSLY CHANGED THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS ITEM TO A HIGHER THAN REQUIRED VALUE.
ADDITIONAL DATA AND CLOSER EXAMINATION HAVE CONVINCED IOA THAT
THE LOWER CRITICALITY IS MORE APPROPRIATE. IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2007A
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0504-4
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 2007
ITEM: BYPASS VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ClL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DURING THE INITIAL ASSESSMENT, IOA ERRONEOUSLY CHANGED THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS ITEM TO A HIGHER THAN REQUIRED VALUE.
ADDITIONAL DATA AND CLOSER EXAMINATION HAVE CONVINCED IOA THAT
THE LOWER CRITICALITY IS MORE APPROPRIATE. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/13/88
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-2008A
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0504-2
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDACID: 2008
ITEM: BYPASSVALVE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DURING THE INITIAL ASSESSMENT, IOA ERRONEOUSLY CHANGED THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS ITEM TO A HIGHER THAN REQUIRED VALUE.
ADDITIONAL DATA AND CLOSER EXAMINATION HAVE CONVINCED IOA THAT
THE LOWER CRITICALITY IS MORE APPRORRIATE. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/13/88
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-2010
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0504-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ATCS
2010
MOTOR(BYPASS VALVE)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSION WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK ROTTER ON 5/8/88, HAS
REVEALED SUFFICIENT LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY
TO 3/IR. IOA AGREES WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER'S ANALYSIS AND
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2017
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2034-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
2017
SWITCH 26 (RADIATOR CONTROL LOOP)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE ASSIGNED CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE. (NEW FMEA NO. 05-6WC-I002-I WITH CRIT.
2/2).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2028
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
2028
SWITCH 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA'S RE-EVALUATION OF THE CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS ITEM HAS
REMOVED IT FROM THE CIL BY GIVING IT A NON-CIL RANKING.
THEREFORE, THE ISSUE NO LONGER EXISTS. (NEW FMEA NO. 05-6WC-
1005-1 WITH CRIT 3/IR).
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-3018
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ATCS
3018
HI LOAD ANTI-CARRYOVERDEVICE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA FMEAs DO NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN RESTRICTED FREON FLOW
IN THE BODY OF THE EVAPORATOR AND RESTRICTED FREON FLOW IN PLACES
SUCH AS THE ACOD. A RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE ACOD WILL HAVE
NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON EVAPORATOR OPERATIONS AND SHOULD
BE A 3/3 CRITICALITY. HOWEVER, SINCE THE NASA FMEA DOES
CORRECTLY CARRY THE CRITICALITY OF A WORST CASE RESTRICTED FLOW,
MDAC WILL WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-3019
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3019
ITEM: HI LOAD EXIT DUCT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK
ROTTER, ON 5/5/88. HANK INDICATES THAT EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF
STEAM/WATER FROM THE EXIT DUCT OCCURS DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS
AND HAS NO EFFECT. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-3030
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3030
ITEM: HI LOAD NOZZLE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK
ROTTER, ON 5/5/88. HANK INDICATES THAT EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF
STEAM/WATER FROM THE NOZZLE OCCURS DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND
HAS NO EFFECT. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/18/87
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-3036
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0323-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
3036
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA AGREES WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3040
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0327-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
VALVE/NOZZLE
ATCS
3040
TOPPING EVAPORATOR INTEGRAL PULSER/SHUTOFF
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFIFITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-3046
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
PLATE
ATCS
3046
TOPPING EVAPORATORWATERVALVE/NOZZLE MOUNTING
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES WHICH RESULT IN A LEAKAGE OF FREON INTO
THE FES CORE INTO ONE FMEA. ALTHOUGH IOA WOULD ORDINARILY
RECOMMEND A SEPARATION OF THE FAILURES, THE NASA FMEA DOES
CORRECTLY CARRY THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-3048
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ATCS
3048
TOPPING EVAPORATORCORE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES WHICH RESULT IN A LEAKAGE OF FREON INTO
THE FES CORE INTO ONE FMEA. ALTHOUGH IOA WOULD ORDINARILY
RECOMMEND A SEPARATION OF THE FAILURES, THE ONE NASA FMEA DOES
CORRECTLY CARRY THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3049
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0323-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
3049
TOPPING EVAPORATOR CORE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE HIGHER CRITICALITY AND WITHDRAWS
THE ISSUE BASED ON THIS CONSERVATISM.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3050
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
3050
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ANTI CARRYOVER DEVICE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPS ALL FMEAs INVOLVING A RESTRICTED FLOW OF FREON INTO
ONE FAILURE. WHEN THE RESTRICTION IS IN THE ACOD, THERE IS NO
AFFECT ON THE EVAPORATOR OR FREON LOOP OPERATION. ALTHOUGH IOA
WOULD ORDINARILY RECOMMEND A SEPARATION OF THE FAILURES, THE
NASA FMEA DOES CORRECTLY CARRY THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. IOA
ACCEPTS THIS APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-3051
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
3051
TOPPING EVAPORATORANTI CARRYOVERDEVICE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES CAUSED BY A MIXING OF FREON AND WATER
INTO ONE FMEA. WHEN THE MIXING OCCURS IN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR,
THE RESULT IS A LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP AND THE TOPPING
EVAPORATOR. THIS IS A SURVIVABLE ENTRY CONDITION. MIXING OF
WATER AND FREON IN THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR WOULD BE A i/i
CONDITION. ALTHOUGH IOA WOULD ORDINARILY RECOMMEND A SEPARATION
OF THE FAILURES, THE NASA FMEA DOES CORRECTLY CARRY THE WORST
CASE CRITICALITY. IOA WILL, THEREFORE, WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-3052
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
3052
TOPPING EVAPORATORANTI CARRYOVERDEVICE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES CAUSED BY A MIXING OF FREON AND WATER
INTO ONE FMEA. WHEN THE MIXING OCCURS IN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR,
THE RESULT IS A LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP AND THE TOPPING
EVAPORATOR. THIS IS A SURVIVABLE ENTRY CONDITION. ALTHOUGH IOA
WOULD ORDINARILY RECOMMEND A SEPARATION OF THE FAILURES, THE NASA
FMEA DOES CORRECTLY CARRY THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. IOA WILL,
THEREFORE, WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3053
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0327-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
3053
TOPPING EVAPORATOR EXIT DUCT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITY. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/18/87
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-3055
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0327-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
AND H HEATERS
ATCS
3055
TOPPING EVAPORATOR - EXIT DUCT - ZONE D, E, F,
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITY.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3057
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0327-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3057
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - EXIT DUCT - ZONE D, E, F,
AND H THERMOSTATS
LEAD ANALYST : S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-3060
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0313-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
3060
TOPPING EVAPORATOR- RH AND LH SONIC NOZZLES
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
ACCEPTS THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3067
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3067
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE A/B FROM WATER SUPPLY TO
WATER/VALVE NOZZLE ASSEMBLIES
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK
ROTTER, ON 5/5/88. THE ISSUES RAISED BY MDAC WILL BE USED BY THE
SSM TO PUSH FOR A DESIGN CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM. HOWEVER, LEVEL II
DIRECTION HAS DICTATED THAT THE CRITICALITY REMAIN A 3/IR.
BASED ON THIS DATA, MDAC WILL WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/30/87
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-3076A
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ATCS
3076
FES FEEDLINE ACCUMULATORSTATUS MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS IOA CONCURS WITH THE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND ACCEPTS THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
MDAC
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3079
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2028-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
3079
FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SSM, HANK ROTTER, ON 5/5/88
WHO AGREED, IN THEORY WITH THE MDAC CRITICALITIES OF 2/IR.
HOWEVER, LEVEL II DIRECTION HAS DICTATED THAT THE FAILURE REMAIN
AT THE CURRENT CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, MDAC WILL WITHDRAW THE
ISSUE. (NEW FMEA NO. 05-6WE-I002-3).
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-3079A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2030-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
3079
FES CONTROLLER- SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SSM, HANK ROTTER, ON 5/5/88
WHO AGREED, IN THEORY WITH THE MDAC CRITICALITIES OF 2/IR.
HOWEVER, LEVEL II DIRECTION HAS DICTATED THAT THE FAILURE REMAIN
AT THE CURRENT CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, MDAC WILL WITHDRAWN THE
ISSUE. (NEW FMEA NO. 05-6WE-I002-3, CRIT 3/IR).
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C. 4-170
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-3118
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2052-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ATCS
3118
TOPPING EVAPORATORHEATERSELECT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RE-EVALUATION OF THIS FMEA BY NASA RESULTED IN A MODIFIED
CRITICALITY. ISSUE HAS BEEN RESOLVED. (NEW FMEA NO. O5-6WE-
2001-1, WITH CRIT 2/2).
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4006
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0411-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
4006
AMMONIA CONTROLLER A
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IN ORDER FOR THE PREMATURE OPERATION OF THE CONTROLLER TO OCCUR,
A SECOND FAILURE MUST HAPPEN. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE. (NOTES
BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER).
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ATCS-4007
06-3-0410-1
ATCS
4007
FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N.O.)
S.K. SINCLAIR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4008
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0410-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
4008
FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N.O.)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITY. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-4012
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0408-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
4012
TANK ISOLATION VALVE (N.C.)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SSM, HANK ROTTER, ON 5/5/88.
THE DESIGN OF THE VALVE IS SUCH THAT IT CANNOT FAIL OPEN WHEN IT
IS CLOSED TO START, BUT IF OPEN IT CAN FAIL TO CLOSE. THIS
OCCURS ONLY DURING POST LANDING OPERATIONS. THEREFORE, MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ORIGINAL ISSUE AND NASA WILL CHANGE THE FMEA TO A
2/2 CRITICALITY FOR POST LANDING COOLING CONCERNS.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-4027
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2201-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ATCS
4027
HYBRID DRIVER (POWER-PRI/GPC)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RE-EVALUATION BY IOA WILL PERMIT AGREEMENT WITH NASA
CRITICALITIES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-176
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-IIII5X
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0304-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ATCS
Ili15
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THIS ITEM. IOA AGREES WITH
THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C. 4-177
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-IIII6X
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0305-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ATCS
Ili16
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER,FLUID CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THIS ITEM. IOA AGREES WITH
THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-178
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-IIII8X
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0305-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
11118
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER, FLUID CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THIS ITEM. IOA AGREES WITH
THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C. 4-179
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/07/88
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-III21X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2041-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
11121
SWI0, ii (FREONSIGNAL CONDITIONER)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA AGREES WITH THIS
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND ACCEPTS THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
MDAC
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C. 4-180
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: ATCS-14032X
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0408-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATCS
14032
TANK ISOLATION VALVE (NC)
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ORIGINALLY ASSIGNED HIGHER THAN REQUIRED CRITICALITIES OF
THIS FMEA. RE-EVALUATION WILL PUT IOA IN AGREEMENT WITH NASA
CRITICALITIES.
REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988 C.4-181

SECTION C.5
CREWEQUIPMENTSUBSYSTEM
C.5-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2201
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HOOK
CREW EQUIPMENT
2201
EXTENDED RANGE CREWMEMBER SAFETY TETHER-SMALL
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA HAS LUMPED THE FAILURE TO CLOSE INTO THE "HOOK BREAKS
OR JAMS OPEN" FAILURE. NASA, THEREFORE, UTILIZES A MORE
CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FAILURE AND FUNCTION DURING THEIR
ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS
THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.5-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2301
NASA FMEA #: JSCI7067B-2A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
2301
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE IS UNDER NASA FMEA FAILURE "EITHER HOOK LATCH JAMS
OPEN". NASA, THEREFORE, UTILIZES A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION
OF FAILURE AND FUNCTION DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.5-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/02/87
ASSESSMENTID: CRWEQP-3301
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
CREWEQUIPMENT
3301
3-POINT LATCH TOOL HOOK
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM,S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON RE-EXAMINATION OF AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES THAT THIS
FAILURE IS COVERED IMPLICITLY IN THE NASA FMEA PACKAGE. IOA
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.5-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 11/22/87
ASSESSMENTID: CRWEQP-3413
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
CREWEQUIPMENT
3413
EVA WINCH AND MOUNTASSEMBLYMOUNTINGPLATE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM,S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ x ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON RE-EXAMINATION OF AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES THAT THIS
FAILURE IS COVERED IMPLICITLY IN THE NASA FMEA PACKAGE. IOA
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.5-5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENTID: CRWEQP-6408
NASA FMEA #: TREADMILL IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
6408
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY ATTACHMENT FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ p] [ P] [ p] [x] *
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. MDAC CONCURS AND WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.5-6
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: ii/19/87
ASSESSMENTID: CRWEQP-13809X
NASA FMEA #: SNATCHBLOCK2B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
13809
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.5-7
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/87
ASSESSMENTID: CRWEQP-16409X
NASA FMEA #: TREADMILL IB
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
CREW EQUIPMENT
16409
TREADMILL QUICK DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A S
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA CONCURS AND WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.5-8
SECTION C. 6
INSTRUMENTATIONSUBSYSTEM
C.6-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: INSTR-305X
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-7-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
305
MDMOF4, OAI, OA2, OA3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA iii WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C iii AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-305X. THESE MDM's PROCESS/ROUTE
CRITICAL APU STATUS DATA. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FALSELY INDICATING A
HEATER STUCK ON COULD PROMPT MANUAL SHUTDOWN OF AN APU,
REQURING ABORT. FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE FAILED MDM CHANNEL COULD
NOT BE DETECTED. NOTE: NASA FMEA WRITEUP IS INCONSISTENT WITH
2/2 CRIT AND ASSIGNS SCREENS FOR THAT 2/2 CRIT.
CIL ISSUE RESOLUTION:
A. ACCEPT NASA'S CRITICALITY PER IOA GROUNDRULES. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.6-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: INSTR-306X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 306
ITEM: MDMOF3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 116 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 116 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-306X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS, MDM
OF3 HANDLES CRITICAL FUEL CELL MEASUREMENTS FOR WHICH THERE IS NO
REDUNDANT PATH (SE IOA 306X). LOSS OF THESE MEASUREMENTS
WOULD REQUIRE MISSION TERMINATION.
CIL ISSUE RESOLUTION:
A. MDM'S ASSESSED BY DPS. NO CIL ISSUES ON OFI,OF2 OR OF3 MDM'S.
NOT CARRIED BECAUSE FUEL CELL SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS SHOWED THAT
REDUNDANCY FOR ALL MEASUREMENTS EXIST. MCR PRESENTED TO RE-
CHANNEL EACH FUEL CELL TO DIFFERENT MDM. MCR NOT APPROVED. DPS
HAS NOT WRITTEN FMEA YET. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.6-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: INSTR-307X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDACID: 307
ITEM: MDMOF3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 117 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 117 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-307X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS, MDM
OF3 HANDLES CRITICAL FUEL CELL MEASUREMENTS FOR WHICH THERE IS NO
REDUNDANT PATH (SE IOA 307X). ERRONEOUS MEASUREMENTS
COULD CAUSE IMPROPER MANUAL SHUTDOWN OF A FUEL CELL, REQUIRING
UNNECESSARY MISSION TERMINATION.
CIL ISSUE RESOLUTION:
A. MDM'S ASSESSED BY DPS. NO CIL ISSUES ON OF1, OF2, OR OF3
MDMS. NOT CARRIED BECAUSE FUEL CELL SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS REVEALED
THAT REDUNDANCY FOR ALL MEASUREMENTS EXIST. MCR PRESENTED TO RE-
CHANNEL EACH FUEL CELL TO DIFFERENT MDMS. MCR NOT APPROVED.
DPS HAS NOT WRITTEN THE FMEA YET. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.6-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: INSTR-308X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
3O8
MDMOF1, OF2
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 118 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 118 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS INSTR-308X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS SYSTEM
MDM's OF1 AND OF2 HANDLE CRITICAL FUEL CELL DELTA VOLTAGE
MEASUREMENTS (SEE IOA 308). LOSS OF THESE MEASUREMENTS WOULD
CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION.
CIL ISSUE RESOLUTION:
A. MDM'S ASSESSED BY DPS. NO CIL ISSUES ON OF1, OF2, OR OF3
MDMS. NOT CARRIED BECAUSE FUEL CELL SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS REVEALED
THAT REDUNDANCY FOR ALL MEASUREMENTS EXIST. MCR PRESENTED TO RE-
CHANNEL EACH FUEL CELL TO DIFFERENT MDMS. MCR NOT APPROVED.
DPS HAS NOT WRITTEN THE FMEA YET. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.6-5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: INSTR-309X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
309
MDMOF1, OF2
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 119 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 119 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS INSTR-309X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS SYSTEM MDMs
OF1 AND OF2 HANDLE CRITICAL FUEL CELL DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENTS
(SEE IOA 309). ERRONEOUS MDM OUTPUT COULD CAUSE A FALSE
INDICATION OF FUEL CELL MALFUNCTION AND COULD PROMPT A MANUAL
FUEL CELL SHUT DOWN THAT COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS.
CIL ISSUE RESOLUTION:
A. MDM'S ASSESSED BY DPS. NO CIL ISSUES ON OF1, OF2, OR OF3
MDMS. NOT CARRIED BECAUSE FUEL CELL SUBSYSTEM FEELS THAT
REDUNDANCY FOR ALL MEASUREMENTS EXIST. MCR PRESENTED TO RE-
CHANNEL EACH FUEL CELL TO DIFFERENT MDMS. MCR NOT APPROVED. DPS
HAS NOT WRITTEN THE FMEA YET. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.6-6
SECTION C.7
DATA PROCESSINGSUBSYSTEM
C.7-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENTID: DPS-100
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-2-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: i00
ITEM: MDMFFI,FF2,FF3,FF4
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA,
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD "COUPLED WITH AND UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)," WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM". IOA DID NOT CONSIDER DEGRADED STATE VECTORS.
IOA DOES NOT BELIEVE THE LOSS OF TWO STATE VECTORS WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE. IN THE WORST CASE ON ENTRY, THE LOSS OF
THE SECOND STATE VECTOR WILL PERMIT THE ORBITER TO FLY WITH ONE
REMAINING STATE VECTOR.
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL. NASA/RI DOWNGRADED FMEA 05-5-
B03-2-I FROM 2/IR TO 3/IR. THIS REVISED CRITICALITY AGREES WITH
IOA CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.7-2
mAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-101
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-2-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 101
ITEM: MDM FFI,FF2,FF3,FF4
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "LOSS OF OUTPUT TO LRU" IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
FAILED MDM PORT - SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O
CARD/CHANNEL FAILURE".
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AND UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM". IOA DID NOT CONSIDER DEGRADED STATE VECTORS.
IOA DOES NOT BELIEVE THE LOSS OF TWO STATE VECTORS WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE. IN THE WORST CASE ON ENTRY, THE LOSS OF
THE SECOND STATE VECTOR WILL PERMIT THE ORBITER TO FLY WITH ONE
REMAINING STATE VECTOR.
IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL. NASA/RI DOWNGRADED FMEA 05-5-
B03-2-I FROM 2/IR TO 3/IR. THIS REVISED CRITICALITY AGREES WITH
IOA CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.7-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-108
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-2-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 108
ITEM: MDM FFI,FF2,FF3,FF4
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "FALSELY STUCK ON BUSY MODE" IS CONSIDERED TO
BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
FAILED MDM PORT - SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O
CARD/CHANNEL FAILURE".
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THE NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AN UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM". IOA DID NOT CONSIDER DEGRADED STATE VECTORS.
IOA DOES NOT BELIEVE THE LOSS OF TWO STATE VECTORS WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE. IN THE WORST CASE ON ENTRY, THE LOSS OF
THE SECOND STATE VECTOR WILL PERMIT THE ORBITER TO FLY WITH ONE
REMAINING STATE VECTOR.
IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL. NASA/RI DOWNGRADED FMEA 05-5-
B03-2-I FROM 2/IR TO 3/IR. THIS REVISED CRITICALITY AGREES WITH
IOA CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.7-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENTID: DPS-120
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-I-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDACID: 120
ITEM: MDMFAI,FA2,FA3,FA4
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AN UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM".
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL.
THE IOA WITHDRAWS CRITICALITY DIFFERENCE AND DIFFERENT
APPLICATIONS OF NSTS 22206 AS ASSESSMENT ISSUES SINCE THEY RESULT
IN A MORE CONSERVATIVE NASA/RI EVALUATION OF THE FAILURE MODE
THAN THE IOA ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.7-5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENTID: DPS-121
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-I-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDACID: 121
ITEM: MDMFAI,FA2,FA3,FA4
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT TO LRU" IS CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED
BY THE ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT: FAILED MDM
PORT - SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O CARD/CHANNEL
FAILURE".
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AN UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM".
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.IOA
DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE. IOA
RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL.
THE IOA WITHDRAWS CRITICALITY DIFFERENCE AND DIFFERENT
APPLICATIONS OF NSTS 22206 AS ASSESSMENT ISSUES SINCE THEY RESULT
IN A MORE CONSERVATIVE NASA/RI EVALUATION OF THE FAILURE MODE
THAN THE IOA ANALYSIS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENTID: DPS-128
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-I-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 128
ITEM: MDMFAI,FA2,FA3,FA4
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "FALSELY STUCK ON BUSY MODE" IS CONSIDERED TO
BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
FAILED MDM PORT-SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O
CARD/CHANNEL FAILURE".
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AN UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM."
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
THE IOA WITHDRAWS CRITICALITY DIFFERENCE AND DIFFERENT
APPLICATIONS OF NSTS 22206 AS ASSESSMENT ISSUES SINCE THEY RESULT
IN A MORE CONSERVATIVE NASA/RI EVALUATION OF THE FAILURE MODE
THAN THE IOA ANALYSIS.
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ATMOSPHEREREVITALIZATION PRESSURE
CONTROLSUBSYSTEM
C.8-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-128
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0109-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
128
PRESSUREREGULATOR/300 PSIG (i)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE MODE MAY BE CLARIFIED TO REFER TO EITHER IST OR 2ND
STAGES OF THE REGULATOR. AFTER FURTHER REVIEW AND REMOVAL OF THE
AUXILIARY 02 TANK, IOA WOULD HAVE RECOMMENDED 3/IR CRITICALITY.
COMPARED TO THIS RECOMMENDATION NASA UTILIZED A MORE
CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR
ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES
WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-129
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0110-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
129
RELIEF VALVE, 1250 PSIG.
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER FURTHER REVIEW AND REMOVAL OF THE AUXILIARY 02 TANK, THE
IOA CRITICALITY WAS CHANGED TO 3/IR. NASA UTILIZED A MORE
CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR
ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES
WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-3
rAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-131
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0110-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
131
RELIEF VALVE, 1250 PSIG.
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER REMOVAL OF THE AUXILIARY 02 TANK, THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS
CHANGED TO 3/IR. NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF
FUNCTION AND REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER
CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-4
fAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-132A
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0114-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
132
ISOLATION VALVE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-137
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0111-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
137
CROSSOVERVALVE-LV3 AND LV4 (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-6
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-139
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0111-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
139
CROSSOVER VALVE-LV3 AND LV4 (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-7
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-140
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2011-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
140
SWITCH-S15 AND S18 (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RE-EVALUATION OF THE FAILURE BY NASA HAS RESULTED IN A DIFFERENT
FMEA NUMBER (05-6UC-201-02) AND A REVISED CRITICALITY (3/3) WHICH
NOW AGREES WITH MDAC. ISSUE IS CLOSED.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-8
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-141
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2011-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
141
SWITCH-S15 AND S18 (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA WAS RE-EVALUATED BY NASA AND ASSIGNED A CRITICALITY
(2/1R) WHICH AGREES WITH IOAs ASSESSMENT. ISSUE IS CLOSED.
NASA FMEA NO. 05-6UC-201-I).
(NEW
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-148
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0116-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
IN LOOP2)
ARPCS
148
ORIFICE-(ONE 20 LBM/HR IN LOOP1, TWO i0 LBM/HR
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C. 8-I0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-151
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0120-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
151
LEH 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-II
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-158
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0122-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
158
RELIEF VALVE-245 PSIG (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-159
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDACID: 159
ITEM: FILTER-10 MICRONS (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHELAN, ON 23 MAY 1988,
REVEAL THAT THIS FILTER WAS COVERED AS A PART OF THE CHECK VALVE.
(FMEA NO. 06-IC-0123-I, CRITICALITY 2/IR PFP). IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-161
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0123-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDACID: 161
ITEM: CHECKVALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-163
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1501-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
163
LEH 02 SHUTOFF VALVE/CREW + PASSENGER (8)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARPCS-164
06-1-1501-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
164
LEH 02 SHUTOFF VALVE/CREW + PASSENGER (8)
M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHELAN, ON 23 MAY 1988,
REVEALED THE EXISTENCE OF AN ADDITIONAL PIECE OF EQUIPMENT, A "Y"
CONNECTION FOR THE LEH QUICK DISCONNECTS. THIS MEANS THAT THERE
WILL ALWAYS BE AT LEAST ONE MORE OUTLET THAN CREW MEMBERS AND
THE CRITICALITY CAN BE REDUCED TO A IR/2. IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARPCS-166
06-1-1502-2
ARPCS
166
QUICK DISCONNECTS (8)
M.J. SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHELAN, ON 23 MAY 1988,
REVEALED THE EXISTENCE OF AN ADDITIONAL PIECE OF EQUIPMENT, A "Y"
CONNECTION FOR THE LEH QUICK DISCONNECTS. THIS MEANS THAT THERE
WILL ALWAYS BE AT LEAST ONE MORE OUTLET THAN CREW MEMBERS AND
THE CRITICALITY CAN BE REDUCED TO A IR/2. IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-167
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1502-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
167
QUICK DISCONNECTS(8)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-168
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1502-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
168
QUICK DISCONNECTS(8)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHELAN, ON 23 MAY 1988,
REVEALED THE EXISTENCE OF AN ADDITIONAL PIECE OF EQUIPMENT, A "Y"
CONNECTION FOR THE LEH QUICK DISCONNECTS. THIS MEANS THAT THERE
WILL ALWAYS BE AT LEAST ONE MORE OUTLET THAN CREW MEMBERS AND
THE CRITICALITY CAN BE REDUCED TO A IR/2. IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-169
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1502-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
169
QUICK DISCONNECTS (8)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-174A
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1512-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
174
SHUTOFF VALVE/DIRECT OXYGEN (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ I /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHALAN, ON 23
MAY 1988. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE LEAK TO GO THROUGH THE VALVE
AND THRU THE DIRECT OXYGEN OUTLET INTO THE CABIN. THERE IS A
FLOW RESTRICTER WHICH LIMITS THE LEAK TO 10LBS/HR. AT THIS
LEVEL, THE LEHS WILL STILL PROVIDE OXYGEN TO THE CREW AND NO
IMMEDIATE LOSS OF LIFE OCCURS. GIVEN THIS KNOWLEDGE, IOA
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-212
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0161-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 212
ITEM: N2 TANKS (4)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ClL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF Ii0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN 23 MAY 1988,
IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-214
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0191-1
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
214
LINES & FITTINGS - TP27 & TP28
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RE-EVALUATION OF SYSTEM AND CONTROLS WILL PERMIT IOA TO AGREE
WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-223A
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0230-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
223
ISOLATION VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-224
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0230-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
224
ISOLATION VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF ii0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-232
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0231-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 232
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MMU CAN NOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE MISSION CRITICAL. THEREFORE, IOA
WILL AGREE WITH NASAs LOWER CRITICALITIES AND WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-234
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0165-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
234
N2 SYSTEM SUPPLY ISOL. VLV-LV3&LV4 (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR _ [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF ii0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-235
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0165-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
235
N2 SYSTEMSUPPLY ISOL. VLV-LV3&LV4 (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] E ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF ll0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-237
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0165-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
237
SINGLE PHASEMOTOR/N2-SYSTEMISOL. VLV (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA STUDIED THE ELECTRICAL MOTOR SEPARATELY FROM THE VALVE, AND
THIS COMPARISON WAS MADE BASED ON THE FMEA ANALYSIS FOR THE
VALVE.
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF ii0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-241
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2013-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
241
SWITCH, SI3&S21/N2-SYSTEM ISOL VLV (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF ii0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-271
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0152-3
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 271
ITEM: SHUTOFF VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF ii0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-276
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0178-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
276
CROSSOVER VALVE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF Ii0 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION REVEALED THAT THE DESIGN OF THIS VALVE IS
SUCH THAT IT IS FLOWN NORMALLY CLOSED. SHOULD A LEAK OCCUR, THE
OPERATING LEG CAN BE CHANGED AND THE LEAK ISOLATED. IT SHOULD
ALSO BE NOTED THAT EVEN WITH A LEAK, N2 IS STILL AVAILABLE TO
THE CABIN ATMOSPHERE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-312
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0146-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDACID: 312
ITEM: PPO2 SENSOR-C (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RE-EVALUATION ALLOWS IOA TO AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES.
IS WITHDRAWN.
ISSUE
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-322
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0214-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
322
CABIN PRESSURE SENSOR (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-324
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0211-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
324
CABIN DP/DT SENSOR (i)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-35
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-327
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2022-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
327
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI6/DP/DT (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-36
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-344
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDACID: 344
ITEM: FILTER (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN, NASA, SSM, ON 23 MAY 1988, PLUS
EXAMINATION OF PART DRAWINGS REVEALED THAT THIS FILTERS DESIGN
PRECLUDES THE CREDIBILITY OF RESTRICTED FLOW. IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-350
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0203-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
35O
SINGLE PHASE MOTOR (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-358
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-200100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
358
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB22 & CB34 _2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RE-EVALUATION BY NASA HAS RESULTED IN A DIFFERENT FMEA NUMBER
(05-6UC-90X) AND A MODIFIED CRITICALITY (3/3) WHICH MATCHES IOA'S
RECOMMENDATION. ISSUE CLOSED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-359
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-200100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
359
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB22 & CB34 (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RE-EVALUATION BY NASA HAS RESULTED IN A DIFFERENT FMEA NUMBER
(05-6UC-100X) AND A MODIFIED CRITICALITY (3/3) WHICH MATCHES
IOA'S RECOMMENDATION. ISSUE CLOSED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-362
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0207-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDACID: 362
ITEM: CAP (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER RE-EVALUATION, IOA HAS DETERMINED THAT THE FAILURE OF
SCREEN B IS NO LONGER AN ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-364
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 364
ITEM: DEBRIS SCREEN (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS DEBRIS SCREEN IS COVERED AS A PART OF THE NASA FMEA 06-IC-
0206-1 WHICH IS WRITTEN AGAINST THE VALVE. SINCE THE CRITICALITY
MATCHES IOAs, THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-367X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0229-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDACID: 367
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR REDUNDANCY
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-368X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0229-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 368
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR REDUNDANCY
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-II31X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2017-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 1131
ITEM: SWITCH-S12
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR REDUNDANCY
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-45
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-1461X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0115-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
1461
FILTER, I0 MICRON (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE FILTER UNDER THE LINES AND
FITTINGS ANALYSIS. THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FOR THE FILTER ALONE WAS
NOT CONSIDERED CREDIBLE. HOWEVER, BY DEFINING THIS AS A POSSIBLE
FAILURE MODE, NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE
DEFINITION OF FAILURE MODES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-46
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-1501X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1510-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
1501
LINES AND FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-1761X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1511-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
1761
ORIFICE, DIRECT BLEED (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-2632X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0193-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
2632
LINES AND FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-3291X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0191-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 3291
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-3431X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0201-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARPCS
3431
RELIEF VALVE, 16 PSIA
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARPCS-3611X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0206-3
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 3611
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 20 JULY 1988 C.8-52
SECTION C.9
HYDRAULICS AND WATER SPRAY
BOILER SUBSYSTEM
C.9-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-II0
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
ii0
SPRAYVALVE (WATERSUPPLY)
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE IS INCORPORATED AS A "CAUSE" IN FMEA 06-3A-0605-2.
ELECTRICAL OPEN OR SHORT CIRCUIT MUST INVOLVE BOTH REDUNDANT
SOLENOID COILS. INDIVIDUAL ELECTRICAL FAILURES ARE COVERED IN
WSB EPDC FMEA.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.9-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-II7
NASA FMEA #: 06-3A-0604-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
117
STEAMDUMPNOZZLE
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS BLOCKAGE OF NOZZLE FOR ANY REASON. FREEZING
IMPLIES BOTH HEATERS LOST. SINGLE HEATER FAILURE IS COVERED BY
FMEA 06-3A-0622-I. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.9-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-I18
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HYD/WSB
118
HYDRAULIC/LUBE OIL WATER FILTERS
J. DUVAL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [ P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDED ADDING "OR RESTRICTED FLOW" TO FAILURE MODE
DESCRIPTION OF FMEA 06-3A-0605-2 TO COVER BLOCKAGE OF WATER VALVE
FILTER. SUBSYSTEM MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL ACCEPTED THIS
RECOMMENDATION DURING IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING ON
4/26/88.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.9-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-131
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0629-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
131
LUBE OIL TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST : J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA SHOWS SCREEN A=P IN NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW BOARD
PRESENTATION, 3/30/88. IOA ACCEPTS SCREEN PASSED, RATHER THAN
NA, AS THIS DOES NOT AFFECT CIL STATUS OR WAIVER STATUS.
THIS FMEA IS NO LONGER ON THE CIL.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-143
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDACID: 143
ITEM: GN2 TANK
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA 06-3-0609-2 DELETED BY NASA. COMBINED WITH 06-3-0609-1.
NASA APPROACH TAKES RUPTURE OF GN2 TANK AS WORST CASE FAILURE
MODE. IOA ACCEPTS THIS APPROACH. NO SEPARATE FMEA FOR LEAKAGE
IS NECESSARY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
HYDWSB-149
06-3A-0606-2
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
HYD/WSB
149
GN2 SHUTOFF VALVE
J. DUVAL
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
GN2 REGULATOR VALVE IN SERIES WOULD REGULATE PRESSURE TO H20 TANK
- REQUIRES SECOND FAILURE TO CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY: THIRD FAILURE
IN REDUNDANCY CHAIN IS LOSS OF A SECOND HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM, FOR ANY REASON.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-164
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 164
ITEM: GN2 FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: J. DURAL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 06-3A-0606-I COVERS FILTER BLOCKAGE AS PART OF GN2
SHUTOFF VALVE FAILURE MODE-FILTER IN QUESTION IS PART OF GN2
SHUTOFF VALVE. IOA ACCEPTS THIS APPROACH.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-197
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
197
HYBRID DRIVER CIRCUIT (CONTROLLER)
LEAD ANALYST : J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE (FMEA 05-6W-2208-1B) IS 3/IR, PPP BY NASA
BASELINE PRESENTED TO NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW BOARD ON 3/30/88.
IOA CONCURS WITH THIS CRITICALITY-SWITCHING CONTROLLERS WILL
REGAIN GN2 SHUTOFF VALVE CONTROL. SCREEN B IS ACCEPTABLE AS P,
RATHER THAN NA. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT CIL OR WAIVER
STATUS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-431
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
431
PRESS ACTIVATED RELIEF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS VALVE FUNCTION IS NOT REQUIRED UNLESS HYD LINE IS BLOCKED.
IN THAT CASE, LINE BLOCKAGE IS THE CAUSE OF HYDRAULIC LOSS, AND
THE CIRC PUMP IS IRRELEVANT. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DECISION TO
OMIT THIS FAILURE MODE. CRITICALITY WOULD BE 3/3, IF IT WERE
INCLUDED.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-439
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-E27
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDACID: 439
ITEM: FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE, ACCORDING TO
HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL (IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES
REVIEW MEETING, 4/26/88). IOA CONCURS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-451
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A02-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
451
QUICK DISCONNECT-HYD/SSME(SUPPLY)
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY. LOSS OF TWO Q. D.'S ON TWO
HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS STILL ALLOWS RTLS ABORT, IN WORST CASE. FMEA
02-6-A02-I IS I/I BECAUSE ENGINE VALVES DO NOT LOCK UP IN THIS
CASE-UNCONTROLLED FUEL/OXIDIZER MIXTURE CAN LEAD TO SSME
CATASTROPHIC FAILURE. THIS ISSUE WAS WITHDRAWN AS A RESULT OF
MEETING WITH NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL ON 4/26/88.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
HYDWSB-455
02-6-A07-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
HYD/WSB
455
CHECK VALVE-RETURN LINE FROM ENG'S/ACT'S
W. DAVIDSON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY. SECOND FAILURE IS HYD
LINE LEAK UPSTREAM OF VALVE. THIRD FAILURE IS LOSS OF A SECOND
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM, FOR ANY REASON.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-465
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM"
HYD/WSB
465
HYDRAULIC LINE (SUPPLY) SYSTEM1
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LINE RUPTURE IS DETECTIBLE WHEN L. G. ISOL VALVE 1 IS OPENED.
FLIGHT CREW CAN TAKE ACTION TO MANAGE LEAK. THIS IS
JUSTIFICATION FOR PASSING SCREEN B, ACCORDING TO SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL (IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING,
4/26/88).
IOA CONCURS WITH THIS REASONING.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-466
NASA FMEA#: 02-6-SYSTEM-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
466
HYDRAULICLINE (RETURN) SYSTEM1
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CRITICALITY IS BASED ON WORST CASE CONSEQUENCES OF A
HYDRAULIC LINE RUPTURE. IOA ACCEPTS THIS APPROACH. THERE IS NO
NEED TO CONSIDER SEPARATE FMEA'S FOR LINE SEGMENTS WITH LESS
SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-469
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G04-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
469
REDUNDANT SHUTOFF VALVE (N.O.)
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA ORIGINAL CRITICALITY WAS BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT
THE PYRO UNLOCK MECHANISM CANNOT OVERRIDE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
LOCKUP. IN ACTUALITY, THERE IS NO HYDRAULIC PRESSURE LOCKUP.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY. SCREEN B IS PASSED,
ACCORDING TO NASA BASELINE DOCUMENTED IN NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW
BOARD PRESENTATION, 3/30/88. IOA CONCURS-REDUNDANCY (PRYO
SYSTEM) IS ACTIVATED BY AUTOMATIC DETECTION AND SWITCHOVER, PER
NSTS-22206, SECTION 2.3.5.a.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-471
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
471
REDUNDANTSHUTOFFVALVE (N.O.)
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VALVE LEAK IS DETECTIBLE WHEN L. G. ISOL VALVE 1 IS OPENED.
FLIGHT CREW CAN TAKE ACTION TO MANAGE LEAK. THIS IS
JUSTIFICATION FOR PASSING SCREEN B, ACCORDING TO SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL (IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING,
4/26/88). IOA CONCURS WITH THIS REASONING.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-486
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-G13-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
486
LANDING GEAR CONTROL UP/CIRC. SOLENOID VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ORIGINAL IOA CRITICALITY WAS BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT
THE PYRO UNLOCK MECHANISM CANNOT OVERRIDE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
LOCKUP. IN ACTUALITY, THERE IS NO HYDRAULIC PRESSURE LOCKUP.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA 3/IR CRITICALITY. SCREEN B IS PASSED,
ACCORDING TO NASA BASELINE DOCUMENTED IN NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW
BOARD PRESENTATION, 3/30/88. IOA CONCURS; VALVE FAILURE IS
DETECTIBLE AT L. G. ISOL VALVE OPEN, DUE TO CLOSURE OF SHUTTLE
VALVES (ON TELEMETRY). DETECTION AT L. G. ISOL VALVE OPEN IS
SUFFICIENT TO PASS SCREEN B, ACCORDING TO SSM WALLACE TUTHILL
(IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING, 4/26/88).
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-487
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
487
LANDING GEARCONTROLUP/CIRC. SOLENOID VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DELETED FMEA 02-6-G13-3. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS DECISION.
THIS VALVE REMAINS CLOSED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE FLIGHT, SO IT
CANNOT FAIL TO CLOSE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-489
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
489
LANDING GEAR CONTROL UP/CIRC SOLENOID VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VALVE LEAK IS DETECTIBLE WHEN L. G. ISOL VALVE 1 IS OPENED.
FLIGHT CREW CAN TAKE ACTION TO MANAGE LEAK. THIS IS
JUSTIFICATION FOR PASSING SCREEN B, (ACCORDING TO SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL (IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING,
4/26/88). IOA CONCURS WITH THIS REASONING.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-494
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SOLENOID
HYD/WSB
494
LANDING GEARCONTROLVALVE - 2 POS, 3 WAY,
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VALVE LEAK IS DETECTIBLE WHEN L. G. ISOL VALVE 1 IS OPENED.
FLIGHT CREW CAN TAKE ACTION TO MANAGE LEAK. THIS IS
JUSTIFICATION FOR PASSING SCREEN B, (ACCORDING TO SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL (IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING,
4/26/88). IOA CONCURS WITH THIS REASONING.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-671
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-Ci0-2
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDACID: 671
ITEM: CHECKVALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CRITICALITY IS BASED ON POSSIBLITY THAT LOSS OF 2 ACTUATORS
COULD CAUSE E. T. UMBILICAL PLATE TO BECOME MISALIGNED AND FAIL
TO RETRACT PROPERLY, RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. IOA CONCURS.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-672
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-CI0-I
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDACID: 672
ITEM: CHECKVALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY. SECOND FAILURE IS
HYDRAULIC LEAK UPSTREAM OF CHECK VALVE. THIRD FAILURE IS LOSS OF
ANOTHER HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FOR ANY REASON. IOA CONCURS WITH SCREEN
B INAPPLICABILITY, PER NSTS-22206, SECTION 2.3.4.b.2(b).
SYSTEM IS NOT OPERATIVE DURING ANY NORMAL MISSION PHASE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-724
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
724
FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE IS COVERED IN ATCS SUBSYSTEM, FMEA 06-3-0301-3.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-817
NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2114-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
817
POWERCONTACTOR(K3, K4)
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO CONTROL POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE CIRC PUMP AT
APU START OR DURING APU OPERATION. THIRD FAILURE IS LOSS OF
ANOTHER CIRC PUMP FOR ANY REASON, WHICH CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF
VEHICLE. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-818
NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
818
HYBRID DRIVER (K3), AR TYPE III
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CIL
ITEM
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT DRIVERS MEANS LOSS OF ONE CIRC PUMP AT APU
START OR DURING APU OPERATION. NEXT FAILURE IS LOSS OF A SECOND
CIRC PUMP FOR ANY REASON, WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AS A
CONSEQUENCE. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-821
NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-2110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
821
HYBRID DRIVER (K4), AR TYPE III
LEAD ANALYST: W.E. PARKMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
[ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT DRIVERS MEANS LOSS OF ONE CIRC PUMP AT APU
START OR DURING APU OPERATION. NEXT FAILURE IS LOSS OF A SECOND
CIRC PUMP FOR ANY REASON, WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AS A
CONSEQUENCE. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.9-27
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-850
NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-1E
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDACID: 850
ITEM: RPC
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ASSESSMENT. THIS FAILURE MODE IS NOT A CIL
ITEM IN THE NASA BASELINE AS DOCUMENTED IN THE NSTS LEVEL I/II
REVIEW BOARD PRESENTATION OF 3/30/88.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 9-28
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-1771X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2051-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
1771
BOILER CONTROLPOWER/HEATERSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA CRITICALITY FOR THIS FAILURE MODE IS 3/3 AS DOCUMENTED IN
THE NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW BOARD PRESENTATION OF 3/30/88, AND IT
IS NOT LISTED AS A CIL ITEM. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 9-29
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-5001X
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C06-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LINE
HYD/WSB
5001
VALVE, CHECK, L.G. HYD. CKT. FUSELAGERETURN
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P 3 [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO REDUNDANCY: THIRD FAILURE IS LOSS OF
ANOTHER HYDRAULIC SYSTEM, FOR ANY REASON.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.9-30
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/10/88
ASSESSMENTID: HYDWSB-8005X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-00100-1B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
HYD/WSB
8OO5
DIODE, HYD MN PUMPDEPRESSVLV SOL CKT.
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE IS INCLUDED IN THE NASA FMEA/CIL BASELINE AS
DOCUMENTED IN THE NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW BOARD PRESENTATION OF
3/30/88, WITH CRITICALITY 3/IR P F P. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
ASSESSMENT.
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SECTION C.lO
MECHANICALACTUATIONSUBSYSTEM
C. i0-i
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-II02
NASA FMEA #: 02-4-052000-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDACID: 1102
ITEM: GEARBOX
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-II02A
NASA FMEA #: 02-4-052000-5
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1102
ITEM: GEARBOX
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-II02B
NASA FMEA #: 02-4-052000-6
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDACID: 1102
ITEM: GEARBOX
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-II03
NASA FMEA #: 02-4-052000-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1103
ITEM: GEARBOX
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-II03A
NASA FMEA #: 02-4-052000-5
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1103
ITEM: GEARBOX
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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mAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-II03B
NASA FMEA #: 02-4-052000-6
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: ll03
ITEM: GEARBOX
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-II04
NASA FMEA #: 02-4-054000-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDACID: 1104
ITEM: PRESSURELINE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-II05
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1105
ITEM: PROBE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-9
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-II06
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1106
ITEM: PROBE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-II07
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1107
ITEM: SHAFT
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-ii
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP-II08
MECH/ADP
1108
SHAFT
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-II09
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP
1109
DEPLOYMICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-III0
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP
IIi0
DEPLOYMICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-IIII
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP
llll
STOWMICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-III2
MECH/ADP
1112
STOWMICROSWITCH
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1500A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1500
+28V CONTACT#1
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1500
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1500
+28V CONTACT#i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1501A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1501
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1501
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1501
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1502A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1502
+28V CONTACT#2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1502
05-6EE-2002-2
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1502
+28V CONTACT #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p] [ F] [ p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1503A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1503
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-23
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP-1503
05-6EE-2002-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1503
+28V CONTACT #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
IN] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[p]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1504A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1504
+28V CONTACT#3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR J [ P ] [ F ] [ P J [ X J
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-25
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1504
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1504
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-26
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1505A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1505
÷28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-27
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1505
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1505
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ S ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP-1506A
05-6EE-2002-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1506
+28V CONTACT #4
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [ F]
IN] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[p]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1506
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1506
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1507A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1507
+28V CONTACT#4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1507
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1507
+28V CONTACT#4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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wAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1508A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1508
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1508
05-6EE-2002-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1508
+28V CONTACT #I
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1509A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1509
+28V CONTACT#i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1509
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1509
+28V CONTACT#I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1510A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1510
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1510
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1510
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1511A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1511
+28V CONTACT#2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1511
05-6EE-2002-2
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1511
+28V CONTACT #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1512A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1512
+28V CONTACT#3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1512
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1512
+28V CONTACT#3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ _ [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1513A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1513
+28V CONTACT#3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1513
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1513
+28V CONTACT#3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1514A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1514
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1514
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1514
+28V CONTACT#4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1515A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1515
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1515
05-6EE-2002-2
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1515
+28V CONTACT #4
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1516A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1516
+28V CONTACT#i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1516
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1516
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1517A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1517
+28V CONTACT#I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1517
05-6EE-2002-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1517
+28V CONTACT#I
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1518A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1518
+28V CONTACT#2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1518
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1518
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1519A
05-6EE-2002-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1519
+28V CONTACT #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1519
05-6EE-2002-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1519
+28V CONTACT#2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1520A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1520
+28V CONTACT#3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1520
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1520
+28V CONTACT#3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1521A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1521
+28V CONTACT#3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ClL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1521
05-6EE-2002-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1521
+28V CONTACT#3
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1522A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1522
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1522
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1522
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1523A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1523
+28V CONTACT#4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1523
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1523
+28V CONTACT#4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1532A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1532
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1532
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1532
+28V CONTACT#i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP-1533
05-6EE-2002-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1533
+28V CONTACT #i
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
IN] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP-1533A
05-6EE-2002-1
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1534
+28V CONTACT #i
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1534A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1534
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1534
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1534
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1535A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1535
+28V CONTACT#2
LEAD ANALYST: A°D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1535
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1535
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1536A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1536
+28V CONTACT#3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1536
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1536
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1537A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1537
+28V CONTACT#3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ClL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1537
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM'.
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1537
+28V CONTACT#3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] _ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1538A
05-6EE-2002-I
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1538
+28V CONTACT #4
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP-1538
05-6EE-2002-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1538
+28V CONTACT #4
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] IF]
IN] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[p]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1539A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1539
+28V CONTACT#4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1539
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1539
+28V CONTACT#4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1540A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1540
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1540
05-6EE-2002-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1540
+28V CONTACT #I
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1541A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1541
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1541
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1541
+28V CONTACT#I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1542A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1542
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1542
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1542
+28V CONTACT#2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ] ......
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1543A
NASA FMEA#: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1543
+28V CONTACT#2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [i/I] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [X]*IX]
COMP_E [ N/N j [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1543
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1543
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1544A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1544
+28V CONTACT#3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1544
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1544
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1545A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1545
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP-1545
05-6EE-2002-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1545
+28V CONTACT #3
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] IF]
IN] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
IOA/MDAC.
[ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1546A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1546
+28V CONTACT#4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-93
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1546
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1546
+28V CONTACT#4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-94
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1547A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1547
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
I OA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-95
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1547
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1547
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-96
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1548A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1548
+28V CONTACT#i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-97
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1548
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1548
+28V CONTACT#I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1549A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1549
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-99
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1549
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1549
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.10-100
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1550A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1550
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1550
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1550
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-I02
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1551A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1551
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-I03
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1551
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1551
+28V CONTACT#2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-I04
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1552A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1552
+28V CONTACT#3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-I05
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1552
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1552
+28V CONTACT#3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-I06
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1553A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1553
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[
[
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] IX] *
] IX]
] E ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
IOA/MDAC.
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-I07
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1553
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1553
+28V CONTACT#3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-I08
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1554A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1554
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-I09
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP-1554
05-6EE-2002-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1554
+28V CONTACT #4
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] IF]
IN] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
IOA/MDAC.
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.10-110
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1555A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1555
+28V CONTACT#4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1555
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1555
+28V CONTACT#4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1556
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1556
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [ P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-i13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1557
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1557
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-i14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1558
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1558
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-I15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1559
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1559
+28V CONTACT#2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-i16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1560
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC!D:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1560
CONTACT#i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-I17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1561
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1561
CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1562
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1562
CONTACT#2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1563
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1563
CONTACT#2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A S C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1589
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2017-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDACID: 1589
ITEM: AND GATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1591
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2017-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1591
TIME DELAY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1593
05-6EE-2017-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1593
SOLID STATE DRIVER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1595
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2016-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1595
REMOTEPOWERCONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1597
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2016-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1597
REMOTEPOWERCONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/22/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1600
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2015-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1600
SWITCH RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/22/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1602
05-6EE-2015-2
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1602
LATCH RELAY
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1604
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1604
EMI FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1605
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1605
EMI FILTER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1606
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1606
ITEM: OP AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1607
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1607
ITEM: OP AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1608
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1608
REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1609
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1609
REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[X]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1610
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1610
GENERATOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [ F] [ P]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1611
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1611
GENERATOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1612
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1612
ITEM: CLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1613
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1613
ITEM: CLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1614
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1614
+Q TRANSISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] .
] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1615
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1615
+Q TRANSISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1616
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1616
-Q TRANSISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. T_E
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1617
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1617
-Q TRANSISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1618
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1618
TRANSFORMER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 J [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
E ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP-1619
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1619
TRANSFORMER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1620
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM"
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1620
+10V AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1621
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1621
+I0V AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1622
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1622
-10V AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT".
MECH/ADP-1623
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1623
-10V AMP
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1624
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1624
+IOV TRANSISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1625
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1625
+I0V TRANSISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1626
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1626
-10V TRANSISTOR
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
Ix]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1627
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1627
-10V TRANSISTOR
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [F] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1628
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1628
POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1629
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1629
POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1630
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1630
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ADP-1631
05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1631
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1632
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1632
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1633
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1633
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /ZR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1634
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1634
THERMISTER THERMOMETER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 13 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE E / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1635
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1635
THERMISTER THERMOMETER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1636
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1636
FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1637
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1637
FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1638
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1638
CONTROL CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-162
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1639
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1639
CONTROL CIRCUIT
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1640
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1640
READ ONLY MEMORY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1641
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1641
READ ONLY MEMORY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1642
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1642
TRANSDUCER TEMP AMP
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-1643
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1643
TRANSDUCER TEMP AMP
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ADP-1644
05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1644
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1645
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1645
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1646
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1646
TRANSISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1647
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1647
TRANSISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1648
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1648
ITEM: AND GATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOAIMDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1649
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1649
ITEM: AND GATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1650
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1650
SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1651
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1651
SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. i0-175
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1652
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1652
BINARY COUNTER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1653
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1653
BINARY COUNTER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1654
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1654
ADDRESSABLE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 3 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1655
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1655
ADDRESSABLE SWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1656
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1656
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1657
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDACID: 1657
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1658
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1658
SWITCHING LADDER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1659
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1659
SWITCHING LADDER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1660.
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1660
POLARITY DETECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1661
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1661
POLARITY DETECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] E p ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-185
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1662
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1662
CONTROL LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1663
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1663
CONTROL LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1664
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1664
REGISTER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1665
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1665
ITEM: REGISTER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1666
05-6EE-2014-1
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1666
DISCREET INPUT BUFFER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [El [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-190
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1667
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1667
DISCREET INPUT BUFFER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-191
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1668
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1668
SERIAL/PARALLEL CONVERTER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-192
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1669
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1669
SERIAL/PARALLEL CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-193
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1670
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1670
OSCILLATOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-194
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1671
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1671
OSCILLATOR
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-195
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1672
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1672
2 MH2 CLOCK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-196
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1673
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1673
2 MH2 CLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-197
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1674
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1674
1 MH2 CLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-198
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOa [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1675
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1675
1 MH2 CLOCK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
IN] IN]
C
C ]
[P]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.10-199
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1676
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1676
500 MH2 CLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N [X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-200
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1677
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1677
5O0 MH2 CLOCK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[N] [N] [N] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-201
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1678
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1678
ITEM: COUNTER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-202
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1679
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1679
ITEM: COUNTER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-203
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1680
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1680
ITEM: OR GATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-204
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1681
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1681
OR GATE
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] [N]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-205
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1682
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1682
SENSOR WINDOW GENERATOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-206
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1683
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1683
SENSOR WINDOW GENERATOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1684
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1684
BUFFER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [F] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-208
I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1685
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1685
ITEM: BUFFER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-209
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1686
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1686
OUTPUT CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT".
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1687
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1687
OUTPUT CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-211
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1688
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1688
ITEM: ENCODER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ADP-1689
05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1689
ITEM: ENCODER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-213
L__
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ADP-1690
05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1690
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1691
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1691
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1692
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1692
CPU
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
IN] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1693
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1693
CPU
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[p] [F]
IN] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1694
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1694
SELECTOR LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1695
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1695
SELECTOR LOGIC
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[N] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1696
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1696
READ ONLY MEMORY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1697
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1697
ROM
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1698
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1698
READ/WRITE MEMORY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ _ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1699
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1699
READ/WRITE MEMORY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ESP-2106
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ESP
MDAC ID: 2106
ITEM: ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 100-105 (WASHER,
BUSHING, NUT, COTTER PIN, SAFETY WIRE, ETC)
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/OS-2500
01-4-CS12-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2500
ENVIRONMENTAL BARRIER
H. J. LOWERY
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ x] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/OS-2501
01-4-CSI-I
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2501
SEALS, WINDOW PANE ASSEMBLY
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2502
01-4-CS3-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2502
SEALS, WINDOW ASSEMBLY SPACER/RETAINER
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2503
01-4-CS4-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2503
SEALS, WINDOW ASSEMBLY INSTALLATION
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[F] [F] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2504
01-4-CS13-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2504
SEALS, MANUFACTURING ACCESS PANEL
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2505
01-4-CS15-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2505
SEAL, FEED THROUGH PLATES, BULKHEADS
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2506
01-4-CS17-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2506
SEAL ELECTRICAL FEEDTHROUGH CONNECTOR
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2507
01-4-CSl8-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
01-4-CS18-I
2507
SEALS, HARD LINE FEED THROUGH FITTING
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/OS-2508
01-4-CS19-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: 01-4-CS19-I
MDAC ID: 2508
ITEM: SEALS, CREW MODULE, ETS FEEDTHOUGH BLANKING
PLUGS (OV-102 ONLY)
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/OS-2509
01-4-CS20-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW E x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2509
SEALS, AIRLOCK HATCH "A" AND "B" WINDOWS
LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2510
01-4-CS22-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2510
SEALS, INNER PANES, SIDE HATCH WINDOW
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] E ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2511
01-4-CS24-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
01-4-CS24-I
2511
SEAL, SIDE HATCH WINDOW ASSEMBLY
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-236
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2512
01-4-CS25-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2512
SEALS, AIRLOCK AND INGRESS/EGRESS HATCHES
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[N] [N] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-237
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2513
01-4-CS28-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2513
SEALS, TUNNEL/CREW MODULE STRUCTURAL INTERFACE
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-238
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2514
01-4-CS29-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2514
SEALS, SIDE HATCH TUNNEL SEPARATION PLANE
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] C ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-239
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2515
01-4-CS30-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2515
SEALS, AIRLOCK TO BULKHEAD STRUCTURAL INTERFACE
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, I0A HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-240
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2516
01-4-CS31-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2516
SEAL, BULKHEAD FEED THROUGH, WCCS LINES
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
C ] [ ] C ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-241
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2517
01-4-CS32-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2517
SEAL, LATCH ACTUATOR TO HATCH STRUCTURE
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-242
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2518
01-4-CS34-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2518
SEAL, CREW MODULE, ETS PYRO LINE FITTINGS
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-243
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/OS-2519
01-4-CS35-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OVERHEAD PANEL (OV-102 ONLY)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2519
SEAL, CREW MODULE, FLIGHT DECK "BEANIE CAP"
LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-244
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/OS-2520
01-4-CS39-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2520
ITEM: SEALS, STAR TRACKER BOOM COLLAR STRUCTURAL
ATTACH AND COVER PLATE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-245
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/OS-2521
01-4-CS40-I
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2521
SEAL, STAR TRACKER BOOM
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-246
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/OS-2522
01-4-CS43-I
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2522
SEAL, STAR TRACKER WELL TO CREW MODULE STRUCTURE
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-247
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/OS-2523
01-4-CS44-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2523
ITEM: SEAL, AFT BULKHEAD-POSITIVE PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVES, BLEED VALVES & LEFT HAND SIDE-NEGATIVE PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVES.
LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-248
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2524
01-4-CS46-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2524
SEAL, VENT SEVERANCE PANEL
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-249
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/OS-2525
01-4-CS47-I
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2525
SEALS, SIDE HATCH CABIN FILL TEST PORT
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-250
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE :
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/OS-2526
01-4-CS48-I
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2526
ITEM: SEAL, AIR EQUALIZATION VALVES AND PRESSURE GAUGE
TO HATCH STRUCTURE, AIRLOCK HATCHES
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-251
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/OS-2527
01-4-CS49-I
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2527
SEAL, AFT BULKHEAD-VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-252
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/OS-2528
01-4-CS51-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2528
SEAL, TEST PORT CAP, CABIN FILL, SIDE HATCH
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] [N] [N]
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-253
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/OS-2529
01-4-CS52-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
2529
SEAL, FEED THROUGH PLATE, AIRLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-254
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/MS-2700
02-3A-A2-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
2700
DEBRIS CONTAINER, AFT ATTACH
R. O'DONNELL
NASA [ i /1 ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-255
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/MS-2701
02-3A-U2-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
2701
DEBRIS CONTAINER, UMBILICAL SEPARATION SYSTEM
R. O'DONNELL
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/MS-2702
NASA FMEA #: 02-3A-F4-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
2702
SPHERICAL BEARING, ORBITER/ET FORWARD ATTACH
LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/MS-2703
02-3A-A5-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
2703
BOLT, AFT ATTACH
R. O'DONNELL
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ] [
IOA [ / ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [
MECH/MS-2704
02-3A-U3-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
2704
STUD, UMBILICAL ATTACH
R. O'DONNELL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
CIL
ITEM
] [N]
B C
] [ ] [ ] [x]*
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/MS-2705
NASA FMEA #: 02-3A-A7-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
2705
HOLE PLUGGER/COVER ASSY, ORBITER/ET AFT ATTACH
LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/MS-2706
NASA FMEA #: 02-3A-U6-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
2706
UMBILICAL CLOSEOUT CURTAIN
LEAD ANALYST: R. 0 'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID :
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/MS-2707
02-3A-U8-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
2707
ELECTRICAL DISCONNECT ASSEMBLY, UMBILICAL
R. O'DONNELL
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/MS-2708
NASA FMEA #: 02-3A-US-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
2708
ELECTRICAL DISCONNECT ASSEMBLY, UMBILICAL
LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/MS-2709
02-3A-U7-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
2709
SIDE RESTRAINT STRUT, UMBILICAL
R. O'DONNELL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3102
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ETUD
3102
CENTERLINE MOTOR CLUTCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ETU-3110
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECHIETUD
3110
CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-266
APPENDIX C
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3112
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ETUD
3112
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CLUTCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3 I18
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ETUD
3118
DOOR LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] _ [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ETU-3125
MECH/ETUD
3125
DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SWITCH
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [
[ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] *
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ETU- 314 4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/ETUD
3144
READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ETU-3504
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3504
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETU-3511
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3511
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3512
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3512
ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERENO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3513
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3513
ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3514
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3514
ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FME #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETU- 3515
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3515
CONTROL BUS FUSE
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
IN] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETU-3516
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3516
MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
C ]
[ P ]
CN]
J. BACHER
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3517
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3517
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ETU-3518
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3518
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3519
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3519
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ETU-3520
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3520
HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: _If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMEMTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3521
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3521
HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMEMTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3524
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3524
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ETU-3525
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3525
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] CN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3526
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3526
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT-.
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-285
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3527
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3527
FUSE, IA, TO ACTUATOR STATUS SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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mAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETU-3528
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3528
RESISTOR, 1.2K, TO MCA LOGIC SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3529
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3529
RESISTOR, 1.2K, TO MCA LOGIC SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[N] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4 i01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/KBD
4101
GUILLOTINE/PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
H. J. LOWERY
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4102
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/KBD
4102
GUILLOTINE/PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
H.J. LOWERY
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4103
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4103
ITEM: NUT/BREECH
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-291
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECN/KBD-4104
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4104
ITEM: NUT/BREECH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
H.J. LOWERY
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4105
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD
4105
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4106
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/KBD
4106
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4107
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD
4107
STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 2) ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4108
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD
4108
STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (Sl & 2) ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-296
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4 i09
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD
4109
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES (S5 & 6)
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4110
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD
4110
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES (S5 & 6)
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4111
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD
4111
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
H.J. LOWERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4 i12
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD
4112
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4113
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD
4113
ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 4101 - 4112
LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4500
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4500
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4501
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4501
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4501A
05-6EH-56060-3
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4501
+28V CONTACT #i
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4502
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4502
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4503
05-6EH-56060-I
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4503
+28V CONTACT #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4503A
NASA FMEA # : 05-6EH-56060-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4503
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4504
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4504
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4505
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4505
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4505A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4505
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4506
05-6EH-56060-6
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4506
+28V CONTACT #4
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4507
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4507
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4507A
05-6EH-56060-3
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4507
+28V CONTACT #4
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4508
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4508
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-314
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4509
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4509
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4509A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4509
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-45 i0
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4510
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4511
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4511
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4511A
05-6EH-56060-3
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4511
+28V CONTACT #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
F LIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A S C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4512
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4512
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4513
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4513
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4513A
05-6EH-56060-3
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4513
+28V CONTACT #3
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-322
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4514
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4514
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4515
NASA FMEA # : 05-6EH-56060-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4515
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4515A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4515
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4516
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4516
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4517
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4517
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4517A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4517
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-328
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4518
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4518
+28V CONTACT#2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4519
05-6EH-56000-I
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4519
+28V CONTACT #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4519A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4519
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
MECH/KBD-4520
05-6EH-56000-4
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4520
+28V CONTACT #3
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[P]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ F ]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-332
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4521
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4521
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4521A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4521
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4522
05-6EH-56000-4
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4522
+28V CONTACT #4
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4523
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4523
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM :
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4523A
05-6EH-56000-3
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4523
+28V CONTACT #4
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4524
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4524
+28V CONTACT #1
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4525
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4525
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4525A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4525
+28V CONTACT #1
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELES)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4526
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4526
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
ZOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ _ [ x ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE : 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4527
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4527
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4527A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4527
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ClL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-343
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4528
05-6EH-56000-4
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4528
+28V CONTACT #3
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4529
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4529
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4529A
05-6EH-56000-3
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4529
+28V CONTACT #3
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4530
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4530
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4531
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4531
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4531A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4531
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-349
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4532
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4532
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-350
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4533
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4533
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / J [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4533A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4533
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-352
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4534
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4534
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4535
05-6EH-56000-I
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4535
+28V CONTACT #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-354
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4535A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4535
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. i0-355
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4536
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4536
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-356
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4537
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4537
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4537A
05-6EH-56000-3
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4537
+28V CONTACT #3
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-358
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4538
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4538
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4539
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4539
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-360
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4539A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4539
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD-4540
05-6EH-56000-I
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4540
TALKBACK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[N] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD-4540A
05-6EH-56000-3
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4540
TALKBACK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YS TEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4541
05-6EH-56000-I
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4541
TALKBACK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CN] IN] IN]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4541A
05-6EH-56000-3
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4541
TALKBACK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4542
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4542
TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-366
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4542A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4542
TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4543
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4543
AND GATE #1
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4544
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4544
AND GATE #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4545
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4545
AND GATE #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-370
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4546
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4546
AND GATE #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /_ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-371
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4548
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4548
AND GATE #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4550
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4550
AND GATE #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-373
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4551
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4551
ITEM: AMP #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-374
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD-4552
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4552
AMP #i
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
IN] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IS GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-375
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4553
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4553
ITEM: AMP #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-376
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4554
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4554
ITEM: AMP #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-377
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4556
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4556
ITEM: AMP #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-378
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4558
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4558
ITEM: AMP #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-379
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/KBD-4559
05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4559
ITEM: KI4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-380
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4560
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4560
ITEM: KI4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMIANING ISSUES BY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-381
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4561
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4561
ITEM: K68
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-382
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4562
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4562
ITEM: K68
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-383
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/KBD-4564
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4564
ITEM: K72
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.10-384
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4566
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4566
ITEM: K70
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-385
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4567
05-6EH-56021-2
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4567
STOW MICROSWITCH #I
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-386
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4568
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4568
STOW MICROSWITCH #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-387
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4570
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4570
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-388
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4571
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4571
AND GATE #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-389
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4572
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4572
AND GATE #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NO
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINIG ISSUES MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUES IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-390
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4573
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4573
AND GATE #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-391
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4573A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4573
AND GATE #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /!R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-392
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4576
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4576
AND GATE #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-393
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4578
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4578
AND GATE #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [ F] [ p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-394
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4579
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4579
ITEM: AMP #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-395
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD-4580
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4580
AMP #i
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] IF]
IN] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-396
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4581
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4581
ITEM: AMP #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-397
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/KBD-4582
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4582
ITEM: AMP #2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [F] [P]
[N] [N] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-398
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4584
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4584
ITEM: AMP #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-399
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4586
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4586
ITEM: AMP #2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-400
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/KBD-4587
05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4587
ITEM: K25
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-401
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4588
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4588
ITEM: K25
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-402
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4589
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4589
ITEM: K2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[P] IX]*
[P] IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-403
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4591
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4591
K2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
E ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] [N] [N]
[ ] *
E ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-404
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4593
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4593
ITEM: K27
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-405
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4595
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4595
K37
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-406
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4596
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4596
STOW MICROSWITCH #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.10-407
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD-4597
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4597
STOW MICROSWITCH #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-408
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4599
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YS TEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4599
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ J C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-409
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4600
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4600
+28V CONTACT #I
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-410
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4601
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4601
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-411
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4602
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4602
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-412
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4603
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4603
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-413
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4604
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4604
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-414
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4605
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4605
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-415
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4606
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4606
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-416
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4607
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4607
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-417
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4608
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4608
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. i0-418
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4609
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4609
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FME/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4610
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4610
+28V CONTACT #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4611
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4611
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4612
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4612
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ _ /_ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4613
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4613
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4614
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4614
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4615
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4615
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ _ [ ] [ _ [ J
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4616
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4616
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4617
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4617
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4618
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4618
+28V CONTACT #2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4619
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4619
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4620
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4620
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4621
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4621
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4622
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4622
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4623
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4623
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i-
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-433
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4624
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4624
AND GATE #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4625
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4625
AND GATE #i
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[_] CN] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4626
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM-.
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4626
AND GATE #2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4627
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4627
AND GATE #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4628
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4628
40 MS TIME DELAY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4629
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4629
40 MS TIME DELAY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/KBD-4630
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4630
ITEM: AMP #I
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4631
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4631
ITEM: AMP #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4632
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4632
AND GATE #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.10-442
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4633
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4633
AND GATE #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-443
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4634
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4634
4 SECOND TIME DELAY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.10-444
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD-4635
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4635
4 SECOND TIME DELAY
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-445
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4636
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4636
ITEM: AMP #3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-446
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4637
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4637
ITEM: AMP #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-447
kAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4638
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4638
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-448
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4639
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4639
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-449
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4640
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECHIKBD/EPD&C
4640
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-450
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4641
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4641
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-451
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4642
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4642
AND GATE #i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-452
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4643
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
ITEM :
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4643
AND GATE #i
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-453
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4644
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4644
AND GATE #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-454
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4645
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4645
AND GATE #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-455
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4646
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4646
40 MS TIME DELAY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-456
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4647
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4647
40 MS TIME DELAY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-457
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4648
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4648
ITEM: AMP #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. i0-458
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4649
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4649
ITEM: AMP #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-459
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4650
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4650
AND GATE #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-460
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4651
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4651
AND GATE #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-461
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4652
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4652
4 SECOND TIME DELAY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-462
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4653
NASA [ / ]
IOa [ S /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4653
4 SECOND TIME DELAY
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-463
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4654
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4654
ITEM: AMP #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-464
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4655
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4655
ITEM: AMP #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-465
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4656
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4656
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-466
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4657
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4657
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
MECH/KBD-4658
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4658
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4659
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4659
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4660
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4660
ITEM: AMP #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-470
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4661
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4661
ITEM: AMP #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-471
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4662
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4662
ITEM: AMP #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/KBD-4663
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4663
ITEM: AMP #2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4664
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4664
CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4665
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4665
CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4666
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4666
INVERTED AND GATE
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE MOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4667
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4667
INVERTED AND GATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-477
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4668
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4668
CAPACITOR BANK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4669
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4669
CAPACITOR BANK
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4670
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4670
AND GATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4671
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4671
AND GATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4672
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4672
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-482
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4673
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4673
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4674
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4674
TEST LOGIC
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] E ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4675
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4675
TEST LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD-4676
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4676
CONVERTER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
IN] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4677
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4677
CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4678
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4678
INVERTED AND GATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4679
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4679
INVERTED AND GATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4680
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4680
CAPACITOR BANK
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-490
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4681
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4681
CAPACITOR BANK
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4682
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4682
ITEM: AND GATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUAE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD-4683
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4683
AND GATE
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] IF]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If&a2808Happlicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/KBD-4684
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4684
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4685
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDACID: 4685
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-495
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4686
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4686
TEST LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD-4687
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4687
TEST LOGIC
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/PBD-5103
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/PBD
5103
CENTERLINE/BULKHEADLATCH MOTORCLUTCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5116
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD
5116
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-499 " _
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5117
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD
5117
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBD-5118
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD
5118
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/PBD-5141
MECH/PBD
5141
BULKHEAD ROLLER ASSEMBLY
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5142
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/PBD
5142
BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5143
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD
5143
BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/PBD-5144
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/PBD
5144
BULKHEADREADY-TO-LATCHSWITCH MODULE
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIOALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBD-5148
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD
5148
PAYLOADBAY DOORDRIVE CLUTCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBD-5160
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
MECH/PBD
5160
PAYLOADBAY DOORDRIVE SUPPORTBEARING ASSEMBLY
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5170
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/PBD
5170
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RATIO_R%T_T-L RETENTION (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-508
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBD-5171
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/PBD
5171
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [p]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-509
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5172
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/PBD
5172
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-510
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5173
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD
5173
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-511
LAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5174
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD
5174
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-512
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5175
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD
5175
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ J [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-513
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5177
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD
5177
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR ALIGNMENT ROLLER GUIDE
LEAD ANALYST : J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-514
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBD-5178
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/PBD
5178
PAYLOADBAY DOORPASSIVE STOP
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-515
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBD-5501
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5501
CONTROLBUS 1.2K RESISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p] IF] [ P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-516
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5503
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5503
CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-517
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5506
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5506
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MECHANICAL POWER SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [p] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE _'
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-518
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5509
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5509
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-519
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5510
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5510
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-520
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5511
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5511
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-521
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5512
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5512
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETAION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-522
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5513
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5513
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-523
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5514
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5514
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY
LEAD ANALYST : J . BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-524
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5515
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5515
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-525
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBD-5516
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5516
MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-526
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5517
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5517
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-527
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/PBD-5518
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5518
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
J. BACHER
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-528
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBD-6101
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5519
REMOTEPOWERCONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-529
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBD-6102
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDACID: 6101
ITEM: MOTOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-530
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-6103
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6102
ITEM: MOTOR BRAKE
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-531
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6 i05
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-183-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6105
TORQUE LIMITER
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] E ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-532
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBR-6106
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6106
DIFFERENTIAL ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.10-533
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6109
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/PBR
6109
LIMIT SWITCHES, RELEASE (Sl),
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(s3), (s4)
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-534
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBR-6110
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6110
LIMIT SWITCHES, LATCH (S2),
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
(s3), (s4)
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-535
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6112
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-181-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6112
LATCH ROTARY ACTUATOR
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-536
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBR-6112A
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-182-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6112
LATCH ROTARYACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-537
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6202
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6202
ITEM: MOTOR BRAKE
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-538
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBR-6206
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6206
DIFFERENTIAL ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-539
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6209
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6209
LIMIT SWITCHES, DEPLOY (SI, $2, $4)
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-540
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBR-6210
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6210
LIMIT SWITCHES, STOW(SI, $2, $3)
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-541
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBR-6213
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-152-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6213
DEPLOYMENTCRANKAND LINK
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-542
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/PH-7100
02-4A-593309-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7100
ITEM: PRESSURE PORT
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ J [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] [N]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-543
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7101
NASA FMEA #: 02-4A-593309-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7101
ITEM: PRESSURE PORT
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-544
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7102
NASA FMEA #: 02-4A-593302-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7102
ITEM: 0 RING
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. i0-545
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PH-7103
NASA FMEA #: 02-4A-593302-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDACID: 7103
ITEM: 0 RING
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-546
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PH-7104
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDACID: 7104
ITEM: VIEWPORT
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-547
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7105
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7105
ITEM: VIEWPORT
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-548
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7112
NASA FMEA #: 02-4A-593202-3
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7112
ITEM: O RING
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. I0-549
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PH-7113
NASA FMEA #: 02-4A-593202-3
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDACID: 7113
ITEM: 0 RING
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-550
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MECH/PH-7114 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7114
ITEM: VIEWPORT
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
A.D. MONTGOMERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-551
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MECH/PH-7115 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7115
ITEM: VIEWPORT
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
A.D. MONTGOMERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-552
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/PH-7116
MECH/PH
7116
VIEWPORT LATCH
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-553
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MECH/PH-7117 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7117
ITEM: VIEWPORT LATCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-554
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/VDM-8109
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM
8109
ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWNON MDAC ID 8100 - 8108
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-555
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8501
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8501
ACTUATOR MOTOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-556
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8504
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8504
MCA PURGE SIGNAL DRIVER
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-557
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8505
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8505
MCA DC POWER BUS
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-558
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8506
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8506
MCA AC POWER BUS
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-559
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/VDM-8509
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8509
ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS/PINS
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-560
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/VDM-8510
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8510
CABLES/WIRING
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-561
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/VDM-8514
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDACID: 8514
ITEM: FUSE
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.i0-562
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8515
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8515
RESISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 10-563
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/VDM-8516
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8516
RESISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-564
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9102
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/SDM
9102
OPEN LIMIT SWITCHES (Sl & 3) ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASSA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-565
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9103
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/SDM
9103
STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (Sl & 3) ACTUATOR
H.J. LOWERY
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-566
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9104
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/SDM
9104
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($2 & 4)
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-567
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9105
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/SDM
9105
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES (S2 & 4)
LEAD ANALYST : H. J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-568
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9106
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/SDM
9106
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-569
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/SDM-9107
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MECH/SDM
9107
GEARTRAIN ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-570
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/SDM-9108
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/SDM
9108
ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9100-9107
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.I0-571
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/SDM-9501
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/SDM/EPD&C
9501
ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWNON MDAC ID 9500
H.J. LOWERY
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. i0-572


